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Abstract 
As power system data becomes more abundant, there is an increasing need for applications 
which can make appropriate use of this data to perform power system analysis tasks.  Data 
provides opportunities for performing event detection, diagnostics, and forensics on the system 
in a way which has not previously been possible.  The integration of data and information 
systems remains a key challenge in taking full advantage of the smart grid.   There is a need to 
―tap into the data‖ to discover relationships and to draw attention to patterns.  Opportunities are 
provided by the data to develop and perform diagnostics.  New functionality and applications in 
the smart grid can best be enabled by taking full advantage of available data.  If not resolved, the 
lack of suitable advanced data analysis capability threatens to become a barrier to developing 
new intelligent grid operation and control paradigms. This need motivates the work in this thesis.  
There remains a great deal of opportunity to advance the state of the art, especially for 
developing suitable techniques to perform automated analysis and event detection based on the 
data.  The work is presented with the anticipation of encouraging future extensions, especially 
with respect to the identification and classification of patterns in power system data. 
 
This thesis examines data mining and advanced data analysis techniques in the context of a 
number of specific power system applications.  In particular, these applications concern the use 
of model data (sensitivities) to identify relationships, the data-enhanced estimation of network 
models, event identification from oscillation monitoring data, and dealing with the challenges of 
real-world data and data quality.  Several important contributions of this work are the following.   
Analysis and results show that sensitivity and model data can be leveraged via correlation and 
cluster analysis to gain information about the expected or model-supported relationships and 
patterns in power systems. In particular, results exemplify these benefits for the areas of market 
power potential identification, coordinated control of resources, and in the creation of structure-
preserving network reductions. Results also show that a space of network reductions which 
satisfy power flow solution equivalence exists and can be further explored by choice of desirable 
constraints. Another key contribution is the realization that the expected or model-supported 
patterns can be ascertained from actual data, which is done in the form of estimating equivalent 
models and network model parameters.  Solutions are presented which highlight the benefit of 
data-over-time for estimating the structure of a reduced network model in the form of a matrix 
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representing the system structure, and at a lower-level, for estimating parameters on individual 
transmission lines from historical data. The realization is that while data facilitates these 
advanced data-centric applications, there are also barriers to the progress of such applications. 
These limitations are a function of the data itself, and arise both with respect to the noise and 
error qualities of the data as well as from a lack of adequate representation of true characteristics 
present in the data, such as load fluctuations.  Thus, it is imperative to understand, improve, and 
enhance the quality of real data.   
 
It is concluded that the ability to use and analyze real data is critical to implementing and 
advancing cutting-edge data mining solutions in power systems.  The second half of the work in 
this thesis focuses on addressing these issues.  Real data is shown to be useful for diagnosing 
problems. An oscillation monitoring event detection framework is presented, where results 
indicate that with information from nominal modes, it may be possible to correctly classify 
ringdowns to an originating event. The data quality (availability and integrity) issues are found to 
be critical to this line of work, and it is concluded that this is probably the most pressing area for 
immediate attention.  Without trusting the data, one cannot trust decisions based upon the data.  
A key contribution is to relate the data and cyber dependencies of power systems and 
demonstrate how it is possible to take advantage of available information (including from cyber 
network monitors) to flag suspicious data sensors and measurement values and then take 
appropriate action. Results show that bad data from malicious sources can be detected without 
relying upon traditional residual-based schemes.  The analysis is performed before such data is 
available to corrupt applications such as state estimation.  In summary, this work presents a 
number of contributions for the enhancement of power system applications through the use of 
data and data mining techniques.   
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1. Introduction 
The system of systems referred to as the ―smart grid‖ is a modernization of current electricity 
delivery systems that will monitor, protect, and optimize the operation of its elements.  A topic at 
the forefront of the electric power industry is the need for advanced data analysis techniques for 
power system data.  The integration of data and information systems is considered one of the key 
challenges in taking advantage of what the smart grid offers [1]. High-resolution time-
synchronized data has the potential to revolutionize the way the power grid is controlled and 
operated. Satisfying the requirements for handling the increasing amounts of data from 
measurement sources is a critical issue.  A number of new sensors have been introduced in the 
last 10-15 years, and it is expected that sensors will continue to increase in both type and 
quantity [2].  Data from sensing and measurement technologies, enabled by an interoperable 
communications and information infrastructure, can support a variety of important applications.  
The balance between factors such as cost, performance, and risk can be optimized by taking 
advantage of integrated data from sensor, communication, and information management systems. 
 
The idea of considering the data acquisition, data transmitting, and data processing together in 
the analysis of a wide area measurement system (WAMS) is important.  Emphasis must be 
placed on the WAMS as a means for efficient usage of data and dataflow to achieve a more 
secure and better strategy for the flow of electrical energy.  Data is a fundamental requirement 
for performing WAMS functions.  Consider the data flow from measurements to applications.  
The data flow begins with the devices: RTUs, SCADA, PMUs, etc.  Phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) measure and record synchronized phasor, or synchrophasor data, made possible by a 
high-accuracy clock, commonly from a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver [3].  The 1980 
paper [4] explains the use of GPS to provide a precise time source, and the 1983 paper [5] shows 
its use for accurately recording phase angles in power systems. One of the first recognized 
applications is to use precise angle measurements to improve state estimation [6].  PMUs can 
exist in a variety of devices found throughout the power system, including protective relays [7].  
With the growing deployment of PMUs, a recurring theme is how to proficiently extract 
―information‖ and ―learn‖ from data that PMUs provide [8]. 
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In the data flow process, measured data must undergo processing and communication in order to 
be used.  The end point-of-use must successfully receive the data, either raw or filtered.   After 
data is transmitted and received, it must be filtered in a data processing layer before more 
advanced data analysis, data mining, and future power systems applications can be performed.  
The data processing level currently includes energy management systems (EMS) where 
operation and control of the power grid is carried out.  Here optimization is performed to operate 
the system in a state which satisfies objectives such as minimizing cost or losses.  Current 
applications at the EMS level include state estimation, power flow, optimal power flow, and 
oscillation monitoring.  Applications require credible data.  State estimation receives significant 
focus because it often plays the role of a data filter, taking the raw measurements and producing 
data which can then be used by other applications.  Most of this thesis is concerned with the data 
processing layer.  The current grid, as well as the anticipated more intelligent grid, relies on this 
data.  Data integrity is important.  Thus, communication properties are critical.  In fact, the 
communication infrastructure of the power grid is in some ways equally important to the 
electrical infrastructure.   
 
One theme commonly expressed among professionals in the power industry is the need for 
effective ways to discover key relationships from the data and to emphasize important patterns.  
This leads to the question: How should a pattern be defined?  A pattern can be defined as the 
―opposite of chaos; it is an entity, vaguely defined, that could be given a name‖ [9]. Patterns can 
be many things including a face, a word, a speech signal, etc.  The goal of pattern recognition is 
to utilize available sensors, processers, and domain knowledge in the best possible way so that 
decisions can be made automatically [9].  Doctors diagnosing disease, pilots landing airplanes, 
and banks scoring credit applications are just a few instances where pattern recognition is 
valuable. When problems occur in the grid, it is important that the patterns representing the 
problems be identified as quickly as possible.  Then, it is important to provide feedback to 
system operators so that they can improve their control strategies.  From the perspective of 
improving grid resiliency, if it is possible to effectively identify and classify patterns in the data, 
it should also be possible to better recognize what is occurring, and act appropriately.   
Specifically, there is a need to ―tap into the data‖ [2] for diagnostics, performance assessment, 
etc.  There is also a need to develop and enhance computational capabilities to deal with large 
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volumes of data and algorithms to interpret the data and convert it into information that can be 
acted upon.  The smart grid can best enable new functionality and advanced applications if we 
take advantage of a wide range of systems which can provide valuable information and then 
manage the data effectively.  
 
The term ―data mining‖ (like ―smart grid‖) encompasses an entire genre of definitions, and hence 
can be a dangerously ambiguous problem.  There are many challenges: What are the ―patterns‖ 
we seek, how do we find them, how do we analyze them, and what do they tell us? Certainly, 
many different disciplines have a need to solve some variants of the problem of extracting useful 
information from data.  Independent efforts in numerous disciplines, unfortunately, tend to be 
highly specific to a particular problem.  It has since been recognized that the need to extract 
useful information from raw data is a commonality bridging many scientific and engineering 
fields.  Only relatively recently (~1990s) has data mining gained significant recognition as its 
own field, so a potentially great number of pattern-finding concepts remain to be adopted from 
other disciplines.  For example, a classification approach is applied in [10] to nuclear plant 
sensors.  Similarly, operational hydrology and turbulence provide a surprisingly relevant 
perspective on the nature of severe disturbances as observed from the time-series data streams 
[11], [12].  Previous work in the power systems area on cascading disturbances is also relevant 
[13], [14], [15] in the sense that it involves looking for patterns in data over time.  The great 
challenge with respect to data mining and the power industry is to develop, adapt, and improve 
techniques for identifying representative patterns specific to power systems.    
 
For power systems, in contrast to general data analysis problems, the underlying physics of the 
system and devices are mostly known.  Also, years of experience, intuition, and understanding 
about power systems are available to build upon.  To most effectively incorporate collected data 
with this knowledge, we must know exactly which data is relevant and to what purpose.  Skill is 
needed to recognize and obtain the minimum amount of required data for a particular 
application.  Important practical issues arise in actually obtaining the required data and then in 
securely and reliably transporting the appropriate subset of information to the applications that 
will ultimately use it.   
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Currently, operators have insights and rules-of-thumb that come from watching the system over a 
long period of time and learning about its behavior.  Over a long enough time, a watcher of the 
system will start to see patterns in its behavior.  This observer will start to notice what is normal, 
what is abnormal, what events usually precede other events, etc.  Then, after an event occurs, 
such a knowledgeable observer may be able to look through data and reconstruct a sequence of 
events.  The drawback is that this reconstruction is generally only available after time-consuming 
manual effort is dedicated by experienced engineers, sifting through measurement data.  Manual 
analysis cannot be the norm.   More effective ways to automatically process and analyze both 
historical and real-time data are needed. Improved methodology is needed to bring important 
patterns in the system to the forefront, both to engineers and to operators.   
 
Integrating data and data mining theory into power systems analysis is the main purpose of this 
work.  This thesis examines problems and applications for which data mining can be an 
important and useful part of the solution.  Rather than taking a low-level approach to the storage, 
handling, and passing of data, we approach the problems from an application-centric point of 
view: What do we really want to accomplish, and how does the data help achieve that goal? The 
definition of ―knowledge‖ that we seek to obtain is inherently non-concrete.  Therefore, we find 
it necessary to investigate useful data mining concepts by presenting them with respect to 
particular concrete applications.  
 
Essentially, the applications in this thesis can be classified along two main routes.  One route 
seeks patterns in measurement data to ascertain information about the system.  The other route 
seeks patterns in calculated data, which includes data produced by a model and may also include 
measurement data that has undergone transformations.  Calculated data can allow benefits such 
as aggregation for system reduction. In the chapters to follow, Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
key background concepts related to data mining which are important to our work.  The subject of 
modeling is an important component of our work, relevant for measurement as well as calculated 
data types.  Essentially, we can use the data to learn about the system creating the data, while 
considering different levels of modeling assumptions.  A common purpose of aggregation is to 
make an ―equivalent‖ or a reduced model of the system, and clustering provides such an 
aggregation tool.   Clustering power system objects, such as generators, can reveal insight about 
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the way certain objects behave together.  The subsequent chapters each detail the use of data 
mining concepts in different types of power system applications.  The chapters and applications 
presented are outlined below.    
 
First, Chapter 3 focuses on identifying relationships from sensitivities, and two specific 
applications are presented.  These involve the aggregation and control of reactive power devices 
and the identification of generator groups with the potential ability to exhibit local market power.  
The work in this chapter exhibits the usefulness of data mining techniques to identify 
relationships from model data (sensitivities).  The analysis can reveal and quantify previously 
unrecognized relationships which are supported by the model.  Sensitivities reveal the propensity 
of certain components to operate together.  In summary, it is important to characterize and 
exploit ―model‖ relationships along with those observed from measurement data.  Relationships 
discovered in the model provide a reference for comparison of what is expected to be observed in 
the measured data.  Monitoring the extent to which relationships in the measurement data mirror 
those in the model data helps to assess the quality of both the model and the data.   
 
While Chapter 3 recognizes the usefulness of model data for identifying important relationships 
between system components, Chapter 4 deals with the problem of identifying the model itself.   
A network model can be considered a particular type of pattern, and Chapter 4 deals with its 
estimation in three particular applications.  The first application concerns the estimation of an 
equivalent network connecting PMU buses based on PMU data. The benefit of data over time is 
exploited by considering multiple snapshots of data to obtain information about the system. A 
reduced model connecting PMU buses is created from data.  The second application concerns the 
creation of structure-preserving equivalents.  Finally, the third application in Chapter 4 utilizes 
the data-over-time concept to estimate parameters of individual transmission lines rather than an 
equivalent model.  
 
Then, Chapter 5 utilizes time-series data analysis techniques which are useful when dealing with 
real data.  When estimating models from data, one must deal with the properties of real 
measurement data rather than idealized or simulation data.  In such cases, the data has random 
and possibly systemic errors, and the model of the system may be unknown or incorrect. Real 
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data and its uncertainty present a number of challenges to the development of robust algorithms 
which need to deal with such data and still be able to correctly extract information.  In Chapter 5, 
we study the associations of variables in time series data.  
 
Another important component of our work is the ability to quickly reveal information about what 
occurred in the system based on measurement data.  In Chapter 6, the use of oscillation 
monitoring data for event pattern recognition is presented.  To obtain more value from data 
collected over time, it is useful to investigate the information contained in the dynamics of the 
system rather than only steady-state patterns.  The goal is to find and exploit associations 
between the model content of oscillations which occur as the system changes state (ringdowns) 
and, in particular, to identify information about the causing event.  Estimated modal content is 
used to classify events and estimate where in the system the event may be occurring. 
 
In developing the applications described above, a key challenge has emerged which we have 
identified as critical to progressing new data-enhanced applications to the point of deployment in 
real world systems.  This issue, in summary, is data quality.  The availability of information 
regarding the quality of the data, as well as availability of the data itself, is a significant 
challenge.  Chapter 7 deals with different aspects of the data quality problem.  It is important to 
consider the impact of false data and make algorithms robust with respect to such data.  Chapter 
7 presents applications for the protection of data and applications and deals with how to find 
false data.   Finally, conclusions of the thesis and suggestions for moving forward in this area are 
presented in Chapter 8.  Many power system applications are in a position to benefit from such 
techniques. 
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2. Data Mining Background 
Terms such as ―data explosion‖ are being used more frequently to describe the situation of power 
systems with respect to data.  The work in this thesis spans several multi-disciplinary research 
areas, all of which can be said to be related to the broad category of data mining.  Data mining is 
indeed a broad subject, so it is important to provide some clarification.  We introduce in this 
chapter some background on the topics this work covers, as well as background on what 
―conventional‖ data mining tools can already provide.  Existing off-the-shelf solutions can 
provide subsequent value to the work described in this thesis; these tools are likely to be useful 
from a practical standpoint but are not the focus of this research.   
 
Our focus with respect to data mining is to look for relationships or ―patterns‖ which we can 
exploit for power systems analysis.  An important point is that intractably many rules or patterns 
often exist in a dataset.  Thus, results may contain patterns which are not what we intend to 
discover—such patterns may happen by chance or by overfitting of the model.  Therefore, it is 
important to define what patterns we are interested in capturing and to focus on searching for 
―interesting patterns,‖ rather than for ―patterns‖ in general.   The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide the necessary background and tools to accomplish this task.   
 
In this chapter, we review several key background concepts in data mining necessary for our 
work.  First, Section 2.1 describes common ways to represent the discovered ―knowledge.‖ 
Section 2.2 describes cluster analysis.  Section 2.3 provides some essential background on the 
statistical analysis of data.  Section 2.4 describes system identification methods which seek a 
model of the system from the data.   Then, an overview of singular value decomposition (SVD), 
a multifaceted tool, is provided in Section 2.5. 
 
2.1. Knowledge Representation 
A knowledge representation style is the form in which results of a data mining algorithm or 
application are presented.  Understanding the possible ways to represent knowledge—what type 
of solution to seek for a particular problem—is essential to understanding how to develop data 
mining applications for power systems.  Specifying the style of the sought solution is important 
to decompose the problem into manageable pieces.  A fundamental concept in data mining which 
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is often encountered in machine learning is the distinction between supervised and unsupervised 
learning.  Classification is called supervised learning because it uses training samples with 
known outcomes or ―classes.‖  Three types of data are used for machine learning systems: 
training examples, test data, and real data.  For both training data and test data, the outcomes are 
known.  The training data is used to come up with the model for learning or classification, and 
the test data is used to validate the model.  Classification techniques from the data mining field 
which are useful for pattern recognition are reviewed in [16].  Then there is real data for which 
the classification is not known.  In unsupervised learning, or clustering, groups are formed 
without first knowing the classifications of the data.  Cluster analysis is addressed in Section 2.4.  
 
Supervised learning and common knowledge representation styles are introduced in this section 
to illustrate the benefits that existing data mining tools can already provide and how they can 
offer subsequent value to this work.  As introduced in Chapter 1, the research in this thesis is not 
on applying off-the-shelf data mining techniques but on identifying key areas and applications in 
power systems where data-enhanced solutions are immediately apparent and tangible.  It is 
expected that as work in this direction continues, more insight from the pure data mining field 
can be increasingly incorporated into power systems solutions.     
 
Objects are described in a data mining context by their attributes. A set of attributes which occur 
together is called an ―item.‖ In market basket analysis, items are the articles being purchased, 
and the goal is to look for associations among the purchases.  Combinations of items meeting a 
pre-specified value for minimum coverage are called ―item sets.‖   
 
For supervised learning, two common knowledge representation styles are decision trees and 
rules.  A decision tree comprises choices at each node and consequences in each branch.  
Decision trees can be constructed using scatter plots to show which two attributes do a ―good 
job‖ splitting the classes at a particular level.  Decision trees can be automatically generated for 
classification purposes by applying the following steps in a recursive manner: select an attribute 
to place at the root node and make one branch for each possible value.  To construct decision 
trees, a measure of ―purity‖ of the nodes denoted information is used, as in signal processing 
[17].  Top-down decision tree algorithms seek, at each stage, an attribute to split which best 
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separates the classes.  The decision to split is based on the resulting information gain.   Top-
down induction of decision trees may also be called a ―divide and conquer approach.‖  The ID3 
and C4.5 systems are well-known decision tree induction systems [18].  The ―practical and 
influential‖ decision tree algorithm called C4.5 is an improvement over ID3 [19].   Ideally, the 
procedure ends with the objects in each leaf node belonging to the same classification, when the 
data cannot be split any further. Interpretation of the results simply requires following choices 
starting at the root node.  Top-down decision tree induction is one of the most extensively 
researched topics with respect to data mining, and many variations on basic methods exist.  
However, such variations rarely produce much improvement in accuracy over diverse datasets 
[18]. 
 
In contrast to decision trees, rules are modular; each represents an independent ―nugget‖ of 
knowledge.  It is easier to add new rules than to modify a decision tree.  While it is possible to 
generate rules from decision trees, the conversion is not trivial.  Proper interpretation of the rules, 
including the order in which they are executed, is important because it can change how objects 
are classified. The problem is that as rules become more accurate, they also become more 
complex. Order-independent rules are advantageous and represent independent modules of 
knowledge. Furthermore, there is an issue of what to do when different rules lead to different 
conclusions for the same instance.  Ordered decision lists prevent this ambiguity since execution 
would stop once a single rule is applicable to the instance.  When rules result in inconsistent 
classification results, one solution is to simply give no conclusion.  It is also possible to have an 
instance that cannot be classified by the rules at all.  Comparatively, a decision tree prevents 
ambiguity in interpretation. A downfall of decision trees is that they cannot easily express 
disjunction that may be implied among the rules that govern a data set. Since a node in a decision 
tree performs a single test, rules can be much more compact.   
 
Types of rules can be further labeled.  Association rules ―predict‖ attributes from other attributes. 
These may be propositional rules, which compare attributes with a constant.  Relational rules 
compare attributes with each other; this often involves inductive logic programs.  We are most 
interested in relational rules, but propositional rules can be useful if we need to compare power 
system values to predefined limits.   
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A simplicity-first methodology should be applied in analyzing practical datasets.  Covering 
algorithms seek to generate rules which cover all instances of each class in turn.  Coverage, or 
support, expresses the number of instances correctly predicted by a rule. Confidence, or 
accuracy, given by p/t, is the number of instances p that a rule correctly predicts as a proportion 
of all of the instances t to which the rule applies.   
 
The 1R algorithm can be used for association analysis and classification.  The 1R algorithm 
makes a rule for each value of each attribute based on the most frequent class, and the rules with 
the smallest error rates are chosen.  The rule construction covering algorithm PRISM generates 
only correct or ―perfect‖ rules by maximizing p/t.  Any rule with accuracy less than 100% is 
―incorrect.‖  Algorithms such as PRISM are outlined in [18]. The apriori algorithm finds 
frequent item sets in the first step, while the second step generates rules for the frequent item sets 
[18].  These algorithms are useful for determining which combinations of items are often 
encountered together.    
 
Another common algorithm is nӓive Bayes which calculates the probability of an instance 
belonging to a class, given the evidence.   Nӓive Bayes, based on Bayes’ rule, ―nӓively‖ assumes 
independence of the attributes, so the resulting probabilities are only valid if that assumption is 
true.  Prior probabilities are required for each attribute in the evidence. Estimates of the prior 
probabilities are made from the training data.  When a new instance is encountered, the 
probability of it belonging to each class is evaluated, and the instance is assigned to the class 
with the highest probability.   
 
Rote learning is a form of instance-based learning, which works directly from examples. There 
is much work in the artificial intelligence community on this topic. The training instances are 
―memorized.‖  As new instances are encountered, memory is searched for the instance that ―most 
strongly resembles‖ the new one.   Instance-based learning is ―lazy‖ because it puts off the work 
until it is time to classify a new instance.  Conversely, ―eager‖ methods produce a generalization 
as soon as possible.  ―Nearest-neighbor‖ and ―k-nearest neighbor‖ classifications are two basic 
instance-based learning schemes.  The k-nearest neighbor method relies on the majority class of 
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the k nearest neighbors.  Attributes may be weighted if some are more important than others.  
However, determining which attributes are the most important and deriving weights is itself a 
key problem.  Also, it may not be possible to store all of the training instances, so another key 
problem is determining what to save.  Regions in attribute space which are ―stable‖ require only 
a few examples to clearly define the classification.  One major drawback of instance-based 
learning is that it does not make explicit the structures that are learned, so it does not really 
provide a description of the patterns in the data.   
 
The algorithms listed above are more favorable for use on data sets with nominal attributes, but 
can be extended to numerical attributes.  In power systems, we are typically concerned with 
numerical attributes and models, where data is generated by a system with a known type of 
structure.  When knowledge needs to be represented by a structure, linear models and regression 
can often satisfy this goal. Regression methods are concerned with deriving an expression to 
predict a numeric quantity. Support vector learning [20] seeks such models. Linear regression 
expresses the class as a linear combination of attributes with predetermined weights, 
 
 0 1 1 2 2 k kx w w a w a w a      (1) 
 
where x is the class, a1…ak are attributes, and w0…wk are weights.  The weights are chosen to 
best fit the training data attributes to their class. If the class label is a nominal value, one may 
find a function for each class where x = 1 for an object in that class and x = –1 otherwise.  Data is 
linearly separable if it is possible to separate instances which belong to different classes by a 
hyperplane. The perceptron learning rule [18] is a very simple algorithm for finding such a 
separating hyperplane, and  Winnow [18] is similar.  Both methods are ―mistake-driven,‖ 
updating the weights only when a misclassified instance is encountered. Winnow is reportedly an 
―attribute-efficient learner,‖ effective at homing in on the relevant features in a dataset.  This is 
advantageous if the data set has numerous attributes where most are irrelevant.         
 
Association analysis as described in this section is computationally expensive.  Classification is a 
special case of association analysis, so algorithms which are sufficient for classification are often 
prohibitive for association analysis.   For classification algorithms, classes must be assigned to 
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the training instances by the system designer.  If the system designer is unable to label classes for 
the training data, then designating the classes is itself a part of the problem.  In such a case, 
clustering may be a better approach, at least initially.  Cluster analysis is considered in the next 
section.  Effectively, the clusters found are the classes.   
 
2.2. Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis is another major part of data mining, often referred to as ―unsupervised 
learning,‖ since it does not require class labels to be known ahead of time.  The goal of clustering 
algorithms is to group objects based on the information that describes them.  Clusters can be 
considered classes, to which the clustering process automatically assigns objects.   These 
algorithms are also encountered in the literature under the names of ―numerical taxonomy,‖ 
―vector quantization,‖ and ―learning by observation [21].‖   
 
The first important point to convey about clustering is that there is no ―perfect‖ clustering 
algorithm.  To better understand this, consider that the same set of points is easily clustered in 
different ways, as illustrated in Figure 1.  The initial set of points is readily perceived as two, 
four, or six clusters.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A fundamental question arises: Which clustering is ―correct?‖  The concept of a cluster is often 
difficult to define. Interpretations are made by the human visual system, but a precise definition 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
Figure 1. (a) Set of points, (b) Two clusters, (c) Four clusters, (d) Six clusters 
 13 
of a cluster is lacking.  How data should be clustered often depends on the data itself and what 
information or results are desired.  
 
There are different types of clusters.  In overlapping or non-exclusive clusters, objects may be in 
more than one cluster.  Some clusters are represented by a prototype, where members of the 
cluster are more similar to the prototype of their cluster than the prototype of another cluster. 
Clusters can also be defined as connected components in graphs, where they are connected to 
each other but not to objects in other clusters.  In well-separated clusters, an object is more 
―similar‖ to every other object in its cluster than to objects in other clusters; this is satisfied when 
distinct groups of points are located far from each other.  Partitional clustering is a division of 
the objects into non-overlapping subsets, so any object may only be in one cluster. In incomplete 
or partial clusterings, not all objects may be assigned to a cluster; unassigned objects may be 
regarded as noise.   These are some of the most important concepts and definitions with respect 
to clustering for this thesis.   
 
Since judging clustering results can be subjective, it is useful to develop clustering metrics to 
better quantify similarity.  One common metric is the sum of the squared error (SSE), also 
referred to as scatter, which is defined as 
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where M is the number of clusters, Ci is the i-th cluster, and ci is the centroid of the i-th cluster 
[22].  Typically, the centroid is the mean of the points in the cluster.  The SSE is related to the 
radius of a cluster i, 
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a measure of cluster tightness, where K is the number of elements in the cluster. Another 
measure of cluster ―quality‖ is called category utility [18].  Unless otherwise specified, our 
algorithms use the Euclidean distance,  
 
  
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k k
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d x y

 x y  (4) 
 
but any distance measure may be used and the algorithms may be adapted accordingly.   
 
The SSE in (2) can be considered an objective function, and the process of clustering can be 
considered an optimization problem.  The objective is then to minimize the sum of the squared 
distance of each object to its centroid.  According to [18], the following problem is nonconvex, 
discrete, and has an abundance of local minima: ―Given the desired number of clusters K and a 
dataset of N points, and a distance-based measurement function, find a partition of the dataset 
that minimizes the value of the measurement function.‖  There is typically no way to find a 
global minimal solution without trying all possible partitions, an approach called exhaustive 
enumeration.  With approximately K
N
/K! ways of partitioning the data, exhaustive enumeration 
is infeasible unless N and K are quite small.  Another computationally intractable method called 
iterative optimization specifies an initial partition, then tries all possible swapping of points from 
one group to another to see if the objective function improves.  Usually, even if an optimal 
solution is found, it is still only locally optimal.  Thus, in attempt to find solutions to this 
problem, numerous clustering algorithms exist; only a few appear in this document.  Clustering 
is used in various capacities throughout this work.  Several algorithms are examined; other 
algorithms can be easily understood from these.  In particular, Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate the use 
of cluster analysis to find and exploit relationships in power systems. 
 
2.3. Statistical Analysis of Data  
Statistical analysis provides another perspective of data mining.  Since statistical properties of 
the data can be employed for the purpose of extracting information about the system, it is 
sensible to consider statistical techniques as data mining techniques.  As will become clear, many 
seemingly different data mining methods are in fact quite similar and complimentary.  This is yet 
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another perspective with which to approach the same problems.  Statistical methods of pattern 
recognition are reviewed in [9].  As with the other types analysis in this chapter, statistical 
analysis is important for a number of applications throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapters 
5, 6, and 7.   
 
Here we provide some necessary background from statistical analysis concerning averages and 
variances.  When dealing with data, the average of a series of measurements is an expected value 
of that quantity as a random variable.  The expected value of a random variable x is 
 
 ( ) i i
i
E x x p  (5) 
 
where pi is the probability that the random variable x takes on each value xi.  In addition to its 
average value, another important aspect of a distribution is its dispersion or how spread out the 
data is around the average value.  This is the expected value of the square of the deviation of x 
from its average value.  Dispersion relates how far, on average, each data point deviates from the 
mean.  The variable to reflect this dispersion is the variance:  
 
     
2
V x E x E x   (6) 
 
The standard deviation is the square root of the variance and has the same units as the 
measurement units of x.  
 
  x V x   (7) 
 
The variance is also the second moment, and the average is the first moment.  In general, other 
moments of the data can be found.  The third moment is related to the ―skewness‖ of the 
distribution.  In theory, if all of the moments of a distribution are calculated, they provide a 
complete characterization.   
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It is important to note that each sample is merely a sample of the population.  For an infinite 
population, without an infinite number of samples (all items in the population), one cannot 
expect a completely accurate representation of the population.  Histograms provide a sample-
image of the shape of a distribution curve from its samples.  While a histogram provides some 
insight about the general shape of a frequency distribution curve, one must be cautious about 
making conclusions based on few samples.  Thus, the way the samples are selected from a 
population is important and is itself a science [23].  The most basic method is random sampling.  
The key point is that from samples we can merely achieve estimates. 
 
Thus, estimates of the mean µ and variance σ2 may be computed from the data using the 
following relationships: 
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The estimate of the mean (8) is simply the arithmetic average   . The estimate of the variance (9) 
contains an N-1 term in the denominator which denotes the number of degrees of freedom in the 
estimation.  The reason there are not N degrees of freedom is because any one of the residuals,   
xi -   in (9), can always be exactly calculated from the others since the value of   is defined by  
(8). 
 
The normal or Gaussian distribution, prominent in statistical theory and in practice, is completely 
characterized by its mean and variance.   
 
 
2
1 1
( )
22

 
   
   
   
x
f x e  (10) 
 
The standard deviation σ is the distance from the location of the mean µ to the point of inflection 
on the distribution curve.  The normal distribution is especially important as a result of the 
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central limit theorem which states that under certain conditions, as sample size increases, the 
sample mean becomes normally distributed about the population mean. 
 
2.4. System Identification 
Although perhaps not widely recognized, system identification is an important type of data 
mining.  The fundamental purpose of system identification is to infer models from observations 
by studying the properties of observations.  Models are an attempt to link observations together 
in order to describe a ―pattern‖ [24].  Thus, system identification tools are useful to approach 
certain problems in data mining.   Using data mining methods for finding linear models and 
regressions, as discussed in Section 2.1, is the same problem as solving a system identification 
problem.  Models constructed by system identification are intended to serve certain purposes and 
must be constructed accordingly.  The techniques used depend on the type of model that is 
sought.  
 
In power systems, system identification helps to solve problems such as state estimation, model 
parameter validation, and identification of topology errors. System identification concepts are 
valuable throughout this work, especially for the applications described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6.  In power systems, system identification has historically played, and continues to play, a 
significant role.  It often seems to be the area which makes the most sense to use.  Background 
on least squares estimation, a general tool, and power system state estimation are provided in 
Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.4.2 respectively.   
 
2.4.1. Least Squares Estimation 
Least squares estimation is a common technique in many areas of science and engineering.  It is 
a practical tool with numerous potential uses in power systems.  The method is simple, and 
provides a natural starting point for many types of analysis.  Even system identification methods 
which appear more complicated can typically be interpreted in terms of extensions to the simple 
concept of least squares estimation.  Hence, it is worth describing the method briefly, for a 
general case.   
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Rather than just mentioning the matrix manipulations needed to arrive at the solution, which is 
trivial, here we instead focus on where that procedure comes from.  Further discussion on this 
topic will be withheld until Chapter 5, where time-series data is considered in more detail.  The 
key point here is to give a warning that one must be careful when applying least-squares 
methodologies.  Assumptions of the method, as with any method, make it well-suited for some 
situations but not for others.  If applied to the wrong kinds of problems, it may still produce a 
numerical answer, but it will not mean what is intended.  
 
Mandel [23] describes least squares estimation in the context of the statistical analysis of data, an 
especially appropriate viewpoint for this work.  The problem of system identification and least 
squares estimation can be considered an ―adjustment of observations,‖  where the goal is to 
deduce a set of well-defined quantities in some optimum fashion from a collection of 
experimental values [23].  The simplest case, where the value in terms of improved precision is 
obvious, is the case where several replicate experimental measurements are averaged to estimate 
the value of some quantity. Thus, least squares estimation lies at the intersection of statistical 
analysis of data, described in the previous section, and of system identification, discussed here.   
Once values for the desired quantities are determined, it is an additional challenge to assess the 
quality of such estimates.  In the case of averages, the problem is simple to conceptualize; each 
point has an impact on the value of the estimate, such that if one point is far off, it will cause the 
average to be a poor representation of the true quantity.  These issues can result in quality 
problems associated with derived data and estimates, discussed more in Chapters 5 and 7.  
Quality problems often arise due to inconsistencies in the measuring processes and due to 
difficulty in determining the ―best‖ way to combine the values obtained into one final estimate. 
 
The arithmetic average is not necessarily the best value.  Weighted least squares (WLS) is a 
weighted average where the weights are determined based on measurement variances.  The 
problem is to select values of coefficients such that the estimated quantity has the highest 
precision.  This means the variance of the estimated quantity must be minimized.  The following 
three conditions characterize WLS estimation:  (1) the best value is assumed to be a linear 
combination of all three measurements, (2) the best value is assumed to be free of systematic 
errors, so it is an unbiased estimate (the expected value is equal to the true value) and (3) the best 
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value has minimum variance.  Thus, taking the average of measurements is a case of linear 
unbiased minimum-variance estimation, as described in [23].   
 
To illustrate the concept of least squares estimation, consider the following matrix equation:  
 
 Ax = b  (11) 
 r = Ax-b  (12) 
 
for which least squares estimation minimizes the sum of the squared residuals in (12) and results 
in the following estimate (109): 
 
    
-1
T Tx A A A b  (13) 
 
where x denotes the vector of estimated quantities.   
 
In (12), the residuals r are estimates of the errors.  When measurements have different weights, 
the weighted sum of the squares of residuals is minimized instead.  To derive the solution, one 
forms an objective function and takes the partial derivative with respect to each variable to be 
estimated: 
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If there are k variables to be estimated, this yields k equations, the solution of which yields the k 
unknowns. In matrix form, the result is 
 
    
-1
T Tx A WA A Wb  (15) 
 
An interesting and useful byproduct of least squares estimation is that it also provides an 
estimate of the variances of the unknown variables.  This is because the estimate x is a linear 
function of the measurements b.  Assume we know the weights or variances of the 
 20 
measurements, or at least their relative proportions.  The variances of all of the measurements 
can be represented in terms of σ2, and the weights wi are the reciprocal of the variances.  Then, 
the law of propagation of errors provides a means to estimate the variance of each element of x  
[23, p. 145]: 
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where N is the number of observations (measurements) and p is the number of estimated 
parameters.  One can also estimate the confidence intervals for the parameter estimates obtained 
[23].  
 
2.4.2. Power System State Estimation 
The concept of using data in an intelligent manner to learn about the power system has its roots 
primarily in state estimation.  A brief overview of the state estimation problem for power 
systems is provided here.  This section provides background for other parts of this work.  
Concerns about false data in power systems, as discussed in Chapter 7, often arise with respect to 
its impact on the state estimation solution.  Additionally, building equivalent models, as in 
Chapter 4, is closely related to the state estimation problem.  State estimation is a well-studied 
field of its own, and an attempt is not made here to give a full coverage of the subject.   
 
The power system state estimation problem is to estimate the current conditions of the network 
based on snapshots of real-time measurements. Estimated quantities principally include bus 
voltage magnitude V and angle θ, the power flow state variables. If it is possible to estimate V 
and θ throughout the network based on measurements, the network is said to be observable [25].  
Once these state variables are known, all other quantities such as currents and real and reactive 
line flows can be computed. Many resources in the literature describe power system state 
estimation.  Detailed coverage can be found in [26] and more in [27] and [28]. Topology error 
detection for state estimation is considered in [29], [30] and [31].    
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State estimation provides operators with useful information about the system, thus increasing 
situational awareness. The state estimator runs approximately every five minutes. The estimate is 
computed using known model equations which relate the power system measurement quantities 
to the unknown states which are to be determined. The model equations contain static network 
data including line and bus configuration (status data) as well as physical network parameters 
such as line impedances.  A topology processing phase precedes state estimation and reconciles 
status data with a more detailed node-breaker model to obtain the bus-branch model which is 
ultimately used by the state estimator. Once the network topology is known, conventional state 
estimation assumes it to be correct. 
 
In general, the power system state estimation problem is described by (19) as follows [26]. State 
estimation seeks to minimize the difference between the actual measurements z and the 
computed values of measurements h(x), where h(x) is a function relating measurements to state 
variables. Typical power system measurement quantities include real and reactive line flows, Pij 
and Qij respectively, 
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where Gij and Bij denote the admittance elements connecting buses i and j, from Ybus = G+ jB, 
where I = YbusV.   The constraints g(x) and c(x) represent the fact that the state estimates must 
also be a valid power flow solution.  
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The equality constraints g(x) represent power balance; they enforce the fact that power 
generation must always equal the load plus the losses. The inequality constraints c(x) represent 
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physical limits such as the reactive power limits of generators which are also handled within the 
power flow problem. 
 
Power system state estimation is typically an overdetermined problem since there are more 
measurements available than are needed to solve for the unknown voltage magnitudes and 
angles. The following quadratic objective function is used in the weighted least-squares (WLS) 
approach to calculate the best estimate of the power system state:  
 
 
( ( )) ( ( ))Tf   z h x W z h x  (20) 
 
The measurement variance inverses are typically used as the weights in matrix W.  The Gauss 
Newton method provides an iterative state estimation procedure, [26]: 
 
  1 1v T TH W H Δx H W r  (21) 
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where the residual r = z – h(x), and the Jacobian matrix H(x) is associated with the measurement 
equations of a WLS state estimator based on an AC (nonlinear) network model. A detailed 
account of the contribution of different types of power system measurements to the Jacobian 
H(x) is given in [26].  
 
The model described above is the non-linear AC system model. Comparatively, a simplified DC 
model (23) assumes linear functions linking measurement to states, 
 
  z Hx e  (23) 
 
which is commonly used in papers addressing false data injection attacks on state estimation 
[32]. 
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2.5. Singular Value Decomposition  
Singular value decomposition (SVD) is a matrix decomposition technique which is also a useful 
data mining tool in many respects.  In this work, SVD appears in Chapters 3 and 5, so an 
overview of SVD is provided.  The motivation, the outcome, and the manner of applying SVD 
can vary considerably depending on the application.  The fact that SVD is  such a multi-faceted 
tool is one of its most attractive features.  In fact, SVD fits several different interpretations, each 
of which lends value in a different way to the present work.  Several useful interpretations of 
SVD are now briefly summarized.  
 
First, in a geometrical interpretation, SVD represents a unit sphere in the input space and an 
ellipse in the output space [33].  The SVD expresses a matrix as A = USV
T
, where S is the 
diagonal matrix of singular values of A.  According to [34], computation is of order O(nm
2
), so 
ideally m should be small.  Consider matrices that are 2x2, so they may be visualized in two 
dimensions.  Then, V is an orthonormal basis in 2D, and those vectors define a circle.  Since U 
and V are orthogonal matrices, their inverse is their transpose, so multiplying both sides by V
T
 
gives AV = US.  This multiplication has the interpretation that A maps a circle V to the ellipse 
given by US, as illustrated well by Figure 2 from [33].  
 
 
Figure 2. Geometric view of SVD [33] 
 
Since U is also an orthogonal matrix, it can be interpreted that the columns of U are the 
normalized basis vectors for an ellipse (right side of Figure 2), whereas the axes lengths are 
given by the singular values or the diagonal entries of S.  In higher dimensions, A maps a 
hypersphere V into a hyperellipse US. There are many references about this interpretation of 
A
1 1 ζ1
ζ2
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SVD, especially in the computer graphics area.  In computer graphics, the SVD A = USV
T
 can 
be thought of as a rotation matrix × a scale matrix × a rotation matrix [33].  In SVD, V captures 
patterns in the attributes (columns) of the data (assuming each row in A is an object) and U 
captures the patterns in the objects (rows), and a new data matrix can be obtained from 
A’=A*[columns of V corresponding to highest singular values].   More mathematical details and 
explanations are found in [35].    
 
Properties of SVD make it a useful tool for solving linear systems.  In particular, SVD exhibits a 
useful relationship for finding a matrix inverse; since A= USV
T 
then A
-1
 = (USV
T
)
-1
=VS
-1
U
T
.  
SVD is also used to calculate rank, which is the number of non-zero singular values of a matrix.  
When solving equations of the form Ax=0 for x, SVD is especially valuable.  This interpretation 
of SVD is significant for the market power potential identification algorithm of Chapter 3.  Any 
such non-zero x belongs to the null space of A.  Thus, x is a right singular vector of A 
corresponding to a singular value of zero in A.  If A has several singular values which are zero, 
the corresponding right singular vectors, which correspond to columns in V, are a basis for the 
null space of A, and any linear combination of these basis vectors gives an x which satisfies 
Ax=0.  If the rank of matrix A is r, the first r columns of U are an orthonormal basis for the 
range space of A and the last (n-r) columns of V are an orthonormal basis of its null space [36], 
[34].  It is also possible to use SVD to find projections [34], such as onto the null space or the 
range space of A.  Additionally, SVD can be used to solve least squares problems.  Consider that 
min ||Ax-b||
2
 is solved by x = (A
T
A)
-1
A
T
b.  Rewriting this in terms of the SVD, the resulting 
matrix is the pseudoinverse of A.    
 
In data mining literature, SVD is often used in a form referred to as principal component analysis 
(PCA).  The relationship between SVD and PCA is briefly summarized.  In PCA, the mean of 
the data is removed, whereas in SVD it is not.  PCA performs eigen-analysis on a covariance 
matrix, formed by calculating the covariance between the columns of the data matrix.  
Covariance calculations are useful for revealing relationships between power system variables, 
discussed in Chapter 5.  PCA finds the orthogonal basis that best represents the given data set.  If 
d is the dimension of the original data set, PCA finds a best approximating plane of dimension 
d’<d by taking the first d’ eigenvectors and examining the subspace they span.  In PCA, the 
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strong components are simply eigenvectors that correspond to large eigenvalues.  This indicates 
that the data exhibits a clear preferable direction. The goal is to find new dimensions that better 
capture the variability of the data.  The first dimension captures the most variability, and the 
second dimension is orthogonal, and it captures the next most variability, etc. The decomposition 
tends to identify the strongest patterns in the data.  Also, most of the variability of data can often 
be captured in only a few dimensions.  The decomposition can be used to eliminate much of the 
noise in the data as well as for dimensionality reduction.  PCA can be used for facial recognition 
to match faces in a database from their PCA basis and in animation compression [33]. In [37], 
PCA is applied to study power flow data.  
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3. Identification of Patterns from Sensitivities 
This chapter describes the use of data from a model, in the form of sensitivities, to identify 
patterns or discernible relationships between certain system components.  Sensitivities are the 
linearized effect of one variable to another variable, and they describe the impact that a small 
perturbation of a variable has on the rest of the system [38].   Studying sensitivities reveals a 
considerable amount of information about expected patterns.  Sensitivities indicate the space of 
patterns or relationships which may occur in the real system by revealing how variables are 
coupled to each other.  There is considerable insight to be gained from sensitivities, which is 
valuable throughout this thesis.  Under certain conditions, the sensitivities determined from 
empirical and analytical approaches, both reviewed here, are the same.    
 
Sensitivities are analytically obtained based on the equations of the power network model.  For 
example, in (24) the sensitivity Sα can be found by calculating the partial derivatives of P with 
respect to qα.   
 
 
P
S
q





 (24) 
 
Sensitivities originate from nonlinear equations which are linearized around an operating point.  
If the derivatives of sensitivities (24) are evaluated at an operating point x0, the approximation 
may only be valid near that point.  That is, if Δqα is too large, (25) may not hold. 
 
 P S q       (25) 
 
The exception is the simplest case, where the system is linear, and then (25) is exact. Thus, 
analytical computation of sensitivities requires knowledge of the model and also requires 
knowledge of the system operating point.  A more detailed description of sensitivities in power 
systems is found in [39].  
 
Empirically, sensitivities may be obtained by considering the change of a variable, qα, by a small 
amount Δqα, and then observing the change in the output variable P.  The resulting change in 
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output is obtained by measurement or by running a simulation so that it is possible to observe the 
change in P. If the change is given by ΔP, then sensitivity Sα may be calculated as follows:  
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
 (26) 
 
Thus, sensitivities can be verified by simulation or by measurement in the real system, provided 
that the input qα is possible to change and that the output P is possible to observe.    
    
In this chapter, applications are presented which find and utilize the relationships described by 
the sensitivities.  The concept behind using sensitivities in this manner is first briefly explained.  
Then, two applications are presented.  The first application uses sensitivities to aggregate and 
control reactive support devices.  The second application aggregates and identifies generators 
with the potential for local market power.  
 
3.1. Clustering Sensitivities for Control 
Since both applications in this chapter involve clustering of sensitivities, this section provides an 
explanation of the concept.  The principle is to use sensitivities to identify groups of devices.  
Specifically, clustering may be used to group elements, as introduced in Chapter 2.  Clustering 
sensitivities can allow groups of smart grid devices to be formed which have the ability to 
respond together in predetermined ways when various scenarios occur.   This involves studying 
the impact of devices on a control objective.  The clustering of devices for control is possible 
based on the coupling of variables, as determined from the corresponding sensitivities.  There is 
no limit to the types of devices which may be controlled in this manner. 
 
Notable examples to which this theory applies include controllable loads and parameters.  An 
observation is made in [39] that some real power line flows have the ability to be independently 
controlled, while others do not.  Lines with highly coupled flows cannot be controlled 
independently; controlling one will always control the other.  Exploring this observation further, 
the ability of certain lines to exhibit this independently controllable property is discernible from 
the relationships in the sensitivities.  For example, computing the sensitivities of real power line 
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flows to a change in control parameters and examining the couplings between sensitivities will 
reveal this property.   
 
3.1.1. Coupling Index  
Specifically, the coupling between variables, as determined from sensitivities, can be found 
using the coupling index (CI).  The CI is also called cosine similarity and is given in this 
application by the cosine of the angle between two row vectors v1 and v2 of the sensitivity 
matrix: 
 
 
1 2
cos v v

 1 2
1 2
v v
v v
 (27) 
 
The CI has values between -1 and 1.  When the CI has an absolute value of 1, the angle between 
the vectors is zero, and there is complete correlation, either positive or negative, between the 
vectors.  When the CI is zero, the row vectors are orthogonal, and the vectors behave 
independently.  This coupling index is one way to identify patterns in sensitivities which denote 
the ability to control certain sets of devices together.  More generally, for example, if we 
consider all line flows, then clustering can find all sets of independently controllable line flows. 
It is necessary to control coupled components together since they cannot be controlled 
independently.  Couplings in any set of sensitivities may be discovered in this way.  In the first 
application in this chapter, we use this analysis to identify voltages with the ability to be 
controlled independently via reactive power injection.  Examining the couplings allows us to 
determine how independently controllable certain bus voltages are with respect to other bus 
voltages.  Finding these relationships allows for simplification of control.  
 
3.1.2. Simplified System Models for Dynamic Exactness 
Simplifying system models and reducing computation are often important for control problems 
and applications. Two classes of methods, aggregation and perturbation, can address the model 
simplification problem [40]. Aggregate models simplify a mathematical model of a system by 
introducing a coarser representation to retain some key qualitative properties of the system. In 
particular, aggregation is useful for implementing decentralized control methods in large-scale 
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systems [40].  While centralized control is common, the survey paper [40] responds to the 
―failure of centrality‖ due either to lack of centralized information or lack of centralized 
computing capabilities. The full system S1 can be represented by 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )t t t   x A x B u  (28) 
 
and the aggregated system S2 is 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )t t t   z F z G u  (29) 
 
where it is required that the following equation is satisfied for all time: 
 
 ( ) ( )t t z C x  (30) 
 
For a linear system, ―dynamic exactness‖ is obtained when certain conditions are satisfied [40].  
The aggregate state vector z(t) must be a linear combination of certain modes of x(t).  The 
eigenvalues of F will be the eigenvalues of A corresponding to the retained modes.  In fact, 
matrix C must be chosen such that it creates zeros in the input-output relationship between u(t) 
and z(t) to cancel the poles in the relationship that should not be retained.  Further information 
about obtaining a minimal realization that satisfies the definition of dynamic exactness (ways to 
choose C) is found in [40].  This is a way to create equivalents which preserve certain modal 
responses. 
 
Coupling methods are discussed in the context of perturbation methods for model simplification 
[40].  Weak coupling methods are nonsingular perturbations, where perturbations are on the 
right-hand side of the differential equations, as in the following: 
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where ε represents a small positive parameter.  This is essentially the cosine similarity (27). If ε 
were exactly zero, the system would be completely decoupled and many computations would be 
reduced. Singular perturbations represent strong coupling.  If the system has slow and fast 
components, 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )t t t   1 11 1 12 2x A x A x  (32) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )t t t    2 21 1 22 2x A x A x  (33) 
 
and ε is taken to be zero, the second equation becomes an algebraic equation for x2(t).  This 
yields the ―strong coupling‖ approximation, 
 
  ( ) ( )t t  -11 11 12 22 21 1x A A A A x  (34) 
  ( ) ( )t t  -12 22 21 1x A A x  (35) 
 
The fast modes associated with A22 are discarded.  The other modes are approximated by the 
modes of the system matrix of (34).  We are often interested in poorly damped, low-frequency 
modes, and since we deal with large scale power systems, singular perturbation methods are 
useful for providing a means to reduce computation.  These algebraic variables x2 can be 
representative of the power flow solution while the differential equation variables x1 can be 
representative of the modeled machine dynamics. 
 
3.2. Aggregation and Control of Reactive Power Resources  
The selective grouping of reactive support devices for providing wide-area voltage support, 
developed in conjunction with this thesis, is outlined in [41] and [42].  This application is 
fundamentally built upon extracting information from sensitivities as well as from measurement 
data.  The presented framework encompasses devices at the residential level with the ability to 
provide reactive support.  Reactive power may be supplied by converter-connected devices [43] 
[44], which includes many types of distributed resources, as well as by machines. The power 
buffer concept [43], [45], [46] allows the power electronics to present a desired behavior to the 
grid.  Such a capability is not currently utilized.   Integrated end-user reactive-power-capable 
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devices can be called upon to provide voltage support via a secure communications infrastructure 
outlined in Chapter 7.   
 
Sensitivities are used to determine effective locations in the transmission system and to control 
reactive power resources at those locations, hereafter denoted Q-Controlled (Q-C) buses.  
Reactive support groups are found from cluster analysis of sensitivities which parallel the secure 
communications architecture, described in Chapter 7.  The proposed framework is envisioned to 
coordinate distributed devices to correct voltage violations in their local area, using secure, 
authenticated messaging to achieve the control.  Details and results are reported in [41] and [42].   
 
3.2.1. The Voltage Control Problem  
In this section, we briefly describe the voltage control problem addressed in this application.  To 
maintain operational reliability [47], the system should be able to withstand the loss of any one 
credible contingency [48].  However, as power systems become more heavily loaded, the number 
of limit violations and unsolvable contingencies may increase.  The effects of an outage may 
perhaps lead to a voltage collapse, whereby voltages progressively decline until it is no longer 
possible to maintain stable operating voltages [49].  It is well known that available reactive 
power resources can be used to control voltages and thus make the system less vulnerable to 
voltage instability.    
 
The August 14, 2003, blackout establishes the importance of this work.  The report  [49] states 
that inadequate reactive power supply was a factor in most previous major North American 
blackouts, and that prior to the 2003 blackout, a lack of adequate dynamic reactive reserves 
combined with a lack of knowledge about critical voltages and maximum import capability left 
the system in a vulnerable state. In [41], the reconstructed 2003 blackout case just prior to the 
blackout is compared to the case after correcting the power factor to unity at just five buses, and 
the voltages are seen to considerably improve.  The purpose of this work is to facilitate 
corrective control, which directs the system to a new stable equilibrium point shortly following a 
severe disturbance [50], [51], as well as preventative control, which is carried out before any 
instability occurs.  Available corrective control actions are not always practical and may require 
the involvement of a large number of buses in the system [52].  Generator re-dispatch is time-
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constrained by ramp limits, and load shedding is often costly and used as a last resort.  The most 
effective and the least costly solutions [53] can be determined and should be enacted within an 
allotted time frame to restore the system to a secure system state.  Example reactive power 
controls include transmission line switching [54], [55], [56], flexible AC transmission system 
devices (FACTS) [57], [58], [59], and synchronous condensers.  Currently, control actions 
mostly occur at the substation level, whereas this application facilitates a comprehensive form of 
reactive power control that goes all the way to the end-user.   
 
The sensitivities of voltages to reactive power injections are fundamental for determining 
appropriate locations and setting reactive power outputs of Q-C buses.  The negative inverse of 
the power flow Jacobian J describes the way the state variables s(θ, V) = [θ, V]
T
 change in a 
solution of the power flow due to bus power injection mismatch.  
 
 
      
-1
θ,V p,q
Δs -J f  (36) 
 
In (36), vector f(p,q) = [Δp, Δq]
T
 expresses power balance which must equal zero at solution.  
Elements of Δp and Δq respectively are Δpi = Pi,calc-(Pi,gen-Pi,load) and Δqi = Qi,calc-(Qi,gen-Qi,load) 
where the calculated power injections, 
 
    ,
1
cos sin
n
i calc i j ij ij ij ij
j
P V V G B 

     (37) 
    ,
1
sin cos
n
i calc i j ij ij ij ij
j
Q V V G B 

     (38) 
 
should equal the specified net power injections.  Let Qs be the vector of specified net reactive 
power injections at each bus i, so Qs,i = Qi,gen-Qi,load. Then, the sensitivity of voltage magnitude V 
to specified reactive power Qs is given by the block matrix ΛVQ of J
-1
:   
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The sensitivities ΛVQ describe how voltage magnitude state variables change in a solution of the 
power flow due to a small change in specified reactive power injection at a bus. Effective 
locations of Q-C buses and control settings are determined based on the sensitivities (39).   
 
The problem of controlling the voltages at specific buses is also an optimization problem, where 
the objective function f1 is the sum of the differences of the bus voltages from their specified 
values, and M is the number of bus voltages targeted for control: 
 
  
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f

     specV V η  (40) 
 
The solution is to minimize f1 subject to the power flow constraints and limits on equipment.  
The result gives the required reactive power injections at the Q-C buses such that the voltage 
profile V of the system equals the specified voltage profile Vspec within some tolerance.   The 
desired voltage profile may include any number of buses, even all buses, making this a global 
rather than a local optimization problem.  The values of Qs are constrained based on the 
individual loads, so the controllability of the reactive component of loads should be classified 
and incorporated into the Q-C bus selection algorithm.  As the system changes, these 
classifications should be updated.  
 
3.2.2. Selection and Aggregation of Q-C Buses 
Sensitivities may be used to identify buses whose reactive power injections have a high impact 
on voltages of interest.  Buses with higher sensitivities are able to provide more control, and are 
candidates for selection as Q-C buses, whereas buses with sensitivities of zero have no impact on 
the control objective.  The sensitivities of f1 to reactive power injection are given by the 
following vector: 
 34 
 
 
1 2f  VQηΛ  (41) 
 
The k most effective locations correspond to the k elements of the sensitivity vector (41) which 
are furthest from zero.  
 
From optimization theory, there are a number of ways to solve this problem [60].  A comparison 
of optimization methods is not a subject of this thesis.  Here we use the steepest descent 
approach, and the Qs values to minimize (40) are solved for using the sensitivities in (41).  The 
use of the system sensitivities of f1 (41) to solve the problem (40) requires a centralized control 
model.   
 
To control voltage by adjusting loads and sources requires communicating control commands 
efficiently and securely. The corresponding required changes in Qs must be communicated to all 
of the end-user devices.  Requirements of this communication are described in context of a 
hierarchical control framework in Chapter 7, where the response is obtained by communicating 
the composite request Qs to the next lowest level, which is then responsible for achieving the 
response amount from within its members.   
 
The task of ensuring that communications are efficient and secure is simplified when the control 
effort can be focused on a subset of the controllers.  Thus, for voltage control purposes as well as 
for communication purposes, buses are aggregated into reactive support groups.  Reactive 
support groups are a key enabler of the framework.   Each bus is associated with a reactive 
support group that consists of the devices determined a priori from a recent system model to 
have the greatest potential to control the affected node's voltage. Thus, only certain devices need 
to be considered as potential destinations for each control message. 
 
Buses in a reactive support group are intended to help each other correct voltage problems.  
Sensitivities allow supporter buses to be identified for each voltage. To do this, each row of     
corresponding to each voltage is examined and the l highest values in the row are determined.  
Since each row is a bus voltage and each column is a reactive power injection, the l highest-
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magnitude columns for a row give the l best Q-C supporters for that bus’s voltage. This method 
provides redundancy since if there are m voltages of interest, there will be m reactive support 
groups where each region has l elements. Ensuring that each voltage has l supporters may be 
beneficial assuming we want reactive control groups to be at least some minimal size.  Similar 
work has been done [61], [62], [63], [64], [65] to help gauge a system's proximity to voltage 
collapse. The makeup of the reactive support group for a particular node is determined based on 
analysis and clustering of sensitivities.  Clustering groups the rows of     to identify voltages 
which are affected similarly by reactive power injections at Q-C buses. These clustering 
algorithms and results of the approach are presented in the following sections.  To describe the 
algorithms in the most general context, the rows of     which represent buses to be clustered are 
referred to as objects.   
 
3.2.3. Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm 
Hierarchical clustering is one approach [22] that complements well the nature of the 
communications and security aspects of the problem since the granularity of control ranges from 
the transmission system to the end-users on the distribution system.  In hierarchical clustering, 
the process may begin either with all items as individual clusters which are successively merged 
clusters or with all items in one cluster which are successively divided.  The former type is 
referred to as agglomerative clustering and the latter is divisive.  Hierarchical methods are 
flexible and non-parametric.  Each level is defined by a distance threshold, where all items which 
are closer than this threshold to other items have been clustered together.  One of the goals of 
hierarchical clustering is to be interactive and flexible, allowing the user to select a particular 
clustering for further examination.  Instead of only one clustering result, we obtain many 
clusterings which form a hierarchy.  Viewing this hierarchy can allow relationships in the system 
to be more easily understood. 
 
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering schemes begin at the lowest level, with each element as a 
single cluster, and at each increasing level the closest clusters are merged.  We can slice the 
hierarchy at different levels depending on how coarse or fine we want the clusters to be.  The 
higher the level, the coarser the grouping becomes. At the highest level, all elements are in one 
cluster.   
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Agglomerative clustering relies on the use of distances between objects, which may be 
represented by a distance matrix D.  Elements Dij give the distance between row i and j of    .  
Any measure of distance may be used; here we use Euclidean distance. At each level, we find the 
most similar pair of clusters (r) and (s) by finding the minimum value Drs in the current distance 
matrix.  Then, clusters (r) and (s) are merged into one cluster.  The rows and columns for (r) and 
(s) in the distance matrix are deleted and a new row is added for the new cluster (r,s). Any metric 
can be used to determine the distance of the new cluster (r,s) to each other cluster l, but typically 
the metric is D(r,s)l = min( Drl, Dsl).  That is, the distance between any two clusters is given by the 
minimum distance between any two elements of the clusters. 
 
3.2.4. Quality-Threshold (QT) Clustering Algorithm 
Another clustering algorithm which may be used to cluster the rows of     is the quality 
threshold (QT) algorithm, originally developed to cluster genes [66]. This method also uses the 
distance matrix D. A threshold and a maximum cluster size are specified initially. For each row 
of    , we build a candidate cluster that contains all other rows of     which are closer in 
distance than the threshold. The candidate cluster with the most elements becomes a true cluster.  
All the points in the true cluster are removed from further consideration.  The process then 
iterates until all points belong to a true cluster. 
 
The criterion which motivated the design of the QT algorithm is the need to form an unknown 
number of potentially large clusters which satisfy a ―quality guarantee,‖ meaning that the cluster 
diameters should not exceed a certain threshold.  The distance of each object to every other 
object is required.  A threshold and, optionally, a maximum cluster size are specified initially. 
For each object, a candidate cluster is built which contains all other objects closer than the 
threshold. An object not within the threshold of any other object forms its own cluster.  The 
candidate cluster with the most elements becomes a true cluster.  Once points are assigned to a 
cluster, they are removed from further consideration, so the process stops after all points are 
assigned. The QT algorithm is computationally intensive, O(n
2
) [67], as it requires a distance 
metric to be computed between all points. 
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3.2.5. Coupling Index (CI) Clustering Algorithm 
An additional clustering method has been developed, particularly for this application, which we 
call the coupling index (CI) algorithm.  The CI algorithm clusters objects based on their cosine 
similarity (27). The resulting clusters are approximately orthogonal to each other.  While we 
developed the CI algorithm specifically for this voltage control application, it is implemented in 
a general way and may be applied to any foreseeable application.  Its use in other applications 
appears later in this thesis.  Here the purpose of clustering is to group buses based on the 
correlations of sensitivities of voltage with respect to reactive power injections.  The CI 
accomplishes this by grouping together buses which are highly coupled to other buses in the 
same group.  In general, the CI algorithm establishes what we henceforth denote as simple 
clusters and reciprocal clusters and (referred to in [41] as weak and strong clusters, 
respectively).  
 
For each object, the algorithm identifies all other objects that are coupled by a CI with magnitude 
greater than a threshold. For an item i, these items form the simple cluster, Ai.  The second stage 
identifies clusters where the items are extremely well matched to the other items in the cluster.  
At this stage, for each simple cluster Ai, the algorithm goes through the elements of Ai.  For each 
element in Ai, it identifies items coupled by a CI greater than the threshold and places them in 
another group, Aj.  If all the elements in Ai and Aj match, the set of matching elements is 
identified as a reciprocal cluster.  Psuedocode is given in [41].  It should be noted that in the 
current algorithm, any strong cluster is also a weak cluster and points can belong to multiple 
clusters.  Points that do not belong to a cluster are outliers and form their own cluster.  The 
interpretation is that strong clusters are good candidates for the support groups, but weak clusters 
may need to be used to ensure that all objects are included in a group. There is room for 
refinement of the CI algorithm implementation. 
 
3.2.6. Example Reactive Support Case 
An example is provided in this section to illustrate the potential to control distributed reactive 
power devices to improve the voltage profile, also documented in [41], [42].  The study system 
considered is the IEEE 24-Bus Reliability Test System (RTS) [68] (Figure 3), which has low 
voltages around 0.95 per unit.  The lowest voltages in the system (highlighted on the one-line 
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diagram) are at buses 3, 4, 8, 9, and 24.  The voltage control problem is solved for this case in a 
centralized fashion using the methodology presented.    
 
 
Figure 3.  IEEE 24-Bus RTS, reactive power support example 
 
The four buses with the greatest impact on the control objective are set as Q-C buses, and their 
settings needed to raise the five lowest voltages to a voltage profile of 1 per unit are determined.  
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the required MVAr outputs (Qnet) to achieve this control.    
 
Table 1. RTS voltage improvement 
Bus # Initial Qnet Final Qnet Initial voltage Final voltage 
3 -37 MVAr 37 MVAr 0.9469 1.0057 
4 -15 MVAr 15 MVAr 0.9598 1.0022 
8 -35 MVAr 35 MVAr 0.9593 0.9975 
9 -36 MVAr 36 MVAr 0.9603 1.0050 
24   0.9594 0.9852 
 
Negative Qnet indicates a net load while positive Qnet indicates a net source.  When the new 
settings are applied to achieve the voltage correction, Table 1 indicates that the power factors at 
all Q-C buses became leading instead of lagging.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 list the voltages at 
the low-voltage buses.  The voltages at all system buses are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. RTS voltage profiles 
 
Reactive power adjustment at a small number of buses can cause a substantial improvement of 
the overall voltage profile.  The use of reactive-only controls as opposed to other forms of 
corrective control has the advantage that such controllers are already available in the system but 
are not being utilized, and more may be added.  Also, the need to use coarser controls such as 
shedding load or changing generation output may be prevented. 
 
In the scenario above, we solved a nonlinear problem for the Qnet values needed to achieve the 
desired voltage profile within a small tolerance. Alternatively, we can directly use the 
sensitivities to approximate the control needed, which requires no iteration.  The accuracy of this 
linear estimate of control is dependent on the linearity of the relationship between the reactive 
power at the Q-C buses and the voltages.  In Table 2, these linear estimates of the controls are 
compared to the actual controls needed.  The linear estimates of Qnet at buses 3 and 4 are close to 
the actual values, but buses 8 and 9 are not.   
 
Table 2. RTS linear control estimate 
Bus # Qnet Needed Qnet Estimated % Error VF VESTQ 
3 37 MVAr 37.26 MVAr 0.69 % 1.0057 1.00294 
4 15 MVAr 14.52 MVAr 3.21 % 1.0022 0.9982 
8 35 MVAr 41.69 MVAr 19.11% 0.9975 0.99813 
9 36 MVAr 13.01 MVAr 63.86% 1.0050 0.99826 
24    0.9852 0.98396 
 
Using the Qnet values from the linear estimate, the voltages at the low-voltage buses VESTQ are 
given in column 6 of Table 2.  The final voltages VF from Column 5 of Table 1 are also shown.  
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With both linear and nonlinear controls, the voltage profile is substantially improved, but the 
improvement with the linear control is not as great.  However, the linear approximation may be 
calculated a lot faster, so the discrepancies in the final voltage values may be tolerable.  Linear 
versus nonlinear control is investigated further for the probing application in Section 7.4. 
 
To find the reactive support groups for the RTS, the clustering algorithms are applied to the rows 
of sensitivity matrix    .  For the agglomerative (hierarchical) scheme, the clusters form as 
shown in Figure 5. From Figure 5, clusters initially form containing (11,12) and (17,20).  Then, a 
large cluster forms and begins to grow. At a higher level in the hierarchy, a cluster forms 
containing (3,24) which is then absorbed into the large cluster.  The last buses to join any cluster 
are buses 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 24. 
 
 
Figure 5. Progression of hierarchical clustering for voltage control example 
 
Results of the QT clustering algorithm, with a threshold of 0.04 and a maximum cluster size of 
five, the clusters are given by column 1 of Table 3.  The QT algorithm shows similar results to 
the hierarchical algorithm.  Buses which were the last to join a cluster in the hierarchical method 
are shown by the QT algorithm to be their own cluster.  The rest of the buses are in two groups.  
If the maximum cluster size is increased to eight instead of five, the buses in the second cluster 
become part of the large group, which coincides with the large group we saw form in the 
hierarchical method. 
 
Bus # 5 8 9 10 11 12 15 16 17 19 20 243 4
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Results of the CI algorithm, both the reciprocal and simple clusters, are identified in columns 2 
and 3 of Table 3.  The same bus may belong to multiple reciprocal clusters, so some regions 
overlap.  Buses with voltages not coupled to any other voltages form their own simple cluster. 
 
Table 3. RTS clusters, each shown in brackets 
QT CI - Reciprocal  CI - Simple  
[3], [4],[5],[8],[9],[24] [9,11,12] [4],[5],[8] 
[10, 12, 11, 17, 20] [15,16,17] [3,24],[3,15,24] 
[15, 16, 19] [16,17,19] [9,11,12],[10,11,12] 
 [19,20] [9,10,11,12] 
 [3, 24] [15,16,17,24] 
  [15,16,17,19], [19,20] 
 
Based on the reciprocal clusters of the CI algorithm and the additional buses 4, 5, 8, and 10 we 
identify for each group l supportive buses; let l=5.  Each set of buses appears as a group in the 
first column of Table 4.  Thus, each region’s five most supporting buses are given by subsequent 
columns of Table 4, in order of decreasing support effectiveness.  Supporting buses may only be 
CAT1 buses. The supportive buses are listed based on the maximum of the sensitivities of the 
voltages of the buses in column 1 to reactive power injections. The sensitivity to each supporter 
bus’s reactive power injection is given beneath the bus number.  
 
Table 4. RTS reactive support groups 
Voltage-Coupled Groups 
5 Supporter Buses and their 
Corresponding Sensitivities 
4 4 9 3 8 24 
 
0.071 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.004 
5 5 10 8 9 4 
 
0.050 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.001 
10 10 5 8 9 4 
 
0.024 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.003 
9,11,12 9 4 3 8 24 
 
0.034 0.019 0.015 0.008 0.007 
15,16,17 15 24 16 19 3 
 
0.013 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.006 
16,17,19 19 16 15 20 24 
 
0.017 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.005 
19,20 19 20 16 15 24 
 
0.017 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.003 
3,24 3 24 9 4 15 
 
0.063 0.028 0.015 0.008 0.006 
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The hybrid approach of Table 4 uses information we know about how voltages can be controlled 
with respect to other voltages and also ensures that each bus voltage will have at least l 
supporters. 
 
3.3. Local Market Power Potential Identification 
In this section, sensitivities and clustering are shown to provide valuable insight into the problem 
of market power potential identification.  The sensitivities of power flows on constrained lines to 
generator output reveal generators which form load pockets under certain binding transmission 
system constraints.  Details and results are reported in [69] and [70].   Our approach uses this 
sensitivity information to assess the ability of certain generators to exhibit local market power, a 
major concern to ISOs. 
 
Market power is defined as the ability of a market participant to profitably maintain prices above 
a competitive level for a significant period of time [71] and can distort competition in electric 
markets [72].  In an electricity market, the substitutability of suppliers depends on the structure 
and capacity of the electric power grid.  When the market is competitive, if a generator 
unilaterally raises its price above marginal cost, it loses customers [73].  However, under 
transmission congestion, suppliers may possess the ability to manipulate the market to their 
advantage when their product is no longer substitutable. The ability of non-substitutable 
generators to raise prices without impacting dispatch is hereafter referred to as ―load pocket 
potential‖ (LPP).  Identification of generators with LPP is achieved using sensitivity information 
available from the linear programming optimal power flow (LP OPF). The LP OPF is a well-
known method for solving optimal redispatch problems [74],[75],[76]. The impact of network 
constraints on admissible price perturbations in the form of a sensitivity matrix is considered to 
group generators with the potential to exhibit local market power [69].    
 
The pattern of possible prices is entirely governed by the network characteristics and constraints. 
Each binding network constraint introduces a degree of freedom in price perturbations, as 
explained in [69].  The difference between possible or ―admissible‖ price patterns and realized 
prices is treated in [77].  The theory builds on prior work [73, 78,  79, 77] in which the sensitivity 
of dispatch and revenues to price is analyzed, accounting for the impact of transmission system 
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constraints, and admissible LMPs.  In this application, it is found that the pattern of admissible 
LMPs is spanned by vectors associated with constrained line sensitivities, so the basis for 
admissible price perturbations can be calculated from these sensitivities.  Also, the effect of any 
number of network constraints may be considered simultaneously. 
 
In identifying LPP, we seek instances of price perturbation vectors with a relatively small 
number of concentrated, non-zero entries. Associated with these entries, a small number of 
suppliers may jointly share the ability to manipulate prices.  In economic experiments such as 
those done at Cornell University [77], pairs of suppliers with joint market power potential always 
discover this ability without direct collusion.  However, buyers and sellers who are less favored 
in terms of market power cannot overcome this disadvantage through learning [80].     
 
A basis for these price perturbation vectors is the null space of a price dispatch sensitivity matrix 
which can be derived from the first order conditions of optimality [77, 81].  The same 
information can be obtained from transmission constraint sensitivities.  The basis is the same as 
that of the augmented constrained line dispatch sensitivities (generation shift factors), easily 
determined as a by-product of the LP OPF.  Thus, constrained line sensitivities efficiently 
determine a basis for admissible price perturbation vectors.  This application analyzes 
sensitivities and highlights certain vectors which show concentrated price variations in the fewest 
entries.  
 
For simplicity, a DC OPF model with only generator MW outputs as controls is considered.  The 
concepts can be sufficiently explained using this model, and extension of this model is possible 
but is a lengthy topic.  In the model, 
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Ci(Pgi) is the generator cost function that depends on the dispatch Pgi.  The first constraint 
represents the relation of power injections to bus angle , and the second constraint imposes the 
binding line flow Pflow constraints.  Branch susceptances are specified in b.  Subscript f denotes 
quantities associated with the constrained lines, which are specified in this model.  
Unconstrained lines are below their limits and are not shown. Matrix A is a branch-node 
incidence matrix that describes the topology of the network. From this model, we show that a 
basis for possible price perturbation vectors can be determined from sensitivities.  For more 
analysis, refer to [69].   
 
3.3.1. Generator Clustering and Price Perturbations  
The LPP algorithm comprises two steps, an initial generator clustering step followed by a step to 
find admissible price perturbation vectors.  The results reveal groups of generators with the 
potential to exercise market power under the conditions. Each step is briefly explained below.  
Then, overviews of clustering algorithms implemented for this work which are not already 
introduced in Section 3.2 are provided in the sections to follow.  These include the K-means 
algorithm and an adaptation of the agglomerative algorithm which is special because of its 
integration with efficient data structure tools.  In particular, tools called k-d trees and minimal 
spanning trees are implemented to enable hierarchical clustering to be performed quickly, even 
for the large systems studied in this work. Otherwise, the use of hierarchical clustering for large 
systems is not generally feasible. The QT algorithm and the CI algorithm are also implemented 
for this work, introduced in Section 3.2.   
 
The first stage of the LPP algorithm is the clustering stage, where sets of candidate generator 
groupings are formed.  We start with the augmented sensitivities S from the LP OPF and 
compute an orthonormal basis B using singular value decomposition (SVD; SVD is explained in 
Chapter 2).  The computation order of SVD is O(nm
2
).  In this application, m is the number of 
constraints, which is small, so this process is not a computational burden.  Rows of B are then 
clustered to provide us with the following block matrix structure: 
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where k is the number of clusters, Δy is a particular network-admissible price perturbation 
vector, and x is a weighting vector (to be determined).  In (43), the rows of B are shown grouped 
together with other generators in the same cluster. Various clustering algorithms have been 
implemented and evaluated for LPP identification; extensive details are found in [70].   
 
Clustering reflects the fact that generators with similar impact on the constrained lines may be 
able to jointly raise their prices without affecting dispatch.  To see this, consider the network 
topology and constraints shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Seven-bus system - initial LMPs and generator dispatches are shown 
 
A load pocket situation exists for bus 6 and bus 7.  Incrementally, the load at these buses can 
only be supplied by the generators at these buses due to the constrained line between buses 2 and 
6.   Also, both Gen. 6 and Gen. 7 can independently exercise market power.  To see why this is 
true, look at the one-line diagram and suppose Gen. 6 increases its price by 1 $/MWh.  The load 
will accept this price in order to satisfy power balance and in order not to further overload the 
constrained lines. The same situation is true for Gen. 7.  Thus, we expect that Gen. 6 alone, Gen. 
7 alone, and Gen. 1, 2, and 4 combined will have some amount of market power potential.   The 
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algorithm results support this intuitive example.  Our approach simply extends this notion to 
identify groups that are not as obvious.   
 
The second stage of the algorithm determines a price perturbation vector Δy in the space of 
network-admissible vectors to maximize price perturbations for the candidate generators while 
minimizing price perturbations for the other generators.  It is suitable to consider only one cluster 
at a time and attempt to find a price perturbation vector that will allow those generators to 
experience LPP.  For each cluster i, we partition B into a matrix Bi consisting of the rows of B 
which are in i, and a matrix B-i consisting of all other rows. The subscript –i is used to denote 
generators which are not in group i.  This gives us k problems of the following form: 
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where the elements in Δyi should be much larger than those of  Δy-i.  That is, for each cluster i, 
we want to achieve an x so that Δy is of the desired form.  The objective function may be 
rewritten as 
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The maximum is obtained by choosing x to be the eigenvector corresponding to the largest 
eigenvalue λmax of Bi’ for each cluster i.  The proof is given in [69]. 
 
3.3.2. K-Means Clustering Algorithm 
The K-means technique is one clustering method which has shown to be satisfactory for 
identifying LPP groups.  It is also one of the oldest and most widely used clustering algorithms 
in practice.  Details are found in [22].  The algorithm is simple and fast (polylogarithmic) in 
practice [82], although in theory it has polynomial smoothed running time [83].  K-means is a 
prototype-based partitional clustering scheme which represents K clusters by their centroids.  
The centroid is typically the mean of the points in the cluster.  The K-means algorithm proceeds 
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as follows: First, K points are chosen as the initial cluster centroids. Then, each point is assigned 
to the closest centroid.  Each collection of points is a cluster.  Then, centroids for each cluster are 
recomputed.  The process ends when points stop changing clusters, equivalent to when the 
centroids stop changing.  
 
The K-means algorithm is locally optimal since, by assigning points to their closest centroid, it 
minimizes the SSE in (2) for a given set of centroids.  However, K-means may not result in a 
globally optimal clustering since each iteration considers specific centroids, and the algorithm 
considers a specific number of clusters.  In fact, different runs of K-means for different 
initializations will generally result in a different SSE.  To avoid this problem, K-means can be 
run multiple times, where the results with the lowest SSE are used.  A lower SSE means that the 
centroids or prototypes of the given clustering are a more accurate representation of the groups in 
the data.   
 
While results are sensitive to choice of initial centroids, no initialization methods appear to be 
without problems.  For example, consider random initialization, which is a commonly attempted 
remedy [22].  The first initial centroid may be selected at random; then for each additional initial 
centroid, the point that is the furthest away from the current centroids may be selected.  The 
problem is that this method can select outliers in sparse regions of the space and is also 
computationally intensive [22].  Outliers cause clusters to be less well represented by a centroid 
and thus make the SSE larger.   
 
A variant called the bisecting K-means algorithm may be used to apply post-processing.  In post-
processing, a cluster can be split or a new cluster centroid may be added, thereby increasing the 
number of clusters.  To decrease the number of clusters, a cluster can be ―dispersed‖ by 
removing the centroid and reassigning points in that cluster to the remaining clusters.  Clusters 
can be merged based on the proximity of their centroids to each other or based on whichever 
merger would result in the smallest increase to the SSE.  Bisecting K-means successively splits 
points into two clusters and keeps splitting clusters until K clusters are obtained.  The bisecting 
K-means algorithm can be considered a type of hierarchical clustering algorithm if the results at 
each stage are recorded.    
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A limitation of K-means is the difficulty in detecting clusters with non-spherical shapes, since 
clusters are formed based on the distance of points to centroids, and the results can be misleading 
when the ―natural‖ clusters have different densities [22].   As an example, Figure 7 shows one 
large, sparse natural cluster and two small, dense natural clusters.  The clusters found by K-
means, with centroids indicated by crosses, may represent the large cluster as two while 
representing the two dense clusters as one.   These results can be deceptive, especially if the 
small dense clusters are of more interest than the sparse clusters.  In our market power work, for 
example, this problem may be of concern. 
 
 
 
This is also a suitable place to mention a challenge of high dimensional data.  Figure 7 shows 
data points in 2D, but the data we deal with is in k dimensions.  It is challenging to understand 
and visualize clusters of data that exists in k dimensions, when only 2D or 3D display is possible. 
 
3.3.3. Minimal Spanning Tree Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm 
In the LPP work, it is useful to look at how the groups form and to validate results against other 
clustering methods.  Basic hierarchical clustering has been described in Section 3.2.3.  This 
section focuses on the data structure tools which make agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
computationally efficient for large systems.  A byproduct of these tools is that results can be 
displayed in a clear, visual way.        
 
Before outlining the data structure tools used, it is important to understand the properties of the 
algorithm we wish to exploit.  In particular, the merging of clusters in agglomerative clustering 
can be done using single-linkage, in which the distance between two clusters is computed as the 
Figure 7. K-means problem with clusters of different density 
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minimum distance between its elements.  We use agglomerative, single-linkage clustering 
analysis (SLCA) in this work.  A known issue with SLCA is referred to as the chaining effect, 
which means that, due to the way clusters are formed, it is possible for two items in the same 
cluster to be farther apart than two items in different clusters.   
 
Making hierarchical clustering efficient is a key issue for practical implementation.  A poor 
implementation can have computational complexity of O(n
3
).  Generally, however, hierarchical 
clustering has complexity O(n
2
).  A main factor in the computational cost is the need to compute 
distances between all points.   Thus, nearest-neighbor searching is an important sub-problem that 
must be carefully handled.   
 
Since the underlying issue which increases computational complexity has to do with nearest-
neighbor searches, much effort has been devoted to making these searches as fast as possible and 
reducing the number of searches needed.   We utilize a data structure called a k-d tree to partition 
the items in the k-dimensional coordinate space.  K-d trees were introduced in [84], and [85] 
describes how to efficiently use them to find the m nearest neighbors of a given query point.  A 
k-d tree is a binary search tree in multiple dimensions.  A simple 2-D kd-tree for points  (2,3), 
(5,4), (9,6), (4,7), (8,1), and (7,2) is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
The levels of the tree cycle through each of the k axes of the data.  The tree is formed recursively 
by cycling through the axes and splitting the data at the median point for each axis.  Since the 
median value is used to split the data, the tree is balanced by design.  The k-d tree can be built in 
O(nlogn) time.  Construction of k-d trees and different types of queries on the data using k-d 
trees are discussed in [84].  In this context, the type of query we are most interested in is a 
nearest-neighbor query.  That is, given any point, we want to search the tree and return the point 
with the smallest distance to the query point.  Nearest-neighbor searches using k-d trees are 
(5,4) 
(2,3) (7,2) 
(4,7) (8,1) (9,6) 
Figure 8. Example 2-D kd-tree 
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discussed in detail in [85], where k-d trees are shown to be efficiently used for searching for the 
m nearest neighbors of a query point.  There are several variants on k-d trees and the associated 
algorithms, and details of our implementation are found in [70].   
 
It is worth mentioning that k-d trees can be used to improve implementations of other clustering 
algorithms, as well.  For example, density of points in space is the basis for clusters in the 
DBSCAN algorithm.  Regions of high density are located and separated from regions of low 
density.  Points are either (1) inside of a dense region (a core point), (2) on the edge of a dense 
region (a border point), or (3) in a sparse region (a noise or background point), defined in [22].  
Density is estimated by counting the number of points within a radius, which must be specified, 
of the current point.  The highest possible density includes all points and the lowest possible 
density is 1.  This algorithm time complexity is typically O(n
2
), but can be improved using k-d 
trees [22]. In DBSCAN, as in hierarchical methods, there is a need to do expensive nearest-
neighbor computations, but k-d trees can expedite this process.  An advantage of DBSCAN is its 
ability to identify clusters of unusual shapes, especially when there is a noisy background 
environment.  For applications where outliers are not important, DBSCAN is useful.  This type 
of clustering has proven useful in extending the non-intrusive load monitoring work in [86] on 
identifying signatures of household loads.  
 
Minimal spanning trees have an important relationship to SLCA. The relationship between 
minimal spanning trees and SLCA is proven in [87] and is also recognized in [88] and [89].  
Consider a set of nodes and a set of edges or branches connecting the nodes.  The minimal 
spanning tree (MST) is a subset of the branches of a graph which has the minimum total distance 
while providing a route between every pair of nodes [90].  Fast algorithms for constructing 
minimal spanning trees in coordinate spaces are discussed in [90].  We implement an 
approximate minimal spanning tree algorithm which uses the concept of k-d trees, introduced 
above, to perform efficient nearest-neighbor searches.  The fundamentals of using minimal 
spanning trees for SLCA are given in [91].  Understanding this connection requires introducing 
the concepts of a fragment and a nearest-neighbor chain.  Simply stated, a fragment is a part of 
the final MST, and a nearest-neighbor chain is a particular way to form a fragment, building it 
towards increasing density.  More formal explanations are given in [70] and [91].   
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For the simple one-dimensional example in Figure 9, we can form a nearest-neighbor chain from 
Point A consisting of A→B→C→D and a nearest-neighbor chain from Point H consisting of 
H→G→F→E. Then, the final MST is formed by linking together the existing nearest-neighbor 
chains, in this case by connecting D and E.  From the MST, a dendogram is easily constructed to 
represent the SLCA hierarchy, as shown in Figure 10.  The conversion of the MST to obtain the 
hierarchy is discussed in [89].    
 
 
Figure 9. Set of points (left) connected into two fragments (right) 
 
 
Figure 10. Connecting the MST (left) and dendogram of the hierarchy (right) 
 
The multiple-fragment algorithm, Algorithm 6 in [91], is based on the minimal spanning tree 
algorithm (MST) and approximate minimal spanning tree algorithm (AMST) of [90].  As the 
multi-fragment algorithm builds its fragments, the fragments obtained are essentially clusters.  
The links used to connect these fragments are unnecessary if they are going to be deleted anyway 
as we aggregate the clusters.  In hierarchical clustering, it is practical to stop after clusters have 
attained some desired size, and not to continue the process until all items are in one cluster.  
Thus, we may have no need to connect the fragments at all.  For details about these structural 
tools, refer to [70].  
 
Special data structures, such as minimal spanning trees and k-d trees, are themselves valuable 
tools to efficiently search for relationships in the data.  Minimal spanning trees and k-d trees also 
provide a way of mapping multi-attribute data into two dimensions.  These tools lend themselves 
to the subfield of data mining called knowledge discovery in data sets (KDD), which has the goal 
of aiding the user in learning about the data: the user applies KDD techniques which reveal some 
new insight to the user; then the user applies this new insight to develop the next stage of the 
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data mining or learning process. Many problems, including finding the minimum spanning tree 
and triangulation, rely on the proximities of N points.  In 2D or 3D, the problem is simplified, 
and is often encountered when connecting terminals or routing cables using minimal wire length 
[92],[93]. Closest-point problems in 2D or 3D can be solved in O(nlogn) time using a Voronoi 
diagram [94]. 
 
3.3.4. Application to Large Systems   
Results of this work for various study scenarios of different sizes, both academic test systems 
and large utility test systems with real constraints, are presented in [69] and [70].    Briefly 
summarized in this section are results for two large-case examples in the Eastern Interconnect.  
Details are available in [70].  A total of 43,311 buses are present in the Eastern Interconnect.   
 
For LPP identification, a cluster quality metric is introduced in [70] for the purpose of comparing 
results from different clustering methods.  For a given scenario, LPP is said to exist if a 
clustering of generators is found, where for at least one cluster i, the objective function evaluated 
at the optimal value of x produces well-separated price perturbation vectors.  To measure this 
quality of the clusters, we define fLPP, 
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where Ni denotes the number of generators in LPP group i and N-i denotes all other generators.  
The values of fLPP are between -1 and 1.  When LPP exists, the values are near 1.  Conversely, 
fLPP near 0 indicates that the price perturbation vector is not well separated, where generators 
outside of the LPP group may have substantial non-zero price perturbations.  For each group in a 
clustering, a price perturbation vector Δy is found, and (46) is evaluated.  The fLPP provides 
information about the extent to which an algorithm has succeeded in identifying load pockets, 
which is important for our application.  The need for developing metrics, exhibited here, is also 
seen throughout this thesis. 
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All price perturbation vectors found from the algorithm, by definition, result in no change in 
dispatch [69].  Generators outside of the LPP cluster are assumed not to change their prices, 
which is why we search for vectors with entries in Δy-i which are zero.  However, they are not 
always exactly zero.  Experimentally, we have found that even when these entries are not exactly 
zero, we can often approximate them as zero by implementing the price perturbations only for 
the generators in the LPP cluster, and the result still produces no change in dispatch. Thus, rather 
than requiring fLPP exactly equal to 1 for LPP to exist, values slightly less than 1 may also be 
acceptable.  For the test cases, results are shown where fLPP > 0.9.  Presumably, there is some 
threshold where, if entries in Δy-i become too large, they are no longer negligible in this manner.  
However, more research is needed to identify this threshold by examining the range over which 
price perturbation vectors of the desired form exist. 
 
The first area of interest, which we refer to as Area A, has 6,453 buses and 638 generators, and 
six binding constraints are considered.  Results are shown in Table 5.       
 
Table 5. Area A clustering results 
Algorithm 
No. Total 
Clusters 
No. of Clusters 
with fLPP>0.9 
fLPP of 
Clusters > 0.9 
Gens in Clusters 
QT, 0.25 6 5 
0.999 37550 
0.989 5067 
0.927 9380, 9124, 9123, 9078 
0.998 37658, 37657, 37656, 37655 
1 32,32 
QT, 0.1 10 4 
0.999 37550 
0.989 5067 
0.998 37658, 37657, 37656, 37655 
1 32,32 
K-Means, 6 6 4 
0.999 37550 
0.998 37658, 37657, 37656, 37655 
0.998 32 
0.998 32 
K-Means, 7 7 4 
0.999 37550 
0.998 37658, 37657, 37656, 37655 
0.998 32 
0.998 32 
CI 6 1 1 32,32 
Agglo., 7 7 3 
0.989 5067 
0.999 37550 
0.998 37658, 37657, 37656, 37655 
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A second large example case is referred to as Area B.  A list of binding constraints is available 
on the MISO website [95].  For each day, a file records the binding constraints in the system 
every five minutes.  A constraint which was biding 119 times for an arbitrary day is given in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Example MISO binding constraints 
Constraint Name Branch Name Contingency Description No. Times Binding 
'AMI13148_OTTO
WATP_IP-1516_2' 
'OTTOWATP IP-1516 2 
(LN/AMIL/AMIL)' 
'HENNEPIN - HALLOCK 
138 (1512)' 119 
 
Figure 11 shows several buses in the area of interest.  The contingency is represented by opening 
the line between ―4RICHLND JCT‖ and ―4TLV STL ETP.‖  The thick, dark line is assumed to 
be binding.  Results in Table 7 indicate that two well-separated clusters are found. The small 
cluster contains two generators at the same bus. 
 
 
Figure 11. An LPP group for the Area B scenario 
 
Table 7. Area B clustering results 
Algorithm 
No. Total 
Clusters 
No. of Clusters 
with fLPP>0.9 
fLPP of 
Clusters > 0.9 
Gens in fLPP>0.9 
Clusters 
QT, 0.25 2 1 0.999 349107, 349107 
QT, 0.1 4 1 0.999 349107, 349107 
K-Means, 2 2 1 0.999 349107, 349107 
K-Means, 3 3 1 0.999 349107, 349107 
CI 2 0 - - 
Agglo., 7 2 1 0.999 349107 
4S OTTAWA
  0.0 Mvar
4OTTAWA JCT
4OTTAWA
4HENNEPIN N
4HALLOCK
2HALLOCK
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4MARSEILLES
4N LASALLE
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To further evaluate our clustering results, the fLPP of randomly generated clusters is examined.  A 
random number of clusters are created, and generators are assigned at random to these clusters.  
Results of five random clusterings on three different systems are shown in Table 8.   As the 
larger study systems are examined, randomly selected clusters are less likely to select ―true‖ 
clusters.  The random-clustering results are poor for both large systems, as expected; out of five 
clusterings, there are no clusters with fLPP>0.9. 
 
Table 8.  fLPP for random cluster assignments 
Case 
No. of 
Clusters 
No. Clusters 
with fLPP>0.9 
Max fLPP of any 
Cluster 
IEEE  
118 
6 0 0.653 
10 1 0.956 
7 0 0.653 
12 1 0.986 
3 0 0.312 
Area A 
223 0 0.842 
195 0 0.482 
170 0 0.493 
157 0 0.412 
3 0 0.183 
Area B 
27 0 0.125 
31 0 0.059 
118 0 0.497 
49 0 0.064 
126 0 0.247 
 
3.4. Conclusions  
It is clear from the work in this chapter that considerable insight can gained from sensitivities.  
Clustering sensitivities allows for the selection and aggregation of network elements with the 
ability to ―help each other‖ solve problems.  Several clustering algorithms are found useful, 
including an algorithm we created based on the coupling index.  It is also shown that appropriate 
data structure tools, k-d trees and minimal spanning trees in particular, are indispensible for 
achieving the computational efficiency needed for studying large systems, particularly for 
hierarchical clustering.  Applications throughout this thesis employ sensitivities to characterize 
relationships; that insight has been revealed in this chapter.   
  
Sensitivities and clustering are shown to facilitate the coordination of multiple devices to achieve 
a control objective in Section 3.2.  A specific case of system voltage control via distributed 
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reactive power sources is presented.  Centralized control is assumed; there remains opportunity 
for work on the decentralized problem.  For example, one may be able to design a control 
scheme in terms of constrained information patterns, which considers the amount of information 
available to each controller [96], [40].      
 
A sensitivity-based grouping approach for LPP identification is presented in Section 3.3.   
Results reveal that the identified LPP groups are strikingly consistent, regardless of the choice of 
clustering method and parameters.  There are a few differences, which are examined in [70].  
This method-independence of the results is a key strength.  Also, although it has not been 
emphasized, the entire MST and all clusterings in the agglomerative hierarchy are available.  
This additional information shows exactly how the clusters merge with each other as the size of 
clusters increases, which can make the discovered relationships easier to understand. There is a 
need, evident from this chapter, for more quantitative metrics to define acceptable grouping 
results.   
 
The key conclusion is that sensitivities provide a repository of patterns useful for power systems 
analysis which may be exploited by myriad machine learning, data mining, and pattern 
recognition tools.  The concepts, data structures, and algorithmic tools developed in Chapter 3 
are general, and the framework is in place for their wide-ranging application.  We utilize the 
observations, results, and tools from Chapter 3 in subsequent chapters, Chapter 4 in particular.  
The work in this chapter also underscores the importance of secure communications and control, 
considered in Chapter 7.     
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4. Estimation of Network Models  
The validity of power network models is important; the model needs to be consistent with the 
data which is obtained.  The critical role of network modeling is obvious; results of power 
systems analysis are only as valid as the models they are based upon.  The goal of the 
applications presented in this chapter is to gain insight into the characteristics of the network, in 
the form of a model, through the use of data mining techniques.  Section 4.1 examines how 
model validity in power systems can be assessed and improved with the aid of measurement 
data.  The first application, in Section 4.2, presents the estimation of a static equivalent model 
from data.  The second application, in Section 4.3, examines the development of structure-
preserving reduced network models.  The third application, in Section 4.4, is similar to the first 
application except that rather than estimate an equivalent model, the parameters on specific lines 
are estimated using historical data.   
 
4.1. Data Capabilities for Network Modeling   
This section describes how utilizing data can enable improved network modeling.  The 
availability of PMU data motivates the first application.  High-precision time-stamped data are 
obtained from PMUs at typical rates of 30 samples per second (1 sample per 2 cycles for a 60 Hz 
system).  A single PMU’s analog measurement quantities may include multiple three-phase 
voltages and currents and their positive sequence quantities, frequency, and the rate of change of 
frequency [7].  There are many opportunities for this data to improve the reliable operation of 
power systems, and the North American Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI) exists to help 
advance these efforts [97].  PMU data can be shared over a communications network in real time 
and collected at a centralized device, called a phasor data concentrator (PDC) [98].  NASPInet 
will enable PMU data sharing so that utilities can use the data for situational awareness, event 
analysis for operations and planning, model validation, real-time control and protection, system 
restoration, and more [99].  There are many Recovery Act synchrophasor projects in various 
stages of development [97], and NASPInet is likely to be an important factor in achieving long-
term satisfaction from the projects.    
 
The model identification problem considered in this application is motivated in part by the fact 
that a spreadsheet of data is often obtained with no accompanying information for mapping the 
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data points to the real-world system.  PMU data is being made available to researchers in limited 
forms through non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) [97], but often underlying models of the 
system are unavailable or incomplete.  In fact, the underlying system model may be unknown, 
even to the owners of the PMUs.  Still, there is a need to know what events are actually 
occurring even when one does not have detailed knowledge about the system.  Thus, a natural 
question is whether it is possible to develop such models from the data itself.   An equivalent 
model of the network estimated such that it is matched to the PMU buses may be helpful in 
analyzing the system.  In [100], we explore the use of PMU data to gain information about the 
system for this purpose.   
 
Fundamental to these applications is exploiting the benefit of data-over-time.  A small example 
can be used to show the concept of using data from multiple time points to obtain more 
information about the system.  To examine how measurements over time can improve an 
estimate, consider the three-bus example in Figure 12. Let P12, P32, θ1, and θ3 denote 
measurements at one instance in time. The unknown variables are denoted by a hat.   
 
 
 
  12 1 2 12ˆ ˆ/P x    (47) 
  32 3 2 23ˆ ˆ/P x    (48) 
 
At first glance, it appears that there is not enough information to solve for the unknown 
impedances, since θ2 is also unknown.  However, if we observe the operating point of the system 
at multiple snapshots, it becomes apparent that we actually do have enough information.  If new 
measurements P12, P32, θ1, and θ3 are taken at time instance b, the value of the unmeasured θ2, 
will also be different (presumably).  This adds two equations, but only one new unknown. 
12P
12 ?x  23 ?x 
1 3
32P
1 2 3
2 ? 
Figure 12. Two-impedance example circuit 
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  12 1 2 12ˆ ˆ/b b bP x    (49) 
  32 3 2 23ˆ ˆ/b b bP x    (50) 
 
With four equations and four unknowns, we can accurately solve for the values of x12 and x23.  
As long as enough sufficiently different operating points are obtained, it is possible to improve 
estimates by taking samples over time.  These are fundamental concepts which facilitate the use 
of data to enhance power system models.   
 
4.2. Computation of Equivalent at PMU Buses Based on Data 
Data mining in the form of system identification techniques can be used for constructing PMU-
based equivalents.  This application computes an equivalent as seen from the PMU buses. Details 
and results are reported in [100]. The ultimate question is to determine how far down we can see 
into the system and what we are able to observe.  Initially, a worst-case, ―model-free,‖ point of 
view is adopted, where it is assumed that there is no knowledge of the underlying system.   
 
From the discussion of sensitivities in Chapter 3 and the analysis in [100], it is apparent that 
information about the power flow Jacobian J and its inverse can be obtained from PMU data.  
The Jacobian reveals information about the structure and the behavior of the underlying network.  
Consider that analytical sensitivities in the Jacobian can be verified empirically by changing the 
load at each bus by a small amount and then solving a power flow to observe the resulting angle 
changes. The empirical computation of sensitivities is fundamentally the same concept which 
allows B to be estimated from PMU data.  For simplicity, we denote the network model B, and 
the application is described in terms of the basic DC power flow assumptions [101],[102].  The 
estimate recovered is actually the negative of the real power vs. angle portion of J.  Details are 
explained in [100].  It is clear that computation of B requires n linearly independent sets of 
injections and their corresponding angle changes.  Ideally, a small load perturbation should 
originate from each bus, one at a time.  In reality, the changes could be anything. 
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4.2.1. PMU-Based Equivalent Estimation 
In [103], a method is presented for estimating an external equivalent based on the measurements 
at the boundary buses.  An adaptation of this method applies to PMU buses.  Generally, each 
PMU bus is connected to at least one non-PMU bus. With PMUs, angles can be measured 
directly, whereas in [103] they must come from a state estimator.  At PMU buses, denoted by 
subscript P, real powers and angles are measured.  Subscript E denotes all other (external) buses, 
where we assume no data is available.  Thus, the system can be partitioned as 
 
 
     
     
     
P PP PE P
E EP EE E
ΔP B B Δθ
ΔP B B Δθ
 (51) 
 
where the second equation of (51) can be written as 
 
   -1E EE E EP PΔθ B ΔP B Δθ  (52) 
 
Substituting (52) into the first equation of (51) reduces to 
 
      
-1
P PP P PE EE E EP PΔP B Δθ B B ΔP B Δθ  (53) 
      -1 -1P PP PE EE EP P PE EE EΔP B B B B Δθ B B ΔP  (54) 
 
If ΔPE in (54) is zero, the relationship between ΔPP and ΔθP is completely characterized by BPP-
BPEBEE
-1
BEP. We can define an equivalent injection associated with the angle changes at the 
PMU buses and rewrite (54): 
 
    -1eq P PE EE EΔP ΔP B B ΔP  (55) 
    -1eq PP PE EE EP PΔP B B B B Δθ  (56) 
 
Thus, the correct estimation of BPP-BPEBEE
-1
BEP from PMU measurements requires an 
adjustment of the power injection measurement values at the PMU buses by first subtracting 
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BPEBEE
-1ΔPE from the true injections.   That is, we must subtract an amount from each PMU bus 
injection equal to  
 
   -1adjust PE EE EΔP B B ΔP  (57) 
 
However, BPEBEE
-1ΔPE is unknown, and even the dimension of ΔPE may be unknown. Such an 
―adjusted estimate‖ results in the true equivalent at the PMU buses.  If ΔPE is zero or if the entire 
expression in (57) is zero, no adjustment is needed, and the estimate obtained will be the true 
equivalent. We are interested in knowing under what conditions this is zero and the quality of an 
estimate we can obtain by assuming it to be zero, due to lack of better information. Then, 
perhaps we can characterize what the adjustment value needs to be in order to obtain a more 
accurate estimate.  All external buses may be reduced to one bus, and then we only need to 
consider scalar values of PE and BEE.  The vector BPE may be known in reality if the utility 
knows what is connected to each of the PMU buses.  For the following discussion, let us assume 
that the adjustment term is zero (or that it is known, effectively making it zero).   
 
The estimate of BPP-BPEBEE
-1
BEP is computed using vectors ΔPP and ΔθP at r time points, which 
can be combined into the matrices Pr and θr, respectively: 
 
 
 
 
(1), , ( )
(1), , ( )
r
r


r P P
r P P
P ΔP ΔP
θ Δθ Δθ
 (58) 
 
The solution obtained is equivalent to minimizing the objective function J, 
 
   
1
( ) ( ) ( )
r
i
J i i i i

   P est P P est PΔP B Δθ ( ) ΔP B Δθ  (59) 
 
so that an estimate for B is obtained from the least-squares estimate: 
 
  
-1
T T
est r r r rB P θ θ θ  (60) 
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When this estimate is obtained, the residual term 
 
 P est PΔP B Δθ  (61) 
 
is as small as possible for all given ΔPP and ΔθP. 
 
An advantage of this approach is that it can readily handle situations where two buses are not 
connected to each other.  Conversely, with other estimation approaches, numerical problems are 
encountered when attempting to estimate the value of B (or line impedance z) for lines which are 
actually out of service. 
 
4.2.2. Incorporating Additional Measurements 
The above estimate is computed assuming that for each PMU bus, both power injection and 
angle measurements are known.  The formulation can be extended to include buses where only 
partial data, either the real power injection or the angle, is known.  The approach for 
incorporating additional measurements into the estimate is described in [100].   
 
To model additional measurements, we first divide the system into PMU buses and the external 
system.  Then, the system is further divided to distinguish buses which may have either known 
power injection measurements ΔPK or known angle measurements ΔθK. The unknown external 
angles are ΔθU and the unknown external injections are ΔPU. 
 
 
     
     
     
          
P PP PU PK P
K KP KU KK U
U UP UU UK K
ΔP B B B Δθ
ΔP B B B Δθ
ΔP B B B Δθ
 (62) 
 
Solving the second equation in (62) for ΔθU,  
 
    -1U KU K KP P KK KΔθ B ΔP B Δθ B Δθ  (63) 
 
and substituting (63) into the first equation in (62), we obtain the following after simplification: 
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 
 
 
      
      
 
 

-1
P PP PU KU KP P
-1
PK PU KU KK K
-1
PU KU K
ΔP B B B B Δθ
B B B B Δθ
B B ΔP
 (64) 
 
which, in matrix form, can be written as 
 
   , ,   
T
T T T
P P K KΔP A' A'' A''' Δθ Δθ ΔP  (65) 
 
where the matrix elements are given by 
 
 
 
 

-1
PP PU KU KP
-1
PK PU KU KK
-1
PU KU
A' B B B B
A'' B B B B
A''' B B
 (66) 
 
and may be estimated as in (60). Instead of the matrix θR consisting of ΔθP, it now consists of 
concatenated vector [ΔθP
 T
, ΔθK
 T
, ΔPK
 T
]
T
 at r time points. Then, the estimate gives us an 
equivalent network connecting PMU buses with PMU buses, PMU buses with known angle 
buses, and PMU buses with known power injection buses. It should be noted that the formulation 
above does not connect the buses where only theta is known or the buses where only the power 
injection is known with each other. 
 
4.2.3. Mapping System Events 
One desired application of the estimate is to relate measurements seen at the PMU buses to 
events in the true system.  This same goal is also motivation for the oscillation monitoring based 
event detection work in Chapter 6.  At the most basic level, if large changes in the system occur, 
the estimate will show a change.  The question is whether or not the cause of the change can be 
determined.  Similarly to monitoring boundary line flows in [104], a large change can serve as an 
indicator that a major event may have occurred in the system:  
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  EQ,normalΔP B Δθ  (67) 
 tol
ΔP
Δθ
 (68) 
 
However, if more detail is to be obtained about the event, other than an indicator that 
―something‖ has occurred, it is necessary to know more about the model.  Thus far, the 
application has taken a completely model-free approach.  Now we relax that assumption.  If the 
base-case or ―normal‖ system is known, a topology change in the full system can be mapped to a 
change in the equivalent system or to a change in equivalent line flow.  Then, it is possible to 
determine the impact of a line outage on the line flows in the equivalent system, as described in 
[100].   
 
Let the base-case system be Bbase.  A line outage in the system has an impact on the matrix of the 
following form: 
 
  base α αB B E  (69) 
 
where Eα is the topology error matrix for the outage of line α.   
 
 
b b
b b
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
αE  (70) 
 
and b is the inverse of the line impedance on line α. To find the expected equivalent BEQ,α at the 
PMU buses after outage of line α, Eα is partitioned and subtracted from the partitioned matrices 
of the B matrix: 
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   
   
,      
,      
   
   
α,PP PP,Base PP,α α,EE EE,Base PP,α
α,PE PE,Base PE,α α,EP EP,Base EP,α
B B E B B E
B B E B B E
 (71) 
   -1EQ,α α,PP α,PE α,EE α,EPB B B B B  (72) 
 
The expected line flows in the equivalent (BEQ,α) are then easily calculated from the equivalent B 
matrix and the true angles at the PMU buses. The angles found from the DC power flow 
solution, using the estimated equivalent, 
 
  -1P EQ EQθ B P  (73) 
 
should always exactly equal the measured angles at the PMU buses.  That is, the equivalencing 
procedure necessarily preserves the system angles as a result of the way the equivalent is made.  
This measured information about the equivalent can then be further analyzed. 
 
4.2.4. Example Equivalent Estimation Cases  
In this section, results of the estimation approach for the seven-bus test system are presented. 
The system is shown in Figure 6 of Chapter 3.  For more details, see [100].  The full B matrix for 
this system is given in Table 9:  
 
Table 9. Actual full system matrix 
 -18.75 15 3.75 0 0 0 0 
 15 -47.5 5 5 7.5 15 0 
 3.75 5 -38.75 30 0 0 0 
B = 0 5 30 -38.75 3.75 0 0 
 0 7.5 0 3.75 -26.25 0 15 
 0 15 0 0 0 -22.5 7.5 
 0 0 0 0 15 7.5 -22.5 
 
In the most ideal situation, every bus would provide information which could be used to estimate 
B.  For such a case, we simulate data by perturbing the load at each bus, except for the slack bus, 
bus 7.  Although bus 1 does not ordinarily have a load, we assign it a load of 0 MW.  As 
expected, using the estimation method with simulated angle and power measurement data, the 
original B is recovered as the estimate Best in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Full system estimated matrix 
 -18.75 15 3.75 0 0 0 
Best = 
15 -47.50 5.00 5.00 7.50 15.00 
3.75 5 -38.75 30 0 0 
0 5.00 30.00 -38.75 3.75 0 
0 7.50 0 3.75 -26.25 0 
 0 15 0 0 0 -22.50 
 
The exception to the perfect recovery in this example is that no information can be obtained 
about the slack bus.  In a real system, these perturbation sets would be obtained from the load 
profile of the system over the course of time, where the perturbations must be diverse in the 
sense that they should include as many buses as possible.   
 
An example of the estimation approach is presented assuming that the PMUs are located at buses 
1, 5, and 6.  Of interest is whether outages of lines not connected to PMU buses manifest 
themselves in a noticeable way.  The Ward equivalent calculated at the PMU buses is denoted 
the actual equivalent in Table 11 and has the line flows given in Table 12. 
 
Table 11. Actual Ward equivalent at PMU buses 1,5, and 6 
BEQ = 
-10.811 4.6573 6.1538 
4.6573 -23.119 3.4615 
6.1538 3.4615 -17.115 
 
Table 12. Line flows in actual equivalent of Table 11 
EQ flows, MW = 
67.86 
41.33 
-66.45 
 
For this case, the estimate Best in Table 13 incorporates injection changes which occur over time 
at all buses in the full system.  The injection sets for this example include equally significant 
perturbations at all the buses, including the external buses for which no data is available to 
compute the estimate.   
 
Table 13. Estimate with external injections 
Best = 
-15.158 16.388 11.512 
1.9809 -14.095 6.7097 
2.9222 10.264 -12.882 
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As expected, the estimate shows that the presence of unmeasured load perturbations in the 
external system can have a significant effect on its accuracy.  However, if the external injection 
term is truly zero, or equivalently if it is possible to compute the adjusted injections in (55), the 
estimate is Best,0 in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Estimate without external injections 
Best,0 = 
-10.811 4.6574 6.1538 
4.6573 -23.119 3.4615 
6.1536 3.4615 -17.115 
 
 
Some observations can be summarized about these estimates: 
1. The equivalent estimated when no injection changes occur at non-PMU buses   
accurately captures B.  
2. The adjusted equivalent also accurately captures B.  
3. The equivalent network is generally a full network with lines connecting all possible 
pairs of buses.  
4. The estimate when injection changes are equally present at both the PMU buses and 
the non-PMU buses does not accurately capture B, and it is not symmetric.   
 
For the same example case, we now examine the impact of line outages.  Single-line outages of 
line (2,4) and line (3,4) result in actual equivalents given by the matrices in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Actual equivalents with line outages 
  BEQ,(2,4) =   
-10.81 4.6695 6.1407 
4.6695 -22.964 3.2942 
6.1407 3.2942 -16.935 
 
BEQ(3,4) = 
-10.11 3.956 6.1538 
3.956 -12.418 8.4615 
6.1538 8.4615 -14.615 
 
There is noticeable impact of both line outages on the equivalent, and the corresponding 
equivalent line flows are given in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Actual equivalent line flows with line outages 
EQ line flows, MW, (2,4) = 
69.53 
39.21 
-70.54 
 
EQ line flows, MW, (3,4) = 
50.71 
35.10 
-60.21 
 
As before, if the external system injection changes are zero, the estimate accurately recovers the 
true equivalent. Thus, one can discern which line outage has occurred.  However, if there are 
considerable injection changes at PMU and non-PMU buses, the estimate will not match the 
actual equivalent.  Examples are shown in [100].  In this case, estimates may deviate 
significantly from the estimate that would be expected given zero external injections.  Although 
this phenomenon presents a significant challenge, assuming these estimated equivalents are 
distinguishable from each other and from the no-outage estimate, it may be possible to do further 
data mining work to identify and classify these event ―signatures.‖   
 
In summary, even if we obtain the best estimate possible, to determine which line in the original 
system experienced an outage requires knowledge of the base-case system.  Then, one can watch 
the expected equivalent line flow changes as an indicator, and that area can be examined in more 
detail following a suspected event.   
 
The changes in equivalent system line flows due to a line outage of each of the ten original lines 
in the seven-bus system are shown in Table 17. Column values are equal to the new equivalent 
line flow minus the original (non-outaged) equivalent line flow. 
 
Table 17. MW changes in equivalent line flows due to line outages in seven-bus system 
  (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (2,4) (2,5) (2,6) (3,4) (4,5) (5,7) (6,7) 
 
EQ(1,5) -16.81 1.09 0. 61 1.67 -21.39 58.75 -17.14 -14.35 14.92 18.08 
EQ(1,6) -8.22 13.20 -4.18 -2.12 28.19 -39.23 -6.24 6.81 -14.92 -18.08 
EQ(5,6) -7.01 -7.60 -4.17 -4.09 -34.14 66.45 6.24 -3.14 19.78 15.65 
 
Comparisons and results of the estimation under various line outages are given in [100].  For this 
small system, each line has a distinct impact on the equivalent, so it is possible to discern which 
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line is out. In general, the mapping of line outages in the full system to changes in equivalent 
system line flows may not be unique. 
 
4.3. Essential Structure Preserving Network Reductions 
When examining large interconnected power systems, performing extensive analysis on the full 
network is often not practical or desirable.  Reduced models of the larger system, referred to as 
network ―equivalents,‖ can be constructed.  By using data mining techniques and with the aid of 
available measurement data, we seek to adaptively reduce the system to obtain models which 
preserve important structural features of a system.  These models are denoted essential structure 
preserving (ESP) models.  We are interested in examining the impact of different equivalencing 
or reduction schemes on properties or purposes of interest, where the desirable features to 
preserve may vary depending on the application.  Examples include LMP characteristics and 
transient stability response.  A notable example is generator coherency, which is considered here.  
Grouping generators together based on coherency is not a new concept, and [105] illustrates the 
feasibility of using clustering to form coherent groups.  This application presents a solution 
approach in two stages, a grouping stage and an aggregation stage, which are considered 
separately.   There are several key aspects of this project; we focus on the application of data 
mining insight to suitably group and aggregate power system elements.  
 
In forming ESP models, we leverage our experience with clustering methods as well as with 
sensitivity analysis, from Chapter 3.  The use of clustering to form subsystems from a larger 
system is presented.   The approach has also been developed into a tool to facilitate the 
systematic creation of reduced systems that accurately represent the full system with respect to 
some desirable properties.    
 
Network reduction techniques, especially the Ward reduction [106], have been used for a long 
time.  Ward reduction modifies injection locations but not branch values or the topology of the 
retained network.  Other more recent reduction techniques [107], for example, aggregate buses 
and optimize branch values between areas so that inter-area flows are reasonably well preserved 
for various dispatches. Another key example is power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) based 
equivalents [108] which preserve the impact of bilateral transactions.  The validity of equivalents 
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should be maintained as the system is changing, and we need to understand how frequently and 
under what conditions modifications are needed.  On-line external network modeling [109] 
differentiates between external equivalent methods, which operate without the use of real-time 
data, and external solution methods which use data to solve a state estimation or power flow 
problem. A forecasting-aided state estimator [110] has a prediction step that uses information 
from past estimates to model how the system state evolves over time.  We believe it is important 
to develop methods which can tune the equivalent to preserve the properties which are 
advantageous for the problem at hand.   
    
4.3.1. Coherency-Based Equivalents 
Much influence for our work on the equivalencing topic comes from the area of coherency 
recognition, so here we briefly describe some of those key insights.  Coherency-preserving 
equivalents are a type of dynamic equivalent, which are useful for transient stability studies. In 
the event that the classical machine model is used, there is a relatively simple relationship [111] 
that can be used to identify coherent generators, which will be described in this section.  It has 
generally been accepted that a classical generator model is sufficient for representing coherency.  
If this coherency-based aggregation is only required for external systems, this approximation 
may be appropriate.  One of the interests in this work is to facilitate validation for machines with 
more complicated dynamic models.    
  
Three classifications of dynamic reduction techniques are modal, physical, and topological [111].  
Modal approaches are based on controllability, observability, and time-scale properties of a 
linearized system. Physical approaches choose model types for components based on their role in 
particular faults.  The topological approach is about aggregation into subsystems, and includes 
coherency methods.  This work can be considered a physical and topological approach. 
 
Using a Ward-type approach in [112], machine inertias are allocated according to distribution 
factors, and a detailed algorithm for computing the reduction is given.  Distribution factors 
relating the eliminated buses to the retained buses can also be obtained.  For coherency-based 
dynamic equivalents, coherency refers to the tendency of generators to swing together.  In 
general, coherency recognition algorithms are focused on predicting the behavior of the 
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trajectory of nonlinear equations before they are solved.  Relationships between parameters that 
indicate coherency, as well as the conditions of both e-coherency (exact coherency) and n-
coherency (near coherency), are discussed in [111].    
 
Early efforts often require transient stability runs to be performed before coherency recognition 
can be done.  One work from 1978 [113] requires simulations with a linearized system and 
contributes some initial results on the subject.  The two key results from [113] are that coherency 
can be determined by considering a linearized model, and that using a classical machine model is 
sufficient to show the coherent groups.  The overall procedure consists of these three steps: (1) 
identification of coherent groups, (2) network reduction of the buses, and (3) dynamic 
aggregation of generating unit models. The need is also recognized for on-line application of 
coherency-based dynamic equivalents and for sensitivity analysis of the coherent groups to fault 
location and to switching (opening and closing) of lines. 
 
The subject of identifying coherent groups of generators is further addressed in [114].  Coherent 
groups are identified based on coupling between generators in the state matrix.  An analytical 
procedure to identify weakly coupled groups and strongly coupled groups through the use of a 
coupling factor is discussed.  Strongly coupled groups are coherent.  Weakly coupled groups are 
independent of fault location.  Results show that machines which are geographically close may 
not be in the same coherent group, which may be a function of the transmission system.    
 
Computational algorithms for constructing modal-coherent dynamic equivalents are described in 
[115].  Inertial averaging is used to aggregate the generators in each of the coherent groups.  A 
coherency measure for different deterministic disturbances can quantify how much error results 
due to reducing the order of the equivalent.  Generators can then be grouped to retain the lowest 
order equivalent that satisfies a reasonable degree of accuracy.   
 
The interarea model estimation (IME) problem is defined and analyzed in [116].  In this analysis, 
a two-area system is used to represent power transfer from one coherent area to another, and it is 
assumed that there is a center point in an equivalent machine for each area where the voltage is 
fixed.  Interarea dynamics of multi-machine power systems are also analyzed in [117]. ―Slow‖ 
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coherency is defined to group machines with identical slow motions.  A singular perturbation is 
used to separate slow and fast variables.  Slow coherency allows machines with different fast 
dynamics to be grouped together, allowing the same groupings to be applicable for different fault 
locations.  Groups of generators which exhibit slow coherency are identified and grouped in 
[118], and these groups are used to demonstrate a controlled islanding strategy on a 
reconstructed pre-blackout case for the August 14, 2003, blackout.  The goal is to contain the 
impact of the disturbance within the formed islands and thus prevent its propagation to the rest of 
the system.  An EPRI program called DYNRED is used in [118] and [119] to perform dynamic 
reductions.  A reduced system does not necessarily represent the modes of interest, so it is 
important to know ahead of time which modes to preserve.   
 
There are also dynamic equivalencing methods which do not involve coherency.  Motivated by 
the impact of distribution networks with distributed generation (DG) on transmission system 
dynamics, a more recent paper (2007) [120] considers dynamic equivalencing of distribution 
networks. According to [120], coherency methods may not be well suited for a distribution 
network where numerous DGs exist.  A dynamic equivalencing method based on the Hankel 
norm approximation is discussed in [120]; however, the reduced system cannot be represented as 
an equivalent generator, and the equivalent must be changed for different operating conditions.  
The Hankel norm is a measure of the effect of a system’s past input on its future output, and it 
often plays an important role in the field of model approximation [121].  Renewable energy 
integration and the need for equivalent models of wind farms for transient stability studies 
motivate recent dynamic equivalencing work. The approach in [122] to wind farm modeling is to 
combine the wind park into a minimal set of equivalent models by combining all turbines which 
have the same mechanical natural frequency.   Offline identification methods from the System 
Identification toolbox in MATLAB are used in [123] to determine dynamic equivalents based on 
measured data from disturbances in the distribution network.  The system is regarded as a black 
box, so information about generators is not known, and an equivalent model is derived for the 
entire system (rather than just the external system) based on observed input/output data. 
  
As evident from the preceding discussion, an abundance of literature exists concerning 
coherency and the identification of coherent generators in power systems as well as the use of 
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coherent groups to form dynamic equivalents.  Our approach takes advantage of a number of 
insights gained from the works mentioned above, and before proceeding, we emphasize the goals 
of our work:  
 
(1) To do coherency recognition without needing to compute the linearization of the full 
system, its dynamic equations, and its stator algebraic equations.    
(2) To do coherency recognition without needing to simulate the system. 
(3) To perform the coherency analysis in a computationally efficient way so that the analysis 
may be computed quickly for a large system.  The intention is that the algorithm should 
facilitate further applications, including those which may require adaptive calculations of 
an online equivalent for online transient stability analysis. 
(4) To be able to incorporate data into the analysis, in addition to whatever model 
information we have.  Data is valuable for everything from identifying groups to updating 
the equivalent model and creating ―equivalent generators.‖ 
(5) To develop a strong validation framework.  Validation questions include how coupled 
these coherent groups are for different faults and how different dynamic models impact 
the accuracy of the results (i.e. how much is coherency dependent purely on the 
electromechanical modes). 
(6) To use the coherency recognition results in an efficient and effective way for computing 
the dynamic equivalent model to be used in other applications.   
 
In the following sections, a solution approach is presented in two separate stages, a grouping 
stage and an aggregation stage.  The grouping and aggregation are performed according to 
selectable criteria, and a tool has been created which encompasses the options applicable to each 
stage.  
 
4.3.2. Bus Grouping Approach 
The first stage of the technique is to determine which network elements can be grouped together.  
For buses or generators, which are the focus of this section, the groups are referred to as ―bus 
groups.‖  The output of this stage is a listing of the bus numbers belonging to each cluster.  The 
grouping is accomplished by performing cluster analysis on vectors which represent some 
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relationship(s) we want to capture.  The representative vectors which serve as input to the 
clustering algorithms are generically referred to as feature vectors.  A tool has been implemented 
for this work which forms feature vectors and then clusters elements based on these criteria.  In 
the tool, the grouping criteria are selectable.  Several instances of the criteria to group generators 
based on similarity are described in this section.  There are a variety of clustering algorithms at 
our disposal for this work.  These include the Quality Threshold (QT), the K-means, and 
agglomerative (hierarchical) methods, all described earlier.  Allowing flexibility in the choice of 
bus grouping criteria is important since the intention is to facilitate the study and preservation of 
different properties.   
 
First, a criterion is described to form and cluster the feature vectors based on a metric found in 
the coherency identification literature [111].  This criterion is worth mentioning because it is 
both fast and parameter based, and results from its use corroborate well other grouping criteria 
we examine.  From this criterion, some insights are gained which have contributed to our 
generalized grouping strategy.    
 
In order to adequately explain the connection we wish to exploit, it is necessary to first present 
some key conditions related to coherency.  In general, electromechanical coherency is defined as 
 
 ( ) ( )i jt t     (74) 
 
for all generators i, j within a coherent group of generators {G} and for some period of time, tc-t0. 
Using the definition in [111], exact coherency or e-coherency for a group of generators {G} 
satisfies the following definition: 
 
 1 1( ) ( ) 0
S
i i iw t        (75) 
 
where δ1 is a reference angle in {G} and the steady-state post-fault angle difference is given by 
1
S
i
.  As described in [111], this analysis is based on nonlinear systems theory [124], where e-
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coherency is considered as a constrained motion. Consider the trajectory of the differential 
equations,  
 
 ( )fx x  (76) 
 
which, for exact coherency, must satisfy the following constraint: 
 
 ( ) 0w x  (77) 
 
The necessary and sufficient condition for these to be satisfied is given by the following [124]: 
 
 
1
( ) 0
n
j
i
i i
w
f
x



 x  (78) 
 
In this formulation, the machines are represented by the classical model, 
 
  
2
2
  for 1,...,ii mi i
d
M P P i n
dt

    (79) 
 
where Mi is the inertia, δ is the rotor angle, Pmi is the mechanical power, and Pi(δ) is the electrical 
power.  Then it is assumed that the electrical power is represented by the simplified equation, 
 
 sin    at 1,...,i si ij ij
j i
P P b i n

    (80) 
 
where bij = |Bij||Ei||Ej|.  In combining these criteria, the coherency condition we are examining 
states that two generators i and j which are coherent must satisfy the following relationship: 
 
 
jkik
i j
bb
M M
  (81) 
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where k is any bus other than bus i and bus j, and Mi and Mj denote the inertias of the machines.  
The relationship in (81) is based only on parameters.  The terms bik and bjk represent the 
equivalent line impedances when the system is replaced by an equivalent at the nodes of all the 
generators.  This criterion is shown graphically in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Graphical representation of coherency criteria [111] 
 
The criterion is applied in the following way in [111].  It is assumed that the angles will be 
approximately equal if the accelerations caused by the fault are equal.  The idea is that during the 
fault, the rotors of the generators are in accelerated motion, so as long as the generators 
accelerate in the same way, the angle condition  
 
  ( )     for Sij ijt k G     (82) 
 
should be fulfilled, where t>tf, and tf is the time when the fault is cleared.  This criterion is based 
on several approximations, and one problem it is subject to is a chaining problem.  In the 
simplest case, consider where one generator may be connected radially to another generator 
which is connected to the rest of the network.  These two generators may be coherent, but this 
criterion would not identify them since they always have different equivalent impedances to the 
rest of the network. 
 
The above criterion exhibits some desirable characteristics and is useful in identifying coherent 
generators in many cases.  It had also led us to adapt a more general approach of performing the 
grouping based on sensitivities of the properties of interest.  Useful candidate criteria for 
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determining structural-preserving groups are the elements of the Jacobian inverse sensitivities.  
The sensitivities in the Jacobian inverse capture the relationships in the way bus angles and 
voltage magnitudes respond to injections, which captures power flow relationships as well.  
When considering the Jacobian inverse sensitivities, there are various possibilities in the way one 
can choose to form feature vectors from its elements.  For example, groupings may be based on 
how angles respond to real power injections, for which it may be appropriate and simpler to use 
elements of the B
-1
 matrix of the DC power flow.  Alternatively, feature vectors may be formed 
based on the transpose of the Jacobian inverse, where clustering by this metric groups buses 
which provide or create similar changes to bus angles in the system.   
 
Then, there is further flexibility in how many elements each feature vector should contain, and 
which elements these should be.  Consider two extreme cases.  In the simplest case, we can 
examine just one ―probe‖ in the system, i.e. a single injection, and compare the ―responses‖ or 
(angle) sensitivities at all buses in the system due to that one injection.  This has the advantage of 
being extremely fast to determine, since it amounts to obtaining elements in just one column of 
the P-θ portion of the Jacobian inverse or B-1, and clustering those, which is simple, since instead 
of clustering vectors, it is clustering 1-D elements.  In the other extreme case,  we can cluster the 
entire Jacobian inverse, considering all of its elements equally.   The most effective and most 
representative ―probes‖ for use as the feature vectors lie between these two extremes.  That is, to 
capture enough of the information to effectively represent the relationships or coupling between 
the buses, only some of the sensitivity elements are required.   
 
More investigation is warranted to optimize the selection of the elements.  Some ideas for future 
enhancement in this direction may involve using the SVD to capture the elements representing 
most of the variability in the data and retaining only the first few corresponding singular vectors.  
Alternatively, one may choose to look at some probes ―near‖ the region of interest and some far 
away, and look at how the angles respond to probes distributed throughout the system, without 
using probes at every single bus.  For example, if a bus has no generation and no load (a zero-
injection bus), there may be no practical benefit in examining a probe at that location.  In 
summary, identifying groups of buses or generators can be effectively determined according to 
sensitivities.   
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4.3.3. Aggregation and Network Reduction  
While the clustering described above concerns how to determine element groupings, one must be 
able to appropriately take the ―aggregation‖ of the devices in these groups and actually produce 
the simplified model with which computations are to be performed.  The behavior of the 
simplified model must be sufficiently representative of the full system behavior, at least for the 
characteristics under study.  Once groups are formed of elements which have the propensity to 
respond together, buses in each group must be aggregated to produce an overall equivalent, 
available for subsequent studies and evaluation.  This aggregation is described below.     
 
To generalize the concept fully, transformation theory is useful.  Tensor analysis, described by 
Kron [125], [126], describes the idea that various basic network elements (or basic elements of 
other types, not just networks) can be connected in different ways, where each way of connection 
is referred to as a reference frame.  The problem can thus be conceptually divided into several 
stages.  The idea is to transform the area such that the characteristics of its interconnections 
remain unchanged.  An analogy to this is the commonly used delta-wye transform, which 
preserves the terminal characteristics as well as the power consumption characteristics.  The 
impedance seen between any two of the terminals, RXY, RYZ, and RZX, must be preserved.  This 
analogy can be extended to more than three buses, as shown in Figure 14.    
 
 
Figure 14. Comparison to delta-wye conversion 
 
The equation to preserve RXY in the three-bus example is given by R1+R2=RC//(RA+RB).  In the 
four bus example, RWX is preserved by satisfying R1+R2=ZThev,WX, where ZThev,WX is the 
Thevenin impedance between terminals W and X.  The bus marked with an M is referred to as the 
mediod bus, which is analogous to the neutral bus in the delta-wye transformation, as shown in 
Figure 15.  The mediod point is arbitrary.   
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In general, the area is of arbitrary size, and each bus in the area has arbitrary connections to 
buses inside and outside of the area.  Some buses have no connections to the external system. In 
moving from the first figure to the second figure in Figure 15, we can utilize the Thevenin 
equivalent impedances between certain buses, determined by calculating elements of the Zbus 
(Ybus
-1
) matrix. All generation and load of the area is represented at one bus, the mediod.  The 
external network remains unchanged.   
 
 
Figure 15. Aggregation overview 
 
The Ward equivalent tends to smear injections among all of the buses, an effect which we 
deliberately wish to avoid.  Rather than lose the identity of the injections, a distinguishing feature 
of this approach is that characteristics of areas are preserved together.  This is facilitated by our 
grouping approach, described in the previous section.     
 
Now let us describe the types of network transformations that can produce an acceptable 
equivalent.   The problem is complicated (or simplified, depending on perspective) by the fact 
that there in fact is no unique solution.  There are many possible ways to aggregate buses, so that 
if specific criteria are not applied as constraints, any way may be acceptable.  After introducing 
and implementing several different approaches to arrive at the final reduced system, the point 
that they are all fundamentally the same, and are all acceptable, has become apparent, as 
described below.  The conclusion from this stage of the work is that all ―exact‖ aggregation 
methods are essentially variations of a Ward equivalent.   
 
M
Internal 
system
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By definition, a Ward equivalent provides an exact matching of the power flow state, V and θ.  
In each group of buses denoted Group_i, we can easily determine a subset consisting of 
boundary buses which are connected to both internal and external buses.  The internal buses may 
be eliminated and all of their adjusted injections may be moved to the boundary buses, leaving 
the external system unchanged.  This results in the following, which provides an exact solution: 
 
 
     
     
     
          
i 1 2 i
b 4 5 6 b
e 8 9 e
I Y Y 0 V
I Y Y Y V
I 0 Y Y V
 (83) 
 
where Y3 and Y7 are zero matrices.  From the first equation, 
 
  1 i 1 i 2 bV Y I Y V  (84) 
 
which is substituted into the second equation of (83) to give 
 
 1 1    b 4 1 i 4 1 2 b 5 b 6 eI Y Y I Y Y Y V Y V Y V  (85) 
  1 1    
beqbeq
b 4 1 i 5 4 1 2 b 6 e
YI
I Y Y I Y Y Y Y V Y V  (86) 
 
The third equation in (83) is unchanged, and the new combined system equations are the 
following: 
 
 
1 1       
     
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bb 4 1 i 5 4 1 2 6
ee 8 9
VI Y Y I Y Y Y Y Y
VI Y Y
 (87) 
 
From any system which preserves the system state as in (87), one may obtain any number of 
other configurations.  To see this, consider an arbitrary transformation matrix T.  It is obvious 
that multiplying both sides of (87) on the left with the matrix T results in a new equivalent 
system.  The more restrictive problem is to define the elements of T such that certain constraints 
are met.    
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In our formulation, a mediod bus represents the electrical center of the cluster.  As described 
above, the choice of mediod is arbitrary, at least with respect to static properties (more 
investigation into the impact of mediod choice with respect to dynamic properties may be 
warranted, as validation proceeds).  For the sake of simplicity, we hereafter choose the mediod 
bus to be one of the boundary buses.  All of the generation and load in the area can be aggregated 
at this bus.  The benefit is that the resulting equivalent provides an intuitive representation of the 
generation and load in the area, and is set up to facilitate further analysis such as dynamic 
equivalencing and model reduction of generators.  If we segment the boundary bus current vector 
Ibeq into the mediod and other boundary buses, Ibeq = [IM, Ibb]
T
, we can investigate what is 
needed to move the injections (equivalent generation and load) at the boundary buses to the 
mediod bus.  That is, the goal is to determine Ybeq’ and IMEQ such that Ibeq’ = [IMEQ, 0]
T
.  Rather 
than attempt to present all the possible solutions, we simply present the requirements for any 
acceptable solution.  Supposing the original system equations are 
 
 
     
     
     
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then the equations which must be satisfied are 
 
       
TT
M bb e MEQ eT I I I I 0 I  (89) 
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where IMEQ is a free variable to be determined such that the boundary bus injections are made 
zero, and the external injections are unchanged.  Here, T is a 3x3 matrix, so 9 variables may be 
chosen to satisfy the constraints.  A typical constraint is to require that the network connecting 
the external buses remain unchanged. Thus, we desire any matrix T which satisfies (89) and (90).  
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In summary, the only requirement of any system transformation T is to satisfy constraint 
equations of the form above.  For the subsequent analysis, we use the simplest instance of such a 
solution, leaving further investigations into other transformations as an open subject.  Hereafter 
we convert the current injections at the boundary buses into diagonal Y elements and then adjust 
the current at the mediod bus so that all of the area generation and load is aggregated at that bus.   
This results in the following adjustments. For each boundary bus which is not the mediod, the 
added shunt element is  
 
 - /bbysh  bb bbI V  (91) 
 
where Ibb is the current injected into the bus.  Then, at the mediod bus, we adjust the shunt so 
that the current injection is equal to the net power of the group.  Similarly, where IM is the 
current injected into the mediod bus, and Inet is the equivalent current injection into the bus 
representing the aggregate generation and load in the group, we obtain the equivalent shunt 
element,  
 
   /mysh   M net MI I V  (92) 
 
and new mediod current is Inet.   
 
From this frame or representation, we can transform the system further if we wish.  A system is 
readily transformable from one frame to another, as discussed above.  The point is that such a 
system configuration is not unique; there is an entire space of systems which preserve the steady-
state characteristics.  The existence of this flexibility in the space of equivalent solutions (which 
preserve the power flow characteristics) may warrant further investigation.  One can investigate 
this transform-space further and investigate the constraints needed on the transformation to 
obtain equivalents of various desirable forms.   All we require for the purposes of this work is 
one ―exact‖ method with which to compare any approximations, yet from the above discussion it 
is clear that more than one ―exact‖ method may exist and be capable of producing an acceptable 
network model.   
 
 83 
4.3.4. Equivalencing Examples  
This section presents examples showing how different reduced systems respond to an event, in 
comparison with the response of the full system.  The events shown were specifically chosen 
because they are faults occurring just past their critical clearing times in the full system 
(―critically unstable‖).  We are interested in examining how the response is impacted in the 
equivalents.   As a case study, let us consider the three groups depicted in Table 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Location of the three groups, shown before aggregation 
 
For these examples, the determination of each group is based on a single probe or real power 
injection in the same area.  This corresponds to a single column of the θ-P portion of the 
Jacobian inverse; these scalars are contoured as percentages in Figure 17, where the highest 
values are shown in red.  For each of the three groups, a separate equivalent is made.  Each of the 
equivalenced areas after network reduction is shown in the boxes in Figure 18, overlaid onto the 
original locations of the groups in the full system.  Each of the reduced systems is denoted by its 
group name. 
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Figure 17. Contours of angle sensitivities showing the three groups 
 
 
Figure 18. The three groups, shown after aggregation 
 
As described in the aggregation sub-section, the power flow steady-state solution is exact for 
each of the equivalents.  The error vectors of voltage magnitude and angle are plotted in Figure 
19 for each of the equivalent systems compared to that of the full system.  The x-axis of the plots 
indicates bus numbers, which are ordered to list the boundary buses first.  While all errors are 
considered negligible, it is apparent that some buses do have slightly more error.  Since by 
design, the constructed equivalents satisfy power flow solution equivalence, the more interesting 
questions are in looking at what happens as the system changes.   
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Figure 19. Power flow solution comparisons  
 
Results for three events are presented in this section, depicted in Figures 20-28.  For the first 
event, a fault is simulated near Group 1, at Line 26-30 near bus 30, as shown in Figure 20.  The 
full system is unstable, as seen from the plot of generator rotor angles in Figure 21.  As evident 
from the one-line diagram, bus 30 borders the aggregated area, so this scenario should help 
stimulate problems which we can subsequently investigate.  The response of the rotor angles in 
each of the three equivalents is illustrated in Figure 22.  When comparing the full system 
response to that of the Group 1 equivalent, Generator 12 responds in a noticeably different 
manner.  One can clearly see the impact of combining Generators 10 and 12, as occurred when 
forming the Group 1 equivalent.  Thus, for certain events, generators 10 and 12 respond 
independently of each other.  
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Figure 20. Location in full system of Line 26-30* fault 
 
 
Figure 21. Rotor angles in full system, Line 26-30* fault 
 
 
Figure 22. Rotor angles in reduced systems, Line 26-30* fault 
 
The second example considers an event which is not near Group 1, a fault on the line between 
buses 89 and 92, shown in Figure 23.  The full system’s critically unstable response is shown in 
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Figure 24.  The response of the rotor angles in each of the three equivalents is illustrated in 
Figure 25.  In each equivalent, the response is well-preserved.  Considering that the impact of 
faults tends to be relatively local, this result is not surprising for the Group 1 or the Group 3 
equivalent.  However, the fault is near Group 2b, and the response of Group 2 is well-preserved 
as well. 
 
 
Figure 23. Location in full system of Line 89*-92 fault 
 
 
Figure 24. Rotor angles in full system, Line 89*-92 fault  
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Figure 25. Rotor angles in reduced systems, Line 89*-92 fault 
 
A third event is shown in Figure 26 for a fault at Bus 25, again near Group 1.  The response in 
the full system is shown in Figure 27.  When looking at the responses of the three equivalent 
systems, shown in Figure 28, it is immediately clear that this situation is exactly what we want to 
prevent.  The full model shows that the system is unstable for this fault, yet the equivalent for 
Group 1 shows that it is stable.  The responses in Group 2b and Group 3 are much more similar 
to the full system, except for a noticeable difference in the behavior of Generator 12. 
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Figure 27. Rotor angles in full system, Bus 25 fault 
 
 
Figure 28. Rotor angles in reduced systems, Bus 25 fault 
 
This example provides compelling motivation to pursue this work, and to develop this type of 
tool, to gain a better understanding of model limitations.  During a transient stability simulation, 
it is possible that the initial groups may lose their validity as the system exhibits nonlinear 
behavior and two buses or generators which started out responding together diverge. 
 
4.4. Transmission Line Parameter Estimation  
This section discusses the estimation of transmission line parameters from historical SCADA 
data. Details and results are presented in [127].  A close analogy is presented in Section 4.2 and 
[100] for using PMU data collected over time to construct a reduced equivalent model at the 
PMU buses.  The focus in this application is on transmission system model errors, which can 
have an adverse affect on the accuracy of results.  Such model errors are often studied in the 
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context of state estimation. There is existing work in the field aimed at identifying and correcting 
transmission model parameter errors using telemetry data [128], [129], [130], [131], [132].  
Uncertainty in data with respect to state estimation is analyzed in [133]. While a few methods 
provide a means for updating the estimates online, the approaches generally only consider a 
single snapshot in time. Also, typically only results for small simulated systems are presented, as 
opposed to real systems.  This work avoids both limitations.  The focus is on using the volume of 
historical SCADA data collected over time, which is readily available to many utilities, to extract 
transmission line model parameters.   
 
In this section, the theoretical analysis is presented.  As described in Section 4.2, the idea is to 
utilize ―data over time,‖ which is advantageous over methods which consider a single snapshot.  
The application to real systems with real data is presented in Chapter 5.  A key aspect of this 
work involves being able to perform analysis such that any errors in the available data do not 
corrupt the estimate.   The challenges of dealing with uncertainty and errors encountered in real-
world data are dealt with in Chapter 5. 
 
First, a brief background of the transmission line parameter estimation problem is provided. 
Then, the basic line parameter estimation method is presented. The estimation is applied to a 
simulated test case in Section 4.4.3, and in Chapter 5 its application to real SCADA data from a 
North American utility is presented and discussed.   By estimating the model parameters of 
individual lines, this approach may be used for validating the parameters of existing network 
models and identifying potential model errors. 
 
4.4.1. Transmission Line Model and Available Data 
In this section, the transmission line model is presented in conjunction with the measured data 
used in this work.  First, it is necessary to consider the possibilities and limitations afforded by 
the model.  This is an idealized or best-case perspective of what can be estimated about the 
model based on available data. Considering error and real data introduces complications, as 
examined in Chapter 5.  
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The transmission line model considered is the pi model in Figure 29, often used to model lines of 
medium length [134] (approximately 50 to 150 miles).   
 
 
Figure 29. Pi line model 
 
Let V1, V2, I1, and I2 denote the magnitudes of the phasor quantities.  Note that what is physically 
measured by potential transformers (PTs) and current transformers (CTs) is only voltage and 
current, respectively; however, these true raw measurements are unavailable. The measurements 
(―raw‖ SCADA data) for this application are P1, Q1, V1, P2, Q2, and V2, recorded every five 
minutes.  
 
The goal is to use the available SCADA measurements to estimate values of r, x, and b in Figure 
29. The assumption is that the angle difference across the line and the line parameters are 
unknown.   If it is possible to know the angle difference across the line (as with PMUs), the 
problem is considerably simplified. 
 
The strengths and the limitations of SCADA measurements are now explored.  The presence of 
data errors and noise is temporarily ignored for this chapter. The pi model reflects the 
relationships that are expected to appear in the data, in light of the assumed known or measured 
quantities.    
 
Several quantities can be derived exactly from this data, at any given time. Since P1, Q1, P2, Q2, 
are measured, the complex powers S1, S2 and apparent powers |S1|, |S2| at the line ends are 
directly known.  From apparent powers and voltage magnitudes, the current magnitudes, I1, I2, 
can be directly computed. 
 
I1 I2
r+jx
jb/2jb/2
P1 + jQ1
V1 V2
P2 + jQ2
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 /i i iI S V  (93) 
 
From the current magnitudes, power factor angles are also known at both line ends, θ1,pf, θ2,pf. 
 
 
 S VI pf   (94) 
 
The above quantities can be exactly computed from the SCADA data.  Notably lacking are the 
line parameters and the angle difference across the line. 
 
In the pi model, let b/2 denote the value of the shunt modeled at each bus. The admittance matrix 
of the transmission line model is Y=G+jB, where 
 
 
1 1
/ 2
1 1
/ 2
jb
r jx r jx
jb
r jx r jx
 
   
 
 
    
Y  (95) 
 
The real and reactive components of Y are matrices G and B, which consist of the following 
elements: 
 
 
2 2 2 2
              
ij ij
ii ij
ij ij ij ij
r r
G G
r x r x
  
 
 (96) 
 
2 2 2 2
/ 2       
ij ij
ii ij
ij ij ij ij
x x
B b B
r x r x

  
 
 (97) 
 
The equations for real and reactive power flow at both ends of the line are given by the 
following: 
 
    21 1 11 1 2 12 12 12 12cos sinP V G VV G B       (98) 
 
   22 2 22 2 1 21 21 21 21cos sinP V G V V G B       (99) 
    21 1 11 1 2 12 12 12 12sin cosQ V B VV G B        (100) 
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    22 2 22 2 1 21 21 21 21sin cosQ V B V V G B        (101) 
 
From (95)-(101), the exact equations for the real and reactive power losses in the line are thus 
given by P1+P2 and Q1+Q2 respectively: 
 
    2 21 2 11 1 2 12 122 coslossesP V V G VV G         (102) 
    2 21 2 11 1 2 12 122 coslossesQ V V B VV B          (103) 
 
Thus, four out of the six equations in (98)-(103) are independent.  The loss equations are 
obviously not independent of the first four since they are each the sum of two other equations. In 
equations (98)-(101), the unknowns are G12, B12, b/2, and θ12 = (θ1-θ2).  Thus, there are four 
equations and four unknowns. 
 
This looks similar to a traditional state estimation problem except with different unknown 
variables.  The difficulty is that the unknowns appear in the equations in a nonlinear manner.  
Thus, it follows that use of a linear technique to estimate these quantities will not yield complete 
success.   To see this, observe that what appears in the equations is always a product term of Gij 
and Bij multiplied with either the term sin(θ12) or cos(θ12).  Solution requires a nonlinear iterative 
approach such as Newton’s method to find b, x, and r to minimize the difference between the 
measurements and the calculated quantities.  Essentially, this is state estimation.  The key 
difficulty is that from one snapshot, there are more unknowns than equations so traditional state 
estimation is not sufficient.  This application shows that it is possible to improve the ability to 
directly estimate b, x, and r using data collected over multiple points in time.  
 
The four unknowns, Gij, Bij, and b/2 are not dependent on time.  This is true generally, at least 
over some window of time, whereas the angle difference θ12 is a function of the operating point 
and may change over time.  Thus, the terms in (98)-(101) which depend on time are the 
following:   
 
 
   
   
12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12
cos ,    sin
sin ,    cos
G B
G B
 
 
 (104) 
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The approach of considering multiple snapshots in time to estimate the transmission line 
parameters is only successful if there are fewer unknowns which depend on time than the 
number of linearly independent equations.  In this case, there are four linearly independent 
equations.  Each additional time point will produce four more equations but will also produce 
four more unknowns.  Thus, in this problem, some approximation is necessary. The choice of the 
approximation is therefore important. 
 
4.4.2. Estimation Approach 
The equations used to perform the actual estimation are presented in this section.  The following 
two equations for real power losses and reactive power losses contain the three unknowns (r, x, 
and b) which are time independent. 
 
 
2
lossP I r  (105) 
    2 2 21 2/ 2 / 2lossQ V b V b I x     (106) 
 
The need for approximation arises since the current magnitude I in (105) and (106) is not known 
exactly from the measurable quantities.  That is, due to current injections from the shunt 
elements, I differs from I1 and I2 which are known from (93).  As an approximation, the average 
of the two line end current magnitudes I1 and I2 is taken for I. This avoids the problem of 
unknowns which depend on time.   
 
Other variations of these estimation equations are possible depending upon which 
approximations are desirable to make.  A bias term u is added to the estimation equation for r, 
 
 
2
lossP u I r   (107) 
 
2 2
21 2
2
loss
V V
Q b I x
 
   
 
 (108) 
 
which is referred to as the Ploss static error and represents a fixed power offset in the 
measurements. 
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Based on (107) and (108), a system of equations is obtained by appending the contributions of 
repeated measurements to the matrix A.  This may be expressed as (109) or (110): 
 
  
2
2 2 2
1 2
1 0 0
0 0 / 2
loss
loss
u
I P
r
I V V Q
x
b
                         
 (109) 
 y p,qAe f  (110) 
 
As additional rows are added corresponding to additional time points, this becomes an 
overdetermined problem.  Then, least squares estimation minimizes the residual, 
 
  y p,qr Ae f  (111) 
 
and results in the following estimate (109): 
 
 
1[ ] T Ty p,qe A A A f  (112) 
 
where ey = [u, r, x, b] denotes a vector of the estimated quantities.  The vector fp,q contains real 
power losses Plosses and the negative of reactive power losses Qgen.   It is possible to estimate 
Plosses and Qgen independently since the equations in (109) are completely decoupled. 
 
4.4.3. Simulated SCADA Data 
In this section, the procedure described above is applied to simulated test system data to serve as 
a reference. To perform these simulations, PowerWorld Simulator is used via SimAuto script 
commands.  A program is written where SimAuto is used to retrieve SCADA data from the 
simulated system.  Then, the program is used to perturb the system to a new operating point.  By 
repeating this procedure, data for a number of operating points is obtained. Simulations provide a 
base case since both the model and the data are exactly known.  The real value of the approach is 
shown in the Chapter 5, where its application to real data is presented, and error and noise are 
considered. 
 
 96 
The system used for the simulations is the seven bus system shown earlier in Figure 6.  The line 
presented as an example is line (3,4) between buses 3 and 4, with the following actual line 
parameters: r=0.01 pu, x=0.03 pu, b=0.02 pu.  A simulated ―error-free‖ SCADA dataset for line 
(3,4) is obtained from five different operating points, given in Table 18.  The units of P, Q, and V 
measurements are MW, MVAr and per unit, respectively.  
 
Table 18. Set of five error-free operating points 
P3 Q3 V3 P4 Q4 V4 
-23.952 -11.235 0.9945 24.021 9.4514 1 
-42.009 -4.4517 0.9947 42.189 3.0011 1 
-60.035 2.0214 0.9947 60.4 -2.9153 1 
-78.055 8.1995 0.9946 78.68 -8.3155 1 
-96.086 14.092 0.9944 97.043 -13.211 1 
 
Using only the points in Table 18 with no added error, the estimate matches the model well, as 
expected. The values of the estimates are given in Table 19.  These results exhibit small errors 
which are attributed to the approximations made, as discussed in Section 4.4.1. An avenue of 
future work is to investigate the impact of the model approximation on the estimate.  Real and 
reactive power plots of the actual data, the estimate, and the model are shown in Figure 30. 
 
Table 19. Study system noise-free estimates 
Line  u (pu) r (pu) x (pu) b (pu) 
(3, 4) Estimate -1.99e-5 0.010055 0.030161 0.020058 
 Model - 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 
 
Figure 30. Seven-bus error-free Ploss plot (left) and Qgen plot (right) 
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Cases showing simulated data with error, as well as cases showing the application to real data, 
are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.5. Conclusions  
This chapter provides insight into the nature of network modeling by illustrating the benefit of 
data-over-time. It is shown that data observed at multiple time points can be used to obtain more 
information about the system, especially static model parameters. Developing and validating 
acceptable models is important since such models underlie most power systems analysis. The 
model needs to represent the underlying physical system, and data can help validate the 
consistency of these models, even as the system is changing.  
 
The first application of Chapter 4, presented in Section 4.2 and [100], estimates a network model 
matched to the PMU buses, building upon the analysis in Chapter 3. When underlying models of 
the system are unavailable or incomplete, such an estimate can be of great practical use.  We 
show mathematically what the estimate gives us, and what the major assumptions are that impact 
the quality of the estimate. The conclusion from Section 4.2 is that estimation of a static 
equivalent model from the data, assuming no knowledge of the underlying system, is possible.  
However, its accuracy depends upon factors over which we seem to have no control, the load 
variations at each bus in the system.  In the circumstance that the injections at the non-PMU 
buses are zero, and variations occur at all of the PMU buses, then the estimate obtained will be 
the desired true equivalent.  This issue is a key challenge and much discussion is found in [103], 
whose authors believe that AGC minimizes the error associated with ignoring the external 
injections.  The impact of AGC on the estimate remains to be more fully studied.  Future work 
should explore this estimation procedure applied to real data and investigate the conditions under 
which the required adjustment term in (54) is zero.  It may be possible to find a way to improve 
the quality of the estimate through the adjustment term.  In summary, true insight into the 
external system load dynamics (57) requires studying this application in conjunction with real-
world data; such data was not available for this study. Obtaining and analyzing real data in 
context with this application would provide a better understanding of how severe the ―external 
factors‖ are and how much they will truly affect the estimation.  
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To identify the cause of changes observed in the estimated equivalent, some information about 
the base case system is needed.  If the assumptions are extended to assume that a base-case 
topology of the system is known, it may be possible to determine a mapping to the equivalent of 
a desired change in the original system. For this to work, the estimated equivalents must be 
distinguishable from each other and from the no-outage estimate.  Further work can investigate 
the identification and classification of these event signatures.  The challenge is that the mapping 
of events in the full system to changes in equivalent system is not necessarily unique.    
 
There is great potential to further develop the method in Section 4.2.  In addition to addressing 
the items listed above, the impact of number of time samples and the frequency with which they 
are taken can be studied.  This will become important when real data is used.  The estimate can 
also be acquired recursively using system identification [24], introduced in Chapter 2, or any of 
the available iterative estimation algorithms [135].  Methods include incremental gradient 
methods and the extended Kalman filter, which can also be considered an incremental Gauss-
Newton method [136], [137].  Incremental methods such as those in [136] and [137] produce an 
estimate which becomes available as data is accumulated.  The role of observability in obtaining 
the most accurate estimate can also be investigated. There is considerable prior work with 
respect to PMU placement for observability which can be leveraged for this purpose.  The more 
information we have about the system, the better of an estimate we should be able to obtain.  
Also, it would be desirable for the estimated equivalent to incorporate additional forms of partial 
knowledge, such as certain lines with known statuses.   It is expected that reactive power and 
voltage magnitude data can improve the estimate, and such data is also available from PMUs and 
would be relatively straightforward to include.   
 
The second application in Chapter 4 presents an approach for developing structure-preserving 
equivalents.  Motivated by the prospect of facilitating online transient stability analysis for the 
quick detection and remediation of events, Section 4.3 creates equivalents with the potential to 
be updated online as the system is changing.  The sensitivity and clustering insight from Chapter 
3 allows network elements to be grouped and aggregated to obtain reduced system models which 
preserve important structural features.  The important features to preserve depend upon the 
application.  Buses are grouped by clustering vectors which represent relationships we seek to 
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capture.  To facilitate online transient stability analysis, we intentionally use clustering metrics 
which are parameter-based, so that the computations may be as fast as possible. The generation 
and load of each group is aggregated at the mediod bus, and dynamic models are left unchanged.    
 
The structure-preserving network reduction process in Section 4.3 is separated into three stages: 
grouping, aggregation, and evaluation.  A tool has been created for each stage, providing a 
framework for designing and evaluating reduced models. Flexibilities are necessarily present at 
each stage and account for the fact that the goals of the equivalent depend on the application, and 
it must be possible to customize the equivalent to achieve the desired characteristics.   
 
The aggregation in Section 4.3 has the advantage that the generation and load models in an area 
are retained at the mediod bus to represent the response of the group.  A next step is dynamic 
equivalencing, i.e. changing the generator and load models to represent aggregate behavior.  By 
having successfully ―moved‖ all generation and load to a single bus, we expect that the 
remaining problem of creating a dynamic equivalent of these models is simplified and can be 
solved in a standardized way.  For example, analysis in Section 3.1.2. can be applied to create 
dynamic equivalents which preserve certain modal responses.  
 
An interesting network characteristic is explored in Section 4.3.  Our analysis shows that a model 
which preserves the system state can be transformed into other possible ―exact‖ configurations. 
Investigations into this space of possible transformations is left an open subject. In addition to 
the genre of exact solutions, we have also found that there a number of solutions which are not 
quite exact compared to the initial steady-state conditions, but may be more desirable in some 
situations. It is possible that some variations may be better than others, especially as the network 
is changing.  To minimize the effect of network changes on the quality of the equivalent, one 
should try to minimize the use of external system variables (especially currents and voltages, but 
possibly line parameters as well) in the direct computation of the equivalent.  Naturally, when 
the equivalent is computed assuming fixed values for these quantities, if these quantities change, 
the equivalent is no longer exact.  One solution is simply to allow the equivalent to be updated as 
the quantities it depends upon change.  Updating the equivalent model as the system changes 
should not be viewed as a disadvantage.  Conversely, the ability to perform effective updates to 
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the equivalent as needed is desirable to maintain the original degree of accuracy.  A key 
motivation for this work is the ability to perform online transient stability analysis, and thus to 
facilitate the online updating of groups and of the reduced model.  If online transient stability 
analysis is to be developed and its results are to be trusted, it is imperative that the computations 
occur quickly and the results have a high degree of accuracy for the scenarios of interest. 
 
In summary, the tools and techniques in Section 4.3 allow us to examine the impact of groupings 
and of aggregations on the results, with respect to particular properties.  It is worth noting that in 
some cases, the same structural groups tend to arise for different properties.  For example, both 
coherency groups found as described above and LMP groups (as discussed in Chapter 3), 
indicate the same generators often appearing together in clusters.  So, the network structure 
couples certain generators together in a way which is visible through a number of seemingly 
different properties.   This characteristic is certainly worthy of further investigation.  A related 
investigation would be to quantify how much coherency depends on the transmission network 
versus on the dynamic models.  
 
To effectively address these intriguing challenges requires improved validation capabilities.  The 
examples in Section 4.3 highlight some of the validation needs. First of all, how should the 
accuracy of an equivalent be defined and quantified? The need for well-defined tangible metrics 
is apparent from Section 4.3.  In particular, since we are interested in the behavior of the 
equivalent as the system is changing, metrics are needed concerning how best to compare 
transient stability response. Transient stability response can be compared by gauging the 
presence or absence of certain modes, so oscillation monitoring is useful in this context 
(discussed in Chapter 6).  Additionally, there is the question of which events are important to 
study for particular applications.  There are many transient stability events to potentially 
compare, so we need a transient-contingency-event-selection methodology to help identify which 
events are important to study in a particular situation.    Evidently some events occur which have 
greater interactions with the aggregated part of the system, and one must consider how to 
appropriately understand and account for that interaction.   
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To help address validation, a script-based validation tool was created for this work which 
interfaces with PowerWorld Simulator via SimAuto and MATLAB.  This is a resource to 
automatically create transient contingencies, run simulations, and retrieve the results for further 
automated, customized analysis.  However, what these suitable comparison metrics should be 
remains an open question.  The hope is that with these tools made available, one can study the 
impact of different groupings and aggregations on system properties, and that it will be possible 
to formulate suitable validation metrics, especially with respect to comparing transient stability 
response.   
 
The third application presented in Chapter 4 is an extension of the first application (Section 4.2). 
Rather than estimate an equivalent model at the PMU buses, in Section 4.4, the parameters of 
individual transmission lines are estimated from historical data. Chapter 5 further addresses the 
estimation of line parameters when real data with noise and error is considered.  
 
In summary, the applications presented in this chapter examine the characteristics of the network 
which are obtained in the form of a model through the use of data mining techniques.  The key 
result is that power system models can be assessed and improved with the aid of measurement 
data and data mining techniques.  Network modeling and validation is a significant area of 
intersection between power systems analysis and data mining, and a great deal of improvement 
can be made in this area.    
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5. Analysis of Time Series Data  
This chapter presents the use of measurement data to find patterns and can be considered the 
real-data parallel to the sensitivity work in Chapter 3 and the model work in Chapter 4.  For the 
Chapter 4 estimation applications, the statistical properties of the data used are important to the 
quality of the estimate [23].  Statistical learning methods play a significant role in data mining, 
and statistical information can be obtained without any knowledge of the system.  In this chapter, 
we examine some of the challenges associated with using raw data to extract relationships.  This 
undertaking can be considerably difficult.  In dealing with measurement data, the basic goal is to 
extract ―trends‖ which should corroborate what is expected and supported by the model.  
Correlation analysis and visualization of measurement data support this goal.  A more practical 
challenge is dealing appropriately with anomalies in the measurement data that would not be 
encountered in the model.   
 
5.1. Data as a Diagnostics Tool 
In this section, we show some real-world examples where the properties of collected time-series 
data are important for estimation as well as diagnostics.  In Chapter 4, the basics of line 
parameter estimation are described and demonstrated for a simulated case.  Here, we discuss 
requirements to adapt the estimation method to work on real-world data, susceptible to noise and 
errors.  The proposed methodology to estimate line parameters using real data is presented in 
[127].   In this section, some key aspects of dealing with real-world data according to the method 
in [127] are outlined.  We also present examples where the data does not exhibit the expected 
behavior and provide some analysis to determine potential causes.   
 
5.1.1. Dataset Selection and Screening 
Before data can be used for analysis, one must select and retrieve the data of interest.  For 
historical data, this data selection can also be designed to accomplish data ―screening‖ functions 
such as value filtering and initial bad data rejection.  Then, for a given set of data, more analysis 
is applied to detect and reject possibly wrong data based on analysis of a fitted model. The 
procedure involves several steps which are implemented as described in this section.   
 
 103 
A dataset selection procedure, such as Algorithm 1 of [127], is responsible for selecting and 
returning a set of data on which the analysis is to be performed. For a specified line, the sample 
dataset for the line parameter estimation application consists of measurements of P, Q, and V at 
both line ends.  This function also provides initial screening and filtering of the raw SCADA 
data.  In the line parameter application, all data is initially screened simply by removing data 
points which have all values of zero.  Additional screening may also be performed.  A data point 
or a row refers to one set of SCADA measurements from one point in time.  Value filters, when 
applied, allow the procedure to return a dataset for particular conditions, such as a<x<b, where x 
is any of the measured or computed variables.  In summary, the dataset selection stage returns a 
random consecutive data chunk of size chunkSize which has undergone the specified initial 
screening and value filtering. 
 
After an initial fit to the dataset is obtained from least squares, outliers which are outside of a 
predetermined threshold from the fit are discarded.  Outlier filtering can be implemented in a 
number of ways; one suggested approach is given in [127]. Screening the data is a critical stage 
of the estimation process, as the dataset which is chosen ultimately impacts the quality of the 
final estimate. 
 
5.1.2. Simulated Data with Error 
While Chapter 4 considers the ideal situation, here we examine the impact of data which is no 
longer ―error-free.‖  In this section, the data is still simulated, so the errors are known.  In 
particular, the five error-free operating conditions in Table 18 are taken, and 200 perturbations 
are made of each point.  This reflects the fact that during each quasi-steady-state operating point, 
the SCADA values do not change much but may change slightly.  Thus, from the five exact 
operating points, we create 200*5 = 1000 hypothetical measurement data points.  Each 
measurement is per-unitized and is randomized by a normal probability distribution of mean zero 
and standard deviation 2 MW, 2 MVAr, and 0.02 per unit voltage.   These 1000 points are used 
to compute the estimate. The estimation results from the new dataset are shown in Figure 31 and 
Figure 32, where Figure 32 shows the real power estimate for the same dataset when the static 
error is not estimated. 
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Figure 31. 1000-point simulated dataset with noise, plots of Ploss (left) and Qgen (right) 
 
 
Figure 32. 1000-point simulated dataset with noise, plot of Ploss, without estimating static 
error term 
 
A comparison of the resistance estimates in Figure 31 and Figure 32 indicates that the accuracy 
of the r estimate is considerably improved when the static error u is not estimated. 
 
It is interesting to note that the five operating points result in five distinct clusters of points on 
the graphs.  In real data, the presence of these bands is also observed, especially when a 
relatively small set of points is examined.  Thus, multiple noisy measurements of the same 
operating point appear to cause this characteristic.  
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Estimates using an entirely different set of operating points are shown in Figure 33 and Figure 
34. Here, 60 randomly chosen operating points are simulated, and for each operating point, 500 
noisy data points are generated.  This results in a dataset with 60*500=30,000 total data points. 
In Figure 34 as well as Figure 32, Gaussian noise has been added to the measurements, and there 
appears to be no benefit in including a static error term in the estimation procedure for r.    
 
 
Figure 33. 30,000-point simulated dataset with noise, Ploss (left) and Qgen (right) 
 
 
Figure 34. 30,000-point simulated dataset with noise, plot of Ploss, without estimating static 
error term 
 
As may be evident when comparing the results above, some sets of operating points facilitate 
better estimates than others.  The issue is that when simulating data, it is challenging to 
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reproduce data with a realistic distribution.  The question arises of how one should perturb the 
system to obtain representative operating points since there are infinite possible ways to change 
the system and obtain a new operating point.  Thus, rather than speculate on what representative 
operating points exist that should be studied, the most value is obtained from testing the 
procedure on real data, examined in the next section. 
 
5.1.3. Application to Real SCADA Data 
The estimation procedure is applied in this section to historical SCADA data from a real North 
American power system.  Identifiers of buses and lines in the real system have been made 
anonymous.  From a practical point of view, it is valuable to be able to present results for actual 
SCADA data.  Estimation on artificially constructed data is merely a special/trivial case. 
Parameter estimation using real world data can be challenging, as evident by the results and 
discussions presented in this section. Real world data rarely follows a known probability 
distribution, much less a Gaussian. 
 
A key feature of this application is that real data provided by a North American utility is used.  
Several months of historical SCADA data, recorded every five minutes, is available.  Large 
volumes of historical SCADA data collected over time are used to estimate the values of 
transmission line model parameters.  This real data often contains significant errors which do not 
have known probability distributions.  Meters used for measuring data are a common source of 
error.   
 
The SCADA data, collected over several months, is available for the five transmission lines. The 
resulting system is presented in Figure 35.  The model values of the line parameters for these 
lines are tabulated in Table 20. Each line identifier α=(i,j) denotes a line α between bus i and bus 
j, according to Figure 35.  This model data has been made available to us to serve as a 
comparison.   
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Figure 35. Five lines with available data 
 
Table 20. Existing model values for lines 
Line r (pu) x (pu) b (pu) 
A=(1, 3) 0.00056 0.01054 0.9079 
B=(3, 4) 0.00052 0.00999 0.75194 
C=(4, 5) 0.00025 0.00445 0.32042 
D=(1, 2) 0.00013 0.00251 0.21230 
E=(2, 3) 0.00045 0.00872 0.6724 
 
Comparisons of the raw data to the predicted data values based on both the estimated parameters 
and the available model parameters are shown for each line in Figures 37-46. These initial 
model-vs.-data comparisons provide indication of potential problems.  Results for all five lines 
are presented.    
 
Each time an estimation is performed, an initial dataset with a size of 30,000 data points is 
selected.  Initially, the first three lines are considered.  Lines D and E are discussed later. Figures 
36, 38, and 40 plot the real and reactive power losses vs. current magnitude for each of the first 
three lines.  The red and blue lines on these plots show respectively the expected data points 
when using the estimated parameter values and the model parameter values. Figures 37, 39, and 
41 show the distribution of residuals about the initial estimate of parameter values. These plots 
indicate that the distribution of real data is not Gaussian. However, even with such distributions, 
the use of large datasets available for lines A, B, and C leads to reasonable and consistent 
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parameter estimates.  The estimation for the real and reactive line parameters (r, u, x, and b) is 
performed, as outlined in Chapter 4 and described in detail in [127].  Estimates for the three lines 
are given in Table 21. Each estimate is based on 30,000 data points.  The estimates of the line 
parameters based on the data above are given in Table 21.  As can be seen from the plots, the 
estimated parameters are close to the available model parameters.  
 
 
Figure 36. Line A -- Ploss vs. I (left) and Qgen vs. I (right) 
 
 
Figure 37. Line A -- Distributions of Ploss residual (left) and Qgen residual (right)  
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Figure 38. Line B  -- Ploss vs. I (left) and Qgen vs. I (right) 
 
 
Figure 39. Line B -- Distributions of Ploss residual (left) and Qgen residual (right)  
 
 
Figure 40. Line C -- Ploss vs. I (left) and Qgen vs. I (right) 
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Figure 41. Line C -- Distributions of Ploss residual (left) and Qgen residual (right) 
 
Table 21. Estimates from 30,000 data points 
Line  u (pu) r (pu) x (pu) b (pu) 
A=(1, 3) Estimate 0.0067853 0.00086639 0.010794 0.90628 
 Model - 0.00056 0.01054 0.9079 
B=(3, 4) Estimate -0.0086491 0.00047885 0.01163 0.7144 
 Model - 0.00052 0.00999 0.75194 
C=(4, 5) Estimate -0.010291 -0.00025763 0.0044154 0.35742 
 Model - 0.00025 0.00445 0.32042 
 
The estimated resistance for Line A is slightly higher than the available model parameter.  The 
estimated value of resistance on Line C is negative; this is discussed in the next section. 
 
5.1.4. Identifying Data Problems  
Consider the Line C estimates from Table 21.  The Line C estimated resistance is negative when 
the algorithms are applied on the available raw SCADA data. However, the magnitude of the 
estimated resistance is close to the model resistance available for this line, which may be an 
indication that a significant number of data points have sign errors.  It is evident that the reactive 
part of the estimation does not have the same data problems.  The suspected sign errors are 
corrected in the data screening stage, and a corrected dataset is obtained.  Figure 42 shows the 
resulting Ploss vs. I plot.  The new estimate of the resistance, r = 0.00030502 pu, is considerably 
improved.       
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Figure 42. Line C, corrected data -- Ploss vs. I 
  
The data for reactance and shunt estimation for the three lines has a more normal distribution 
compared to the data for resistance estimation, as evident from the distribution plots. The real 
power data contains significant noise with respect to the small Ploss values and the small value of 
the parameter r being estimated.   
 
Two additional lines (D and E) are considered in Figures 43-46, and this data exhibits even more 
severe problems.  For these two lines, a suitable model that matches the provided SCADA data 
cannot be identified.  This is evident from the plots of the data for lines D and E, again each 
consisting of 30,000 data points.  The parameter estimates for these lines are given in Table 21. 
 
 
Figure 43. Line D - Ploss vs. I (left) and Qgen vs. I (right) 
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Figure 44. Line D - Distributions of Ploss residual (left) and Qgen residual (right) 
 
 
Figure 45. Line E - Ploss vs. I (left) and Qgen vs. I (right) 
 
 
Figure 46. Line E - Distributions of Ploss residual (left) and Qgen residual (right) 
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Table 22. Initial estimates from 30,000 data points 
Line  u (pu) r (pu) x (pu) b (pu) 
D=(1, 2) Estimated 0.08458 0.0047833 -0.00045384 0.3002 
 Model - 0.00013 0.00251 0.21230 
E=(2, 3) Estimated -0.07685 -0.00386061 0.00580221 0.60989 
 Model - 0.00045 0.00872 0.6724 
 
The distributions illustrate how well the linear estimate approximates the data but do not directly 
compare the model with the data.  Hence, one interesting observation from the real power 
residual distribution of Line E is that the estimate computed actually fits the data reasonably 
well, and we see that while the distributions are not Gaussian, they are not worse than the 
distributions of other lines for which we were able to obtain a consistent and acceptable estimate.  
For reasons which are unclear, this linear approximation actually differs substantially from what 
is expected based on the model.  Comparatively, for Line D we see that this is not the case, that 
the distributions do not appear Gaussian, so the linear model is not even a good fit of the data.  
 
For Line D, the estimated r is much higher than the one given by the model, and the relationship 
between Ploss and I appears to be linear.  For Line E, this characteristic is even more apparent; 
Ploss does not seem to depend on I
2
 but on I , and the relationship between the two appears 
completely linear.  To consider what may cause this linearity, note that P = Re(VI*) would 
depend linearly on I if V is roughly constant.  The fact that V is roughly constant indicates 
voltage regulation, which may indicate the existence of a generator, since generators typically 
have voltage regulation. Interestingly, this observation was later independently verified when we 
were told that there actually is a generator at Bus 2.  This situation points to the helpfulness of 
order statistics, discussed in Section 5.2, which make this even more apparent.    
 
Lines D and E show that problems seem to exist with the data as well as perhaps the model.  
Some investigations to track down the source of the data problems are now presented.  To help 
perform these diagnostics, additional information and SCADA data was graciously provided by 
the utility.  This additional information included data for the three generators connected to Bus 2. 
In the following section, we present some of the correlations we observe between the data of this 
generator and the model parameter estimates.  The existence of this generator was suspected 
from the data, as mentioned previously, since the data seemed to indicate the presence of voltage 
regulation.  The suspicion was confirmed by the utility, who furthermore encouraged us to verify 
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the cause of the problematic data by providing us with more information about the generator.  
Information obtained from the utility consisted of the real and reactive power outputs of each 
generator connected to that bus. 
 
The additional data source is incredibly valuable since it allows us to start making consistency 
checks.  If we have data which we know should be redundant, and using different combinations 
of the redundant data does not provide consistent results, then we know one data source is in 
error.  The problem is that it may not be that simple to find.  There may be more than one data 
source in error or they may have errors of a non-obvious form.  Potentially the ―error‖ could 
even be caused by a human altering the data or switching the labels between measurement 
points, either accidentally or maliciously.  Errors which are not random are more difficult to 
detect and deal with; applications to deal with non-random errors are presented in Chapter 7.  
 
In a way, the problem now is beginning to look more like state estimation and bad data detection.  
The difference is that here we are using not state estimates which have been smoothed by a state 
estimator, but rather raw collected data.   Another key and useful difference between this and 
state estimation is that the line parameters are typically fixed.  Then, once one knows or gains 
some appreciable degree of certainty about what the values should be, this can be used to track 
down the source of the bad data. 
 
Several diagnostic measures were taken to try to determine the cause of the problem.  In one 
approach, an aggregated fictitious line was formed from original lines which were in series.  Line 
G represents lines D and E in series.  The model values for Line G are shown in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Existing model values for lines 
Line r (pu) x (pu) b (pu) 
G=(1, 3) 0.00058 0.01123 0.161355 
 
Combining the two trouble lines, Lines D and E, into Line G yields ―better‖ results (Figures 47 
and 48).  An interesting point is that there is a generator at Bus 2, yet the losses go high and 
positive which would indicate that it is a load and not a generator.  Thus, something appears to 
be wrong with the data coming from the generator, since it is negative of what it should be.   
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Figure 47. Fictitious Line G - Ploss vs. I (left) and Qgen vs. I (right) 
 
 
Figure 48. Fictitious Line G - distributions of Ploss residual (left) and Qgen residual (right) 
 
The estimate for the values of Line G, based on the data above, are given in Table 24: 
 
Table 24. Initial estimates from 30,000 data points 
Line  u (pu) r (pu) x (pu) b (pu) 
G=(1,3) Estimated 2.3037 -0.069271 0.0081922 0.20518 
 Model - 0.00058 0.01123 0.161355 
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The poor approximation is caused by the high Ploss values, and this makes sense because when 
the Ploss value is high, there is significant real power being injected or withdrawn from 
somewhere along the fictitious line (this is due to the presence of generators at Bus 2, as 
discussed).  However, points where Ploss is close to zero should allow us to get reasonably good 
approximations of the line parameters.  If we filter the above data in an attempt to remove data 
points with the generator on, by including only PTotal = [0.01, 0.2], the estimates in Table 25 are 
obtained. 
 
Table 25. Initial estimates from 30,000 data points 
Line  u (pu) r (pu) 
G=(1,3) Estimated 0.10586 0.00017121 
 Model - 0.00058 
 
The following figures examine the data on Line D, one of the lines adjacent to the generator.  
Value filtering is applied based on the generator data.  Let Q1-Q3 be the reactive outputs of the 3 
generators.  Figures 49 and 50 show the correlations between generator outputs and voltage 
magnitude.  As we would expect, the correlation becomes higher and positive as the amount of 
real power generation is increased. In comparing these correlation plots with the ordered I plots, 
as the data set is filtered to include points where the generator is operating at high outputs, the 
estimate begins to take a form which is a closer match to the model. 
 
 
Figure 49. Line D, V correlations with Qgen, filtered with PTotal ϵ [0,0.5]   
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The output range where the estimate is most similar to the model is PTotal ϵ [4.8, 5.2] , yet Figure 
50 indicates that the raw data is not a good match to either the estimate or the model. In Figure 
51, all time points with negative QTotal values have been filtered out (points with QTotal > 0.1 are 
retained), since generators cannot normally operate at a leading power factor.  The data matches 
the estimate reasonably well.  The model, however, does not match either.  
 
 
Figure 50. Line D, V correlations with Qgen, filtered with PTotal ϵ [4.8, 5.2] 
 
 
Figure 51. Line D, V correlations with Qgen, filtered with QTotal > 0.1  
 
5.2. Statistical Properties of Data  
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on event and bad data detection.  To understand what constitutes an 
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This requires the ability to identify normalcy and thus to recognize trends.  Several important 
statistical properties of data are examined in this section, and more background on the subject is 
given in Chapter 2.  In particular, to investigate relationships between variables, the concepts of 
statistical independence and correlation are useful, and Section 5.2.1 reviews these in the context 
of power system data.  Properties of error are explored in Section 5.2.2  The ability to improve 
estimates by taking more samples, utilized extensively in Chapter 4, is examined more 
fundamentally in Section 5.2.5. 
 
5.2.1. Statistical Independence, Covariance, and Correlation 
Two measurements are said to be statistically independent if the error of one of the 
measurements has no effect upon the error of the other measurement.  There is a difference 
between statistical dependence and functional dependence. Functional dependence concerns the 
relationships expected between values. Statistical independence does not imply the lack of 
existence of a functional relationship [23].  Two random variables x and y with deviations x-E(x) 
and y-E(y) are statistically independent if the values of these deviations do not affect each other 
in any way. Hence, statistical independence concerns the independence of the deviations of 
random variables. For independent random variables, the joint frequency distribution (the 
probability that both x is x’ and y is y’) is equal to the product of the two distributions. 
 
Covariance and correlation are often used to describe the relationship between random variables. 
Covariance is the expected value of the product of the two deviations, 
 
        ,Cov x y E x E x y E y      (113) 
 
where the covariance of a random variable with itself is simply equal to the variance.   
 
A sample estimate of the covariance may be calculated from data.  This is done by calculating 
the mean of the x and y sample values, taking the product of the deviations of the sample values 
from the means, i.e. (x-  )   (y- ), and computing the average over all sample values.  When 
calculating this average, the denominator is (N-1), as is the case when computing a sample 
estimate of standard deviation.  The magnitude of the covariance depends on the association 
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between x and y.  If x and y increase together, the covariance is positive.  If one increases while 
the other decreases, it is negative.  However, the difficulty with relying on covariance as a 
measure of association is that if x and y have different standard deviations, the covariance 
calculations will be skewed.  That is, if all of the y deviations are multiplied by a factor of m, the 
covariance will also increase by the same factor.   
 
Hence, scaling is achieved by dividing the covariance by the product of the two standard 
deviations to provide standardization to this metric. This scaled quantity is the correlation 
coefficient: 
 
  
 ,
,
x y
Cov x y
x y
 
  (114) 
 
A sample estimate of the correlation coefficient can also be calculated from data.  Its value 
always lies between -1 and +1. Note that the coupling index (CI) in Chapter 3 is also essentially 
the correlation coefficient.  If two random variables x and y are statistically independent, then 
their correlation coefficient is zero.  The reverse is not generally true.  
 
5.2.2. Propagation of Error 
One major reason for studying the statistical properties of data is to have a better understanding 
of its error.  It is often convenient to perform theoretical analysis without assuming the presence 
of errors.  However, if error and data properties are ignored, major problems can arise in the 
implementation of new ideas as they move to use real data.  Data with error presents challenges 
to the applications which rely upon this data and cannot be ignored.   
 
When studying data error, measurements can be considered a combination of random variables,   
 
 L ax by cz     (115) 
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where x, y, and z are random variables and a, b, and c are constants.  Even if one has multiple 
measurements of the same quantity and then takes the average of those measurements as the 
result, the calculated average has the form of (115).  The mean of L is the sum of the means: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ...E L aE x bE y cE z     (116) 
 
If the variables are statistically independent, then the variance accumulates.  This phenomenon is 
called the Law of Propagation of Errors: 
 
 
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ...V L a V x b V y c V z     (117) 
 
In the more general case, for any two random variables [23, pp. 62], 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( , )V x y V x V y Cov x y      (118) 
 
where x and y may each be a linear combination of other random variables.  If x and y are linear 
combinations of other random variables, the covariance of x and y is a sum of covariance terms 
corresponding to the other random variables.  The fact that x and y may not be statistically 
independent is accounted for by the covariance term, which thus represents the degree of 
interdependence.  In the case where x and y are statistically independent, the variances simply 
add, as above. 
 
In summary, when random variables are statistically independent, the error in a linear 
combination of the variables is larger than for any one of the variables.  If the deviations of the 
random variables from their means are correlated, as in the general case (118), the correlation 
may either increase the error or decrease it.  For example, if one considers a time measured by a 
stopwatch, d = y-x, where y is the end time and x is the start time, there may be a constant delay 
for x and y, corresponding to a fixed time it takes for the operator to push a button.  This positive 
correlation tends to reduce the variance of d because the error is the same for x and y and adds no 
uncertainty to the measurement difference y-x.  
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5.2.3. Measurement Replication and Precision 
Using the principles of error propagation, the goal is to improve precision as much as possible.  
Without requiring the population to have a normal distribution, it is still possible to show that 
replication of a measurement improves precision.  The only requirement is that the N 
observations must be statistically independent and must belong to the same statistical population 
or at least to populations which have the same variance.  Then, the useful result is that the 
variance goes down as the number of measurements N goes up [23, p 63]. 
 
To illustrate the nature of this improvement in precision, consider the average of observations:  
 
 1 2
1 2
... 1 1 1
...N N
x x x
x x x x
N N N N
  
      (119) 
 
Since these observations are assumed to be statistically independent, the Law of Propagation of 
Errors gives the variance of (119): 
 
        
2 2 2
1 2
1 1 1
NV x V x V x V x
N N N
     
        
     
 (120) 
 
Based on the assumption that all of the measurements belong to the same statistical population, 
their variances are all the same, V(x1),…,V(xN) = V(x), and (120) is reduced to the following: 
 
    
2
1 ( )V x
V x V x N
N N
 
   
 
 (121) 
 
Thus, the variance of the sample mean tends to decrease as N increases.  This provides 
justification for the intuition that repeated observations should yield a more dependable estimate.  
 
5.2.4. Derived Quantities 
As described above, measurements are functions of random variables, and other quantities are 
often derived based on these measurements.  The eventual results of interest are denoted derived 
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quantities, which depend on the measured data [23, pp. 68 Mandel].  In examining derived 
quantities, systematic error or bias is important. A systematic error or bias B(x) means that E(x) 
is not equal to X, 
 
 ( ) ( )B x E x X   (122) 
 
where X is the true value of the measured quantity x. Therefore, for a linear function of random 
variables, which has a true value given by U, 
 
 ...U aX bY cZ     (123) 
 
its expected value is the sum of the expected values of x, y, and z: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E u aE x bE y cE z    (124) 
 
Then subtracting (123) from (124), 
 
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ...E u U a E x X b E y Y c E z Z         (125) 
 
it may be seen that the bias of the measurement u given by B(u) is the linear combination of the 
biases: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ...B u aB x bB y cB z     (126) 
 
From (126), if the random variables are free of systematic bias, then a derived quantity which is 
a linear combination of the random variables will also be free of systematic bias.  This is a useful 
property.   
 
Interestingly, the above property does not hold for nonlinear functions.  That is, even if random 
variables are free of systematic bias, it is possible for a non-linear function of these variables to 
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contain systematic bias.  Thus, in general, a derived quantity may have systematic bias even if 
the random variables it is based upon do not.  While this may seem surprising and even 
counterintuitive, the concept is readily shown in [23, pp. 69] by considering the simple problem 
of calculation of the area of a circle based on measurements of its radius.  It is shown that the 
error of the area is systematically high and is proportional to the variance of the radius error.  A 
sketch of this example is the following.  Consider the area of a circle, 
 
 2A R  (127) 
 
where A is the true area and R is the true radius.  Suppose the radius measurement has some 
error, so the measured value is actually r.  Then, the measurement value is the true value plus the 
error: 
 
 rr R e   (128) 
 
The derived area based on the measured radius is given by a: 
 
 2a r  (129) 
 
The error in the derived area a is defined to be ea: 
 
 ae a A   (130) 
 
Then, substituting (127), (128), and (129) into (130), we obtain a relationship between the error 
of the area and the true radius R: 
 
 2(2 )   (for )a r r re e R e e   (131) 
 
If the radius error has a symmetric distribution, then values of both er = e and er = –e occur,  
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  21 2               (for )a re eR e e e    (132) 
  22 2               (for )a re eR e e e      (133) 
 
which may then be averaged to determine the average error of the area,    : 
 
   21 2
1
2
a a a re e e e    (134) 
 
which is a non-negative quantity.  The expected value of  (134) cannot be zero unless the error er 
is always zero.  Otherwise, (134) is strictly an average of positive quantities.  Thus, the average 
error of area a is positive, and it follows that the expected value of the derived area a will always 
be greater than the true area A. 
 
 ( )E a A  (135) 
 
That is, the derived area a has a bias which is nonzero, 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0B a E a A    (136) 
 
even though the radius measurement is unbiased.  The unbiased measurement assumption is only 
that E(r)=R or E(er) = 0.  The distribution of er need not be symmetrical.  The exact value of the 
bias can be shown to be [23, pp. 71] 
 
 ( ) ( )RB a V e  (137) 
 
where V(eR) is equal to the variance of r.  The fascinating property demonstrated here is that a 
purely random error in the radius induces a systematic error in the derived area value.  This 
effect occurs because the derived quantity is a nonlinear function of the measurement, and it is 
important to note that this situation does not arise for linear functions.  However, these induced 
errors are often small and can be neglected.   
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This is an extremely useful property to keep in mind for power systems since we often compute 
nonlinear functions from measurements.  For example, in the line parameter estimation 
application, the actual quantities measured by telemetry are three-phase voltage and three-phase 
current from potential transformers (PTs) and current transformers (CTs) respectively.  From 
those, all other quantities are derived. 
 
5.2.5. Control Charts and Order Statistics  
An important question when dealing with measurements is whether they all come from the same 
homogeneous set.  For measurements of a given quantity, it is useful to look at the order in 
which they are obtained.  In doing so, the goal is to determine that the data does not show 
systematic changes such as a gradual increase, decrease, or cycling.  That is, the data should 
appear random.  This is important because, for example, if we are collecting data over a period of 
time, such as a day, and we notice that there is a gradually increasing trend, then it would be 
incorrect to say something about the average of these values and to apply that to the whole data 
set.  Thus, examining values in chronological order is important.  To determine if data comes 
from a homogeneous set, the simple idea is to divide the set into a number of subsets and 
examine whether the variability between subsets is greater than within subsets.  Note that these 
goals are very much analogous to the goals of clustering.  The question is how to choose the 
subsets.  When choosing subsets, in some cases, the subsets are obvious, like if the same 
quantities are recorded using several different approaches.  In other cases, there is no obvious 
expected natural grouping.   
 
One tool for studying data homogeneity is called a control chart [23, pp. 82] which was 
introduced by Walter Shewhart in 1924.  Data are divided into subgroups, either rational 
subgroups if such groups are obvious or by grouping together a number of consecutive values.  
For each group, the average and the range are calculated.  One can then take the average of the 
ranges of each subgroup to obtain a measure of within-group variability.  Plotting the averages 
and ranges over the subsets gives control charts.  The standard deviation of the population can 
also be estimated.   
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Control charts for each transmission line of the SCADA dataset from Section 4.4 are shown in 
Figures 52, 53, and 54.  Figure 54 also shows control charts for the fictitious line G from Section 
5.1. To obtain these control charts, a chunk of 30,000 data points is retrieved.  Then, this chunk 
is broken into 50 chronological groups.  Values for each group are calculated and plotted.  For 
each transmission line, plots show the average of Ploss and Qgen for the group as well as the 
estimates of r, x, and b from the data points in the group.  These values are all summarized in 
Tables 26, 27, and 28 following the figures. According to [23], for a normal distribution, about 
2/3 of the values should fall within the ―one-sigma limits,‖ and about 95% of the values should 
fall within ―two-sigma limits.‖  Thus, by plotting the chronological averages (or estimates) along 
with the mean of each group and the standard deviations, we can make some conclusions about 
the data.  In the figures which follow, the two-sigma limits are shown with red dotted lines.  We 
should expect 95% of the values to fall within these limits.  
 
 127 
 
Figure 52. Control charts -- Line A (left) and Line B (right) 
 
Table 26. Control chart values – Line A (left), Line B (right) 
 Line A Line B 
 Mean Std Model Val Mean Std Model Val 
Qgen 0.85069 0.10401 - 0.44866 0.29212 - 
Ploss 0.02433 0.0084463 - 0.0074734 0.01321 - 
r 0.00088435 0.00020751 0.00056 0.00011612 0.0010073 0.00052 
x 0.010756 0.00020751 0.01054 0.012259 0.0016 0.00999 
b 0.9065 0.0035856 0.9079 0.71587 0.021851 0.75194 
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Figure 53. Control charts -- Line C (left) and Line D (right) 
 
Table 27. Control chart values – Line C (left) and Line D (right) 
 Line C Line D 
 Mean Std Model Val Mean Std Model Val 
Qgen 0.355 0.059686 - 0.3581 0.020551 - 
Ploss 0.013947 0.0054892 - 0.12923 0.056124 - 
r 0.00093312 0.0022683 0.00025 0.0051675 0.0039691 0.00013 
x 0.0041019 0.0012465 0.00445 -5.6434e-5 0.0025739 0.00251 
b 0.35701 0.0055847 0.32042 0.30105 0.027351 0.21230 
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Figure 54. Control charts -- Line E (left) and Line G (right) 
 
Table 28. Control chart values -- Line E (left) and Line G (right) 
 Line E Line G 
 Mean Std Model Val Mean Std Model Val 
Qgen 0.57577 0.084501 - 0.19755 0.12484 - 
Ploss -0.17276 0.051549 - 1.9703 1.1567 - 
r -0.004759 0.0016349 0.00045 -0.16223 0.24616 0.00058 
x 0.0037386 0.0029283 0.00872 0.018352 0.027021 0.01123 
b 0.58697 0.050566 0.6724 0.22575 0.14962 0.161355 
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The objective is to see whether ―the values, in the order in which they were obtained, behave like 
a set of random drawings from a single population [23].‖ In general, control charts are useful for 
seeing the randomness or non-randomness of data. Control charts are also useful for revealing 
serial correlation, which is when consecutive values are, on average, less different (or more 
different) than non-consecutive values.  What we see is evidence of serial correlation.  Rather 
than fluctuating in a random matter, the values follow a pattern which seems to indicate some 
cycling, trending upwards and then downwards.  However, most of the fluctuations still occur 
within the two-sigma lines. 
 
Further investigation into the causes of non-randomness may be warranted. Rather than study the 
values in chronological order, it is also useful to study the values in order of increasing 
magnitude.  The values arranged in this manner are called order statistics.  Note that the term 
―statistic‖ denotes a function of observations [23, p 85]. That is, a statistic has no unknown 
parameters.  In general, order statistics can be useful for drawing inferences about the nature of a 
parent population from samples of data.  This is done by comparing the ordered data to a known 
distribution type.   
 
An example is given ([23], pp. 96) which uses order statistics to investigate the consistency and 
homogeneity of the ―measuring process‖ for 14 different types of paper.  This is analogous to our 
estimation procedure applied to a number of different transmission lines (five, in this example), 
where the estimated values are different for each line, but the mechanism with which they are 
measured should have the same characteristics.  For the transmission line parameter estimation 
problem, there are a number of variables for which we can potentially study the order statistics.  
To form the figures below, the data are first divided into chronological subgroups, as in the 
control charts above.  Then, these values are placed in ascending order.  Plots of estimated r, x, 
and b values are shown in  Figure 55, where each plot contains data for all five lines.   
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Figure 55. Order statistics of estimated values, with mean removed 
 
Order statistics as in Figure 55 show whether or not the distributions of the populations all have 
the same shape, differing only by their mean value.  In Figure 55, the mean of each series has 
been removed, which represents the fact that the series are estimating different transmission lines 
and therefore should have different mean values. Basic anomaly detection, and therefore bad 
data detection, can also be pursued from order statistics.    
 
5.3. Application of Statistical Properties and Visualization 
The normalcy, trends, and relationships for a set of real SCADA data are examined in this 
section.  This dataset is provided by a North American utility and consists of approximately one 
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month’s worth of five-minute SCADA data and several hours of two-second SCADA data for a 
wind farm.  The two-second data is from a portion of the five-minute data time frame when the 
plant had high output. There are 13 total measured variables at different locations.  The 
measurements are in kV, MW, and MVAr.  Also provided are two state-estimator snapshots.   
 
The objective of this application is to construct a well-informed hypothesis for what is going on 
in the system based only on measurement data.  More specifically, the original goal was to 
determine whether the wind farm is doing the ―right thing‖ with respect to reactive power 
support.  The questions included the following: (1) What are the operators doing? (2) What are 
they using to make their decisions? (3) Are certain variables being controlled with respect to 
certain other variables? (4) What switching actions have occurred and why?  
 
A couple key difficulties arise when attempting to use the available data to provide insight into 
the above questions.  The most prohibitive difficulty with this application is that nothing is 
known about what events may have been captured in the data, so there is nothing with which to 
verify data mining methods, cross check results, and determine if any patterns found are indeed 
related to the true events.  Other difficulties are due to the need to combine information from 
various data sources to obtain a working model.  The labels on the data are not sufficient to 
provide a clear mapping of the 13 data points to locations in the state estimator cases.  The state 
estimator cases are full topology cases; we use the ―consolidate case‖ integrated topology 
processing option in PowerWorld Simulator to make the cases more manageable [138], [139].  In 
this application, difficulties were also encountered in getting the cases to solve and making 
equivalents of the wind farm area from the full state estimator models.   
 
The reconstructed view of the system in Figure 56 is based on a drawing from the utility. The 
measurement points are manually labeled based on point IDs of the SCADA data.  Since limited 
information is available, Figure 56 represents a best effort to correctly match the measurements 
to their real locations. In Figure 56, all MVAr and MW entries are flows, and the four lines and 
transformers are labeled A,B,C,D.  Measurements xC and xD denote the 230 kV side of 
transformers C and D.  Notations fA and tA denote the ―from-bus‖ and ―to-bus‖ of line A.   
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Figure 56. Reconstructed system with SCADA measurement locations labeled  
 
The data contains many discrete changes, as indicated by two of the SCADA time series in 
Figure 57.  These are likely due to deadbands in the recording of data points to the data historian.  
As evident, high-frequency information about transient changes is lacking.   
 
 
Figure 57. Examples of discrete changes in data 
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The programming language R is a powerful tool for statistical data processing which has been 
used to produce most figures in this section.  To ascertain system behavior from data, it is 
important to be able to highlight the usual versus the unusual data characteristics.  Statistical 
summaries such as PDFs and CDFs provide insight into the normal behavior of a system.  
Histograms are also useful statistical tools for illustrating where data spends most of its time 
(normalcy). The time series for the MW flow on line D and its histogram are shown in Figure 58.   
 
 
Figure 58. Time series (left) and histogram (right) for MW flow data on line D 
 
While viewing these data distributions is useful, it is difficult to compare many at once and 
obtain a higher-level picture of the system conditions and relationships.   
 
To obtain such a higher-level view of the system, it is useful to extract relationships in the form 
of visual indicators.  In particular, correlations capture the relationships between variables in an 
easily interpretable way.  Furthermore, it is possible to effectively visualize correlations between 
multiple pairs of variables at one time and immediately notice patterns of interest such as strong 
couplings between variables.   
 
Visual indicators of relationships in the data are shown using a technique called sparklines [140]. 
Sparklines use simple visual representations to convey a lot of information simultaneously.  For 
power systems, sparklines provide an initial view where the viewer can see, at a glance, trends in 
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the data.  The sparklines plot in Figure 59 illustrates cross correlations between the variables.  
Each row and column represents one time-series of measurements from one location in the 
system.  The entries in the matrix are cross correlations of the two time series in the row and 
column.  Entries show at a glance the way measurements at a location are correlated in time with 
measurements at other locations.  The plots were generated using a script written in R.  The 
diagonal entries show autocorrelation, correlation of a signal with itself.  The off-diagonal entries 
show cross-correlations of one time series with the other time series. A peak in the middle of an 
entry indicates that the highest correlation occurs at a time lag of zero.  For autocorrelations, the 
peak is always at a time lag of zero.  If the two time series are independent, the cross-correlation 
is zero at all times.  Sparklines are a general visualization technique and can show other 
relationships besides correlations.   
 
Relationships between MVAr A and MVAr B, and also between MVAr C and MVAr D, are 
highlighted by boxes overlaying Figure 59.  This is one example; any of the relationships 
between variables can be picked out.  The C-D boxed item shows a high, narrow peak, while the 
A-B item shows a high peak that is less narrow.  Both examples show high correlations, but that 
of C-D is higher and that of A-B shows more variance.  Objects A and B are each negatively 
correlated to C and D, which is also easy to see.  Corroboration for this example is given next. 
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Figure 59. Sparklines plot, illustrating cross correlations in SCADA data 
 
Insight can be gained from SVD, also referred to as principal component analysis (PCA) in the 
data mining area. A screeplot helps visualize the relative importance of the components.  A sharp 
drop in magnitude signals that subsequent factors are ignorable.  Figure 60 shows that most of 
the variability in the data is captured in just the first singular value, or principal component.   
Thus, we can see that we are justified in using a biplot, introduced in [141].   
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Figure 60. Screeplot of SCADA data indicating that most data can be represented using 
first singular value 
 
Biplots are used to visualize the first two (for 2-D) principle components of a data matrix to 
show relationships between rows and between columns.  The discussion extends easily to 3-D. 
As described in Section 2.5, a matrix Y can be factored into its SVD: 
 
  TY USV  (138) 
 
Then, a rank 2 matrix Y2 is formed by keeping only the first two singular values,  
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where u1 and u2 are the first two columns of U, and v1 and v2 are the first two columns of V.  If a 
matrix is exactly rank 2, it is exactly represented by its biplot.  Thus, a biplot shows a 2-D 
representation of high-dimensional data. A biplot is a representation of how rows and columns 
map to the first two singular values.  In biplots, generally both rows and columns are plotted, 
allowing dual representation of both time and variables in this application.  For simplicity of 
illustration, the time information on the biplot of the SCADA data shown in Figure 61 is 
removed to just focus on the relationships of the variables.  
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Figure 61. Biplot of SCADA data showing relationships between variables 
 
From Figure 61, it is apparent that only four variables contribute to the variability in the data. 
These are MVAr A, MVAr B, MVAr C, and MVAr D.  MVAr C and MVAr D contribute in an 
opposite way to that of MVAr A and MVAr B.  MVAr C and MVAr D are more correlated than 
MVAr A and MVAr B.   The length of the MVAr A and MVAr B vectors indicates that they have 
higher standard deviations.  The use of SVD to produce biplots is just one instance of its value 
for many aspects of data mining in power systems.  Plotting the largest singular value using a 
moving time window as in Figure 62 can reveal system stress [142]. 
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Figure 62. Largest singular value of SCADA data plotted for a moving time window 
 
Following the explanation of SVD in Chapter 2, one can expect that significant changes in 
operating conditions show up as changes in S and U.  From a geometrical interpretation, this is 
equivalent to the main direction and scaling of the shape of the data changing.  From this simple 
analysis, it seems clear an event occurred between approximately the 400
th
 and 500
th
 time 
sample.   
 
However, what happened is unclear, since we have no knowledge of what actually occurred to 
verify against.  The mapping of changes in singular values to events remains to be further 
investigated; such a study requires the ability to validate true events against hypotheses regarding 
detected events.  Fortunately, even without any additional knowledge, we are still able to observe 
that the suspected event may have something to do with the MVAr values.  This observation is 
determined by analyzing the SVD and determining the major contributors to the largest singular 
value.  Figure 59 also corroborates this hypothesis. In cases where knowledge about the system 
is minimal or nonexistent, it is beneficial to be able to cross-check hypotheses using independent 
methods.   
 
Following the theory of SVD, it may also be insightful to look at the SVD of the sensitivities 
since they follow the same kind of input-output mapping as the data itself.  Then, V corresponds 
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to the (orthogonalized) input data which are the injections, and US corresponds to the 
transformed data which are the voltages and angles of the PMU data, and A is the sensitivity 
matrix. In fact, the estimation applications in Chapter 4 developed as a result of this insight. 
 
Additional enhancements to power system visualization in the area of data mining are possible, 
especially with respect to visualizing the system over time. In [143], a method for visualizing 
PMU data by reducing the system to an equivalent at the PMU buses is discussed.  The analysis 
in [143] assumes the network is known, and an equivalencing procedure is performed to reduce 
the network to a Ward type equivalent at the PMU buses.  The work in Section 4.2 does the 
opposite and reconstructs an equivalent without any knowledge of the system.  The insight and 
visualization techniques developed in [143] are applicable to an equivalent estimated from PMU 
data. Visualization may include contours of angles, equivalent line flows, and more.  
Visualization may also involve creating a biplot which is animated in time, used to visualize the 
PMU-based equivalent (or other data, such as voltage magnitudes and angles) to indicate 
significant changes.  Such a display would show how the contributors to the largest singular 
values of the system are changing in time.  This can provide a quick indicator of problems in the 
system [142], as only the first two singular values are needed, which can be computed easily.  
Also, data from every time sample need not be displayed since the human eye is limited in its 
ability to detect small changes.  
 
5.4. Conclusions  
The value of data collected over time is apparent.  This chapter parallels the work in Chapters 3 
and 4 and presents some of the fundamental challenges associated with using raw measurement 
data to extract relationships. Section 5.1 applies the transmission line parameter estimation from 
Chapter 4 to real data.  Results in Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.4 show that estimation based on 
real measurement data presents challenges not encountered in simulation. Section 5.2 shows how 
the data may be used to help identify sources of problems.  However, it is difficult to determine 
whether the errors are present in the model, the data, or both.  In Section 5.3, correlation and 
visualization techniques are shown to be useful for identifying relationships and revealing 
patterns in a measurement dataset.  
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The applications in this chapter illustrate the importance of visualization for knowledge 
discovery (from the KDD field of data mining, mentioned in Section 3.3.3), especially for 
finding patterns and relationships in power systems.  Visualization can help address the need to 
process data quickly and report updates to the operator in an online fashion, possibly via a 
dashboard display.  The idea is that, at a glance, the operator should see a condensed portrayal of 
important system indicators, like on the dashboard of a car.  Animating a biplot over time may 
provide a useful dashboard display.  
 
Empirical relationships should be compared to what is expected and supported by the model.  A 
conclusion from this chapter is that substantial differences tend to exist between the actual data 
and the model.  The measurements used in the estimation often exhibit noise on the same order 
of magnitude as the parameter being estimated.  Factors other than noise, such as systemic bias, 
can also disrupt the measurements. Bad data is further addressed in Chapter 7. Anomalies in the 
measurement data which are not encountered in the model present complications, especially at a 
practical level.  Such anomalies may represent errors or they may represent events.  Future work 
remains in event detection and analysis to characterize how different power system events 
manifest themselves in the measurement data.  For example, a stressed system exhibits higher 
singular values, and it would be interesting to find out more about what these high singular 
values mean, and to be able to map changes in key singular values to system events.  Chapter 6 
presents an application of event detection based on modal estimates of measurement signals.    
 
In considering the use of data for diagnosing problems in the system, one needs to consider the 
difference between simulated data with errors and real data with errors.  For the work in this 
chapter, a data simulator was created.  With the data simulator, it is possible to add any desired 
error to the measurements. Even with the simulated data, it was found that some sets of operating 
points facilitate better estimates than others. The issue is that when simulating data, it is 
challenging to reproduce data with a realistic distribution.  The question arises of how one should 
perturb the system to obtain representative operating points, since there are infinite possible ways 
to change the system and obtain a new operating point.  Thus, rather than speculate on what 
representative operating points exist that should be studied, the most value is obtained from 
testing procedures on a wide variety of real data.  The differences between simulated data with 
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error and real data with error provide further motivation for model validation, discussed in 
Chapter 4.   
 
The final important point is that real data is important for developing data mining applications.  
It is difficult to represent real data errors in simulation. There is no substitute for validating 
applications with real data.  It is especially important to obtain data corresponding to known 
events for learning and verification purposes.  
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6. Oscillation Monitoring Data Event Analysis  
An oscillation which occurs as the system changes state following a disturbance is called a 
ringdown.  This chapter examines the relationship between disturbances in the system and the 
measured modal content of the consequent ringdowns. The identification of patterns or 
distinguishing characteristics from oscillation data is studied in the context of linear system 
theory and control theory.  The goal is to extract information from the ringdown about the 
disturbance or the event that causes it. This chapter examines how modal content is estimated 
and how that information enables the automatic analysis of events, creating tools for automated 
―grid detective‖ analysis.  
 
Extraction of modal content can be accomplished in conjunction with an oscillation monitoring 
system (OMS).  An OMS implements a set of methods to estimate the modal components of 
oscillation signals measured throughout the network.  These estimates can reveal important 
characteristics of the system.  The core of this work is to facilitate a better understanding of the 
way modes manifest themselves in measurement signals.  One objective is to employ the 
information contained in a signal to help determine the cause of the oscillation.   
 
For example, suppose there is just one PMU or measurement signal in the system.  Then the 
question is to determine how different events manifest themselves in that signal and if it is 
feasible to distinguish them.  Suppose, for example, a fault occurs at the terminals of a generator.  
The PMU will capture oscillation data that occurs as a result of this event.  The goal is to take the 
estimated modal content of the event, as viewed from the PMU measurements, and ascertain 
which possible events may have caused the ringdown.  The question is whether it is possible 
from a single signal to identify the characteristics of the actual event, and if it is, what prior 
information is needed.  For example, if we are looking at generator outages, do we need to know 
information about the type and parameters of the generator?  Or, can we figure out enough based 
on network location, in which case, what information do we need to know about the network?  If 
we have knowledge of the network, we can reasonably understand what would happen to the 
steady-state values and dynamic states of the system under various events.   The drawback is that 
if we have only steady-state information, many possible events could cause a particular change 
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in a value.  The challenging question is uniqueness, or how to figure out what makes each event 
unique such that it can be identified.   
 
The manner in which a particular set of characteristic modes is excited is related to the event 
itself, both its type and its location in the system.  It is desirable to better understand what 
information about the event is captured in a ringdown.  In this chapter, the modal content of 
oscillations is used to recover associations and patterns related to events in the system.  In 
particular, we examine the modal content associated with particular generators or events.  Using 
information about events and their signatures, additional tools can be developed to perform 
forensics and facilitate improved system operation and control.   
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, oscillation monitoring systems are described 
in the context of this work.  Then, Section 6.2 traces the eigenvalues (modes) associated with 
generators to their impact on measurements.  This conveys the content of what may be observed 
in a ringdown signal.  Then, in the sections to follow, applications are presented where the 
estimated modal content of ringdowns is used to identify particular events.  In particular, a 
methodology for using OMS data to classify ringdown events resulting from generator faults is 
presented in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4.  Results of the approach are presented using both a 37-
bus case and a large WECC case.  Extension to another event type, exciter setpoint changes, is 
considered in Section 6.5.    
 
6.1. Oscillation Monitoring Systems 
Fundamental to this work is the existence of a means to routinely extract the model content of 
signals; such functionality constitutes an oscillation monitoring system (OMS).  When 
oscillations are present, it is often desirable to characterize the signal with respect to its 
frequency content.  An OMS [144] evaluates the modal content of measured oscillations in 
power system signals, cross-checks the results using several methods, and generates alerts when 
poorly damped modes are discovered [144].  Estimates are computed of the frequency, damping, 
amplitude, and phase of the components in the sign al [145].   
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Useful information about operational reliability is obtained from the estimated modes. Such an 
OMS can serve as an early warning of serious events.  Alerts can prompt actions designed to 
enhance operational reliability. The report [144] discusses methods to detect in real time the 
danger of growing or poorly damped oscillations, while still in the early stages of an event.  In 
this system, to perform cross-check or validation, moving time-window analysis is used, as well 
as multiple signal groups, and also different types of signal processing engines. The three 
methods analyzed in [144] are Prony analysis, the matrix pencil method, and the Hankel total 
least squares (HTLS) method. The matrix pencil method is from the system identification and 
spectrum estimation areas.  All three methods use singular value decomposition (SVD).  In 
summary, the main purpose of an OMS is to recover accurate oscillation information about the 
power system quickly so that it may be useful in detecting the onset of and thereby preventing 
catastrophic events.  
 
An overview of power system applications of linear analysis techniques appears in [146] (2001).  
Some notable algorithms which are described are the Prony method and the eigensystem 
realization algorithm (ERA).  Key on-line applications include estimating the critical mode 
(poorest damping) in the system; this is implemented by a critical mode estimator (CME) based 
on Prony analysis and used in an on-line dynamic security assessment (DSA) tool.  Spectral 
analysis methods can be classified as non-parametric since they are direct techniques for 
estimating transfer functions without first selecting a set of possible models to which the system 
must belong [24].   
 
In this section, oscillation monitoring is described in the context of this work.  First, Section 
6.1.1 examines ringdowns from a theoretical perspective.  Then, Section 6.1.2 presents Prony 
analysis, used throughout this chapter.  Section 6.1.3 concludes with an outline of our approach 
for using this modal content to characterize events, presented throughout the chapter. 
 
6.1.1. Power System Ringdowns and Linear System Theory 
In power systems, it is imperative to obtain information about damping and stability.  This 
information is present in the oscillations.  Ringdowns commonly appear as exponentially 
damped sinusoids.  In this section, we discuss the content of oscillation signals. 
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For a time-invariant linear system, the impulse response is a complete characterization of the 
system [147], [24].  If the input into a linear system is the Dirac delta function, δ(t), then the 
response of the system is a linear combination of all the modes of the system.  The formal 
definition of the Dirac delta function is given in [17].     
 
 0( ) ( )  characteristic modesh t b t    (140) 
      0 0( ) ( )h t b t P D x t us t       (141) 
 
The us(t) function represents the unit step function which is a 1 for time greater than 0.  The unit 
step function enforces causality by considering the state to be zero at, as well as before, time 
equal to zero. Ideally, if the system could be perturbed by this input, the characteristic modes of 
the system would be clearly seen in the response.   
 
Theoretically, a delta function perturbs the system by an infinitely short amount of time at all the 
frequencies, and then it is suddenly removed as the input.  Thus, the way the system responds is 
completely governed only by its own characteristic modes, so these characteristic modes may be 
retrieved.  When considering power system oscillations, the response will not be ideal for several 
reasons.  Power systems are certainly not linear systems, and the input is obviously not a delta 
function.  Also, it is impossible to perturb a system by a delta function because this would 
require an infinite magnitude and an infinitely small duration. 
 
The total system response is the sum of a zero-input component and a zero-state component 
[147].  This should not be confused with the natural response and the forced response, which is a 
similar decomposition but not the same.  The zero-input portion is the response of a linear 
system when there is no input.  This response reveals the inherent behavior of the system. The 
zero-input component is the solution of the following equation: 
 
  11 1 ( ) 0N N N ND a D a D a x t       (142) 
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where D represents the derivative operator d/dt. Equation (142) is satisfied by a solution of the 
following form: 
 
 ( ) tx t ce   (143) 
 
Then, (142) can be written as 
 
  11 1 0t N N N Nce a a a          (144) 
 
A non-trivial solution requires that the polynomial in (144) be equal to zero, 
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which may be rewritten as 
 
     1 2 0N          (146) 
 
so there are N possible solutions.  Thus, (143) can be any linear combination of the exponential 
solutions, 
 
 1 21 2, , ,
N tt t
Nc e c e c e
 
 (147) 
 
For proof, see [147].  These exponentials represent the poles, eigenvalues, roots, or characteristic 
modes of the system [147], [148]. Which one of the infinite number of possible solutions we 
actually obtain as the response is dependent upon the system input and upon the initial 
conditions.    
 
The zero-state component is determined by assuming an initial state equal to zero.  The zero-
state component is the result of convolving the system input with the impulse response, 
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where y is the output, u is the input, g is the impulse response, and t enumerates the sampling 
instants.  Then, the output can always be calculated if the input is known.  The impulse response 
in (148) is also a weighting function.  Because of the fact that input is generally present, the zero-
state response will generally contain both characteristic modes and non-characteristic modes of 
the system.   
 
In reality, even if we could know the input and the impulse response, it is not generally possible 
to completely know the output.  Other inputs affect the model in (148).  Often, these external 
effects are lumped together into a noise or disturbance term, v(t).   
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From (149), if the output is measured, the input is known, and the impulse response is known, 
v(t) can be found.  In a practical sense, noise is only as important as its effect on the output.  
Measurement noise can come from sensors as well as other signals which are not controllable 
inputs to the user. However, in some cases, the disturbances can be measured or are known.  
Then, the analysis can be appropriately compensated. 
 
 
From these relationships, we can arrive at a transfer function for the input-output relationships in 
the system, and many system identification methods are aimed at estimating such transfer 
functions.  Spectral analysis to determine transfer functions of linear systems is often used in 
time-series analysis.  For oscillation monitoring, these methods are particularly important.  
Determination of transfer function equations for a second order system is discussed thoroughly 
in [149].   
 
Often, the response observed in power systems is largely dominated by only one or two modes, 
so it may resemble a second order response.  That is, the same damped sinusoidal waveform we 
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observe in time-domain power system ringdowns has a Laplace transform to a second order 
system in the frequency domain [149]:  
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Interestingly, such an observed second order response is consistent with the type of response one 
would expect from a generator.  A linearized second order model of a synchronous generator 
represents its electromechanical modes (machine angle and rotor speed),  
 
 
S Dk k
 
  
  
     
 (153) 
 
where kS is the synchronizing coefficient and kD is the damping coefficient.  The eigenvalues of 
(153) are 
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In general, such a second order system is represented as    
 
 
2 22 0n ns s     (155) 
 
where the poles may be expressed as  
 
 s j    (156) 
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where ζ is the damping ratio, ωn is the natural frequency, and ω is the damped natural frequency.  
Characteristics of the measured response can then be analyzed in order to determine the 
parameters ωn and ζ of a transfer function, as in (159). 
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The system may be said to experience insufficient damping when ζ<0.03 and ―acceptable‖ 
damping when ζ≥0.1 [150].    In a system with N machines, there are N-1 electromechanical 
modes, at the minimum.  Thus, the true problem is more complicated.    
 
Measured ringdowns in power systems can be better understood based on an investigation of 
their origin and by recognizing them as indicative of a disturbance.  Estimated modal content can 
be used to our advantage to help diagnose events.  The next section describes this modal content 
extraction, using Prony analysis.  
 
6.1.2. Modal Estimation with Prony Analysis 
Extraction of modal content from a signal is a fundamental part of what an OMS provides.  This 
estimated modal content can provide a useful summary of transient stability runs as well as of 
measured data.  Oscillations in power systems are often well represented as the summation of 
damped exponentials, even though power systems are nonlinear.  Parameters of measured 
sinusoids can be estimated using Prony analysis [145].  Since Prony analysis is widely used for  
modal analysis in power systems, it is now briefly described.   
 
Prony analysis represents the signal in the following form [145]: 
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and estimates parameters Bi and λi of (160).  The parameters of the fit are estimated such that 
(160) fits the observed signal.  The signal in (160) is also commonly written in terms of 
sinusoids,  
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where σi is the damping, Ai is the amplitude, fi is the frequency in Hz, and ϕi is the phase in 
radians.  
 
Many variations exist in Prony analysis implementations.  For our work, Prony analysis is 
performed following the implementation of the Prony toolbox available for MATLAB [151], 
which is described in detail in [152] in its original context for analyzing modes in reactor 
measurements.  The properties of least squares (LS) and generalized least squares (GLS) to 
estimate a transfer function of the system and then identify oscillatory modes for power systems 
are investigated in [153].  Prony analysis can be considered a variation on the LS method, and 
GLS is an iterative approach to allow online updating of modal estimates.  Prony analysis finds 
linear prediction coefficients and then solves for roots of a polynomial.  Prony analysis 
algorithms are examined in [154] for the purpose of analyzing power system harmonics.  The 
authors of [154] also discuss the tuning of parameters and compare the Prony method with the 
Fourier transform.  In their analysis, SVD is found to be the algorithm with the best overall 
performance for estimation of the coefficients in the linear prediction model of the Prony 
method.  The details on the algorithms are omitted here. 
 
The work in [155] extends typical Prony analysis [145] to allow multiple signals to be analyzed 
to determine one set of modal estimates.  That is, this allows information from multiple 
measurements which are redundant to be supplemental to each other by recognizing that they are 
all measuring the same modes.  This type of technique is valuable since one of the major 
practical issues with Prony analysis is its behavior in the presence of noise [155], [144].  Other 
issues such as sample size, data de-trending, and selection of model order are also problematic, 
and are examined in [156].  A case study of a TCSC in [157] examines the response of the 
system to step inputs and noise inputs used to probe the system.  The modal content is examined 
with the purpose of studying the damping effectiveness of the TCSC. 
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Issues of model accuracy and validation, emphasized previously in this document, naturally arise 
here as well.  Prony analysis can help to validate models in the following way. As demonstrated 
in [157], it is possible to ―probe‖ the real power system, and gauge the response of the generator 
of interest. The actual response can be compared to the simulation response to the same probe, 
and the model can be updated as necessary.  This process can be automated using system 
identification techniques, and a lot of work is underway in this area.  While model validation is 
not our primary focus, we expect to be able to extend techniques developed in this work to model 
validation. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the models in the simulations are valid.   
 
In summary, Prony analysis can be used to quantify the modal content of a ringdown by 
determining a best-fit reduced-order model both in time and frequency domains.  Now we 
describe how one may use modal estimates to facilitate pattern recognition. 
 
6.1.3. OMS as a Precursor to Pattern Recognition  
In this section, we describe our framework to find patterns in modal content related to events, 
based on OMS modal estimate results.  This section positions our work in the OMS context.  The 
functionality of an OMS, and the information it provides, have been described, so here we 
examine how an OMS serves as a precursor to more in-depth analysis.  The applications in this 
chapter provide specific examples of these possibilities.  In a way, the OMS is a filter for 
dynamic data similarly to how state estimation is a filter for static data.  It is true that the more 
accurately the modal parameters can be estimated, the better and more useful the post-processing 
event detection framework can become.  Future work in the signal characterization area may thus 
have implications for power system event identification.   
 
The framework presented here facilitates the use of OMS modal estimates for the discovery of 
event signatures in the ringdown data.  Intuitively, different events have different impacts on the 
system and will thus produce different ringdowns.  A plot of an angle measurement taken at the 
same location for different events is shown in Figure 63.  Each time series on the plot shows the 
ringdown caused by a fault at a different generator.   
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Figure 63. Ringdowns for different events, measured at one location 
 
These ringdowns are all measured at the same place, and they are all different in some way.  The 
question is whether this type of information is enough to distinguish between events. Validating 
associations or patterns between modal estimates and events make it possible to better recognize 
what is occurring based on the data.    
 
Power systems are constantly changing.  Small disturbances include load changes, while large 
disturbances include network topology changes and faults.  In this work, the focus is 
predominately on what occurs during large disturbances.  Changes in modal content associated 
with significant events motivate our work to recognize and classify patterns in oscillation data.  
The goal is to better understand what information is captured in these ringdowns so that they 
may serve as tools for performing forensics on the system.  By building up a knowledge base 
with these relationships, we can help discover and validate new associations between measured 
data which is observed and what may have occurred. 
 
In this work, we characterize events in terms of signatures which are then sought in the incoming 
data.  In order for a ringdown to provide useful information about an event, it is necessary to 
identify attributes which are unique characteristics of the event.  There is boundary which will 
likely be encountered where ringdowns or events become too similar to distinguish.  Analysis is 
needed on the extent to which certain events are distinguishable from other events. For example, 
109876543210
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
V
o
lt
ag
e 
an
gl
e 
(d
eg
re
es
)
Time (seconds)
 154 
do generator outages appear distinct in OMS results?  What circumstances are necessary to 
assure that certain events will present distinct signatures? This is a challenge, and the inherent 
limitations of signature-searching remain to be fully explored.    
 
The modal content of measurements is governed by the characteristics and parameters of every 
component in the system.  Machine exciters, governors, power system stabilizers (PSSs), etc., all 
have some impact, as well as the types and locations of loads.  In addition, there are effects due 
to the structure and parameters of the transmission network.  Which modes are excited is related 
to the event itself, both the type of event and its location in the system. For example, an 
interesting association between the modal content of angle measurements and increased wind 
generation in Texas is recognized in [158].   Other event types of interest may include faults, 
generator trips, and system topology changes.  In summary, we seek to discover signatures of 
system events and control actions and determine the impact on OMS results.  
 
In the applications presented in this chapter, the focus is on recognizing events occurring at 
specific generators.  A single event type must be considered at a time for consistency and 
comparison purposes.  It is the intention to gradually extend the framework by adding the 
capability to detect a greater variety of events. The approach is outlined in Figure 64. 
 
 
Figure 64. OMS-based event analysis framework 
 
The links shown by blue dotted lines indicate computation and analysis procedures that can be 
performed completely offline.  The green solid lines represent an online process to quickly make 
decisions about the event. These online decisions would be based on information obtained offline 
as well as on the incoming measurement data.  For this pattern recognition system, the features 
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investigated in this chapter are related to modal content.  The same framework can be followed 
for other event types with other sets of features. Some particular applications of this framework 
are presented in the following sections.   
 
6.2. Mapping Modes to Measurements and Events 
As described in the previous section, the modes in a ringdown can be used to identify patterns in 
measurement data for classifying events.  Results on estimating oscillation parameters of power 
systems in [159] corroborate our theory by showing that for a small disturbance, a measurement 
can be modeled as the output of a linear system excited by a delta function.  Then, the signal is 
completely characterized by the coefficients of the numerator and denominator polynomial.  One 
difficulty is that the events which cause ringdowns are not necessarily ―small‖ disturbances for 
which the above theory is valid.  The system may move from one state to another state or it may 
return again to the same state.  We are interested in the damped oscillatory responses that occur 
as the system moves.  Discovery of such patterns and relationships can lead to improved 
situational awareness by providing event information to operators.  In this section, we investigate 
the relationships of the modal content in oscillations to known modes of the power system.   
 
In this section, we develop an analytic representation for power system measurements in terms of 
the system eigenvalues for a single-machine-infinite-bus (SMIB) system.  The generalization of 
this analysis to an m-machine, n-bus system is then described.  These equations provide insight 
into what phenomena are being captured in the measurements and what is expected to be 
obtained from a mode meter.  The goal is to see analytically how certain modes of this system 
appear in any of the ―measureable‖ state variables.   
 
6.2.1. Two-Axis Single-Machine-Infinite-Bus Approximation  
Single-machine-infinite-bus (SMIB) eigenvalues are calculated by modeling one machine in 
detail while modeling the rest of the system as an infinite bus [160].  The SMIB eigenvalues for 
each generator can be obtained if the dynamic models are known.  A SMIB model allows the 
local modes of a generator to be examined and can greatly simplify analysis. Detailed 
investigation of SMIB models is found in [161].   In this section, we develop a representation of 
power system measurements in terms of the eigenvalues of a SMIB system.   
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For a SMIB, the equations are representative of local phenomena in the full system, and the 
associated equations are easy to analyze.  The SMIB system in Figure 65 [160, pp. 100] uses the 
two-axis machine model representation. The infinite bus voltage magnitude is V∞.  The 
equivalent transmission line which connects the single machine to the infinite bus is modeled by 
parameters Re and Xep. 
 
 
Figure 65. SMIB two-axis machine model [160] 
 
The two-axis machine can be represented by four differential equations or states.  Additionally, 
other models can be represented along with the two-axis model.  Typically, generator models 
also include exciter and governor dynamics, at minimum.  Addition of the IEEE Type 1 exciter 
to the model [160] results in two additional states.  Numerous generator models and 
corresponding control system models can be found in the literature [162, 163, 164, 165].  The 
block diagram model for the IEEE Type 1 exciter is shown in Figure 66, from [166].  
 
 
Figure 66. IEEET1 exciter model [166] 
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The four differential equations representing the machine dynamics correspond to states of rotor 
angle δ(t), speed ω(t), Eq’(t), and Ed’(t), where the (t) is dropped from further notation,  
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and a damping term of TFW = D(ω−ωs) is assumed. In the above system, Efd can be modeled as 
an input or as a state of the exciter.  The IEEE Type 1 exciter is represented by three state 
equations, 
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where VREF is an input, and limits on VR are given by  
 
 min max
R R RV V V   (169) 
 
Turbine governor dynamics are neglected, which is synonymous with modeling TM as a constant.  
 
Note that there is also a simpler one-axis model called the flux decay model [160].  The simpler 
model represents most of the impact we seek to capture, the relationship between machine states 
and terminal algebraic variables.  In summary, there is little simplification on the relationships of 
interest for this application when the one-axis model is used.  The relationship we seek to capture 
can be seen just as easily in the two axis model, which is a more accurate model.  
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6.2.2. From State Variables to Measurements 
For a two-axis machine model as in Figure 65 and a network model, as represented by the 
infinite bus and transmission line, one can compute the effect of state variables on measureable 
variables such as terminal voltage and current. The stator algebraic equations for the two-axis 
model can be written as  
 
  ' sin ' 0d t S d q qE V R I X I       (170) 
  ' cos ' 0q t S q d dE V R I X I       (171) 
 
where is Vt is the terminal voltage magnitude, 
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and after eliminating Vt, the stator algebraic equations simplify to 
 
 ' 'd d S d q qV E R I X I    (173) 
 ' 'q q S q d dV E R I X I    (174) 
 
The terminal current into the network is  
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which may also be simplified to obtain 
 
 sind e d e qV R I X I V     (176) 
 cosq e d e qV X I R I V     (177) 
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Combining equations (173) and (174) with equations (176) and (177), leads to the following set 
of equations:  
 
 ' ' sind S d q q e d e qE R I X I R I X I V       (178) 
 ' ' cosq S q d d e d e qE R I X I X I R I V       (179) 
 
where Vd and Vq have been eliminated.  After some manipulation of (178) and (179), Id and Iq 
can be solved for in terms of the machine constants, network constants, and state variables, 
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where values for the constants in the system of Figure 65 are given by 
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Thus, Id and Iq are linear functions of cos(δ), Eq’, and Ed’.  Similarly, expressions can be found 
for Vd and Vq in terms of the system constants and state variables: 
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The current (180), (181) and voltage (187), (188) equations show specifically how the state 
variables impact the measurements. The rotor angle δ, Eq’, and Ed’ are again explicitly present.   
This analysis thus reveals the relative weights of state variables in a measurement.  
 
A simple view of the problem is as a sensitivity problem, the sensitivity of measurements to 
changes in machine states.  Then, machine states may be approximated as a sum of damped 
exponentials.  
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From the above analysis, the states which appear directly in the measurements are only three 
states, δ, Eq’, and Ed’.  It is therefore appropriate to focus on identifying the modes which appear 
in these three state variables; this is the focus of the next section. 
 
6.2.3. From Eigenvalues to State Variables 
Examining the transformation from eigenvalues to state variables reveals how certain modes may 
be expected in a measurement.  Prior to this point in the analysis, no linearization has been used 
or required.  To obtain the eigenvalues and eigenvectors to continue this discussion, linearization 
is necessary.   
 
As described in [145], when a disturbance is applied and then removed to a linear time-invariant 
(LTI) system, the system will ―ring down‖ according to the solution of the system differential 
equations, 
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 x = Ax  (192) 
 
where A is the linearized system matrix from the dynamic equations in the power system.  The 
eigenvalues, right eigenvectors, and left eigenvectors of A can be represented respectively as λi, 
pi, and qi.   
 
This zero-input [147] response is governed by the characteristic modes of the system. There are a 
number of representations for the solution to (192). A desirable form is the following: 
 
 ( )
tt e A 0x x  (193) 
 te A -1PΛP  (194) 
 1diag , , ntte e   Λ  (195) 
 
As discussed, the solution actually obtained depends upon the system input and the initial 
conditions.   The eigenvalues, right eigenvectors, and left eigenvectors of A can be represented 
respectively for each mode i as λi ,vi, and wi, and Ci is a scalar.   Then, as discussed in [145], the 
state of the system as a function of time may be written as  
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where x0 is the initial system state and n is the dimension of the system.   
 
For the model in Figure 65, the states form x, and the system A matrix is obtained by linearizing 
about the operating point and eliminating Id, Iq, Vd, and Vq.  Let its eigenvalues simply be 
represented by λ1, λ2, and λ3.  Then, keeping the initial condition vector distinctly represented, the 
solution may be written as 
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In summary, the state values depend on the modes as expressed by (197), while the terminal 
voltage and current depend on these states as described by equations (180), (181), (187), and 
(188). 
 
6.2.4. General Impact on Measurements  
While the previous section analyzed the relationship between modes and measureable algebraic 
variables, it is important to extend the discussion to a multi-bus, multi-machine system.  The 
general impact on measurements is described in this section.   
 
Since A is determined by the differential equations of generators and represents the eigenvalues 
or modes associated with the generators, it follows that a measured ringdown in the system will 
contain information about those modes.  A measurement signal, such as line flow deviation or 
voltage deviation, is a linear combination of the states [159], 
 
 ( ) ( )k k
k
s n w x n  (198) 
 
where wk are weights, and samples are taken at t=nT, where T is the sample period. Thus, a 
measured signal contains information about the system modes and is also a sum of damped 
exponentials.   
 
For a general system, the stator algebraic equations can be rewritten so that they are equations 
for Id and Iq (Id-q) as functions of power flow variables V and machine states x.  The stator 
algebraic equations define the relationship between measureable variables and the machine 
states, as sought in (189).  The whole system can be linearized as in [160] to obtain the 
following: 
 
  0 , , ,f d-qx x I V u  (199) 
 ( , )hd-qI x V  (200) 
  00 , ,g d-qx I V  (201) 
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Hence, the terminal equations are essential for the defining relationship between V and x. The 
linearized system simplifies to the following [160]: 
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 (202) 
    -11 AE AE AEΔx A ' B J C Δx  (203) 
   -1AE AEΔy J C Δx  (204) 
 
The algebraic variables y include Id-q and the power flow states V.  Any other power system 
measurement variables can then be calculated from V.  The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the 
matrix in (202) and the algebraic equations (204) thus provide a way to quantify the impact of 
modes on states and on measurable variables.  
 
Additionally, a ringdown can be considered to be in one of three categories.  (1) The system is 
stable and the value returns to the equilibrium value xe. (2) The system is stable but returns to 
some new equilibrium point, denoted xe,new. (3) The system is unstable.  The focus of this work is 
on the oscillations for the first two types.  Future work is possible to obtain more information by 
simultaneously considering the steady-state changes that occur in situation (2). 
 
6.3. Generator Fault Event Classification  
The focus of this section is on identifying a single event type, three-phase to ground faults at the 
terminals of generator buses.  Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 present algorithms well-suited for this 
identification task.  Results for a 37-bus case are presented in Section 6.3.3.  Examining a single 
event type is necessary for consistency, and the present choice is sufficient to demonstrate the 
concepts of this work. When a fault occurs, an immediate change in the terminal characteristics 
of the generator results.  These changes are propagated through the machine states.  If the fault is 
cleared quickly, the event appears as a brief spike in terminal values, followed by an oscillation.  
 
Many issues involved with determining system damping are described in [150].  According to 
[150], oscillatory modes with negative damping (positively growing exponentials) are generally 
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not encountered in a system where speed governors and voltage regulators have been eliminated.  
Thus, oscillatory instability is almost entirely due to the effects of speed governors and voltage 
regulators.  When attempting to map SMIB eigenvalues to Prony analysis ringdowns, it is 
important to keep in mind the fundamental influence that regulators have on damping.  This 
importance appears especially with regard to low frequency oscillations [150].  Another 
difficulty which we encounter is also described in [150]: ―Qualitative determination of damping 
from swing curves may be difficult when the contribution of various oscillation modes is 
important.‖  That is, depending on what the event is, any modes in the system may be excited, 
not just the ones near the event.  In such cases, locating the precipitating generator is more 
difficult; it may be advantageous to examine the coupling between the different generators’ 
modes [161] and incorporate this into the solution. 
 
For the generator faults considered, the goal is to use oscillation data to identify which generators 
are likely to have been involved.  Key eigenvalues and associated generators may be known a 
priori, especially if a transient stability model of the system is available.  Analysis and 
experiments show that the electromechanical modes associated with angle and frequency tend to 
be the most prominent in the ringdown for three-phase faults at the generator terminals. For a 
SMIB system, these modes can be found by examining participation factors.   
 
Participation factors are a measure of the effect of a particular state on a particular eigenvalue, 
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where they relate the kth state variable to the ith eigenvalue.  These are determined from right 
and left eigenvectors v and w respectively.  Eigenvectors may be chosen with any convenient 
scaling; they are typically scaled to make w
T
v= 1. Thus, participation factors show which state 
variables reflect or capture certain modes.  Then, by inspection one can determine which modes 
represent the angle and speed states.     
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Two distinctions concerning the assumed measured signal should be made before proceeding.  
First, a two-bus equivalent system can be constructed based on a SMIB model: one bus 
represents the machine, while the other bus and transmission line represent the rest of the system. 
Ringdowns in the two-bus equivalent represent modes of the particular generator more clearly 
since the dynamics of all other generators are not modeled, whereas ringdowns in the full system 
contain the impact of all generators.  It is useful to compare the modal content of a ringdown in 
the two-bus system to that of the full system.  Additionally, it is important to distinguish between 
the rotor angle and the bus angle.  In simulation, it is possible to obtain the internal rotor angle 
which is a state of the generator, and this angle tends to more clearly preserve the modes.  
Conversely, the bus angle, which is possible to measure, is a function of solving the network’s 
algebraic equations, and may not preserve the modes as well. 
 
There are properties which make some modal estimation approaches better suited than other 
approaches for the goal of performing mode-matching for events.  Ideally, the two components 
of the problem, modal parameter estimation and event signature identification, can be considered 
together.   This may be directly integrated into the OMS, leading to a more online versus a post-
processing event analysis approach.  In reality, some combination of the two will be used.  We 
aim to take advantage of the most integrated approach possible, but it is likely that some post-
processing will inevitably be required.     
 
The next two sub-sections present modal estimation methods as part of this integrated approach. 
In particular, these two methods have special application towards obtaining the goals of this 
chapter.  These are the mode-matching least-squares (LS) algorithm and the Steiglitz-McBride 
algorithm.  A method is sought with the ability to constrain the modal estimation problem to 
prefer to return certain modes.  These methods are both tailored towards incorporating initial 
estimates of dominant modes.  As examined in [167], these two methods can be modified to 
account for some knowledge of the modes which are to be estimated.  The ability to account for 
known or expected modes is a feature which is particularly appealing in this application.   The 
results of these methods are also compared to the conventional Prony method, described in 
Section 6.1.2.  In this chapter, Prony analysis essentially serves as a base-case modal analysis 
method for examining and validating results.  While Prony analysis provides a good starting 
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point, the purpose of examining other methods is to be able to compare the response at different 
frequencies.  It is important to point out that these methods for obtaining the modal estimates 
used in this chapter are by no means the only approaches.  Performance comparisons of several 
methods are given in [168].   
 
We obtain a set of eigenvalues associated with each generator, and these eigenvalues are 
compared to the results of using Prony analysis on the oscillations that occur as a result of 
different events in the system.  As an example, suppose the eigenvalues associated with a certain 
generator or set of generators (or all the generators in the case) are known.  Many of the key 
eigenvalues in a system and their associated generator can be known approximately, assuming a 
transient stability model of the system is available.  Thus, this is a relatively reasonable 
assumption to make.  Then, when an event occurs near one of the generators, a measurement 
device such as a PMU located somewhere in the system will capture the oscillation data that 
occurs as a result of this event.  The question is whether we can take the ringdown data of the 
event and ascertain what possible events may have been the cause.  We may be able to tell which 
generator or generators are likely to have been involved in the event.  Specifically, we look for 
patterns which relate the modal content of oscillations in a signal measured at one location in the 
system to the ―SMIB eigenvalues‖ of the generators in the system. 
 
The methods in this section are used to investigate the extent to which events at different 
generators have distinct signatures in OMS results.  The coefficients of an estimated transfer 
function are termed a linear predictive code (LPC) or model (LPM) [159].  This LPM gives a 
model of the signal, and from this signal model we can compute various signal attributes.  
Important attributes are frequency, presence or absence of critical modes, degree of damping, 
and amplitude of signal components.  The future evolution of the signal can also be predicted 
from the LPM.   
 
Approaches for LPM characterization of the signal are discussed and demonstrated in this 
section. Differences are often present in how the coefficients of the LPM are estimated. 
Understanding the benefits and limitations of particular identification methods with respect to 
signature-seeking is important.  The methods explored in this section are the Prony method 
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[145], the Steiglitz-McBride algorithm [169] with initial mode estimates, and mode-matching 
least-squares (LS) estimation. Signatures of different events are evident.  These approaches 
illustrate the feasibility of distinguishing different events from each other in the resulting 
ringdown data.  Research on techniques to further characterize the signatures and to 
appropriately distinguish between events is warranted.   
 
6.3.1. Steiglitz McBride Algorithm with Initial Parameters 
The Steiglitz-McBride (SM) algorithm, introduced in [169], is also used to estimate the modal 
content of power system ringdowns [168], [171].  The SM algorithm iteratively computes 
Kalman estimates to identify a transfer function N(z)/D(z): 
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Each iteration of the algorithm determines updates of the coefficients α0,…,αn-1, and β1,… βn 
until the estimated response converges to the true response [170].  Convergence properties of the 
algorithm are examined in [170].   
 
The applicability of the SM algorithm in power systems for the purpose of studying low 
frequency electromechanical oscillations and for identifying low-order models from simulation 
data is examined in [171] and [168].   Performance comparisons of the Steiglitz-McBride 
algorithm, the Eigensystem Realization Algorithm, and the Prony method are given in [168].  As 
explained in [171], the estimated transfer function can be written as a sum of the residues over 
the poles: 
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The SM method can be executed in two forms, either with or without the use of initial 
parameters [169].  Executing the SM algorithm with specific initial parameters is advantageous 
for cases where certain modes seem to be of interest, as in this application.  The SM algorithm is 
especially useful because we can specify modes to serve as an initial estimate for the modes of 
 168 
the LPM.  In particular, SMIB eigenvalues and modal estimates from other methods serve as 
useful initial conditions.  The SM algorithm implementation used for this work is the Seiglitz-
McBride function in MATLAB’s Signal Processing Toolbox [172].  
 
6.3.2. Mode Matching Least Squares  
The approach described in this section seeks a direct mapping between the estimated modes of 
the response and the SMIB eigenvalues.  Instead of estimating all of the modal parameters, it is 
possible to hold certain modes fixed and estimate only their amplitudes.  Using least-squares 
estimation, it is thus possible to force the estimate to include certain known modes.  For this 
application, the specified modes can be SMIB eigenvalues.  Specified modes (damping and 
frequency) are held fixed while their amplitudes and initial phases are estimated.   
 
The objective is to solve the following: 
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where the vector f(t) is the estimated signal and the vector y(t) is the true signal.  For this 
method, consider the estimate f(t) to be a summation of unknown coefficients multiplied by 
known sinusoids:  
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The magnitudes and initial angles of modes in the signal can be estimated by solving a linear 
matrix, as long as the dampings and frequencies are known.  These estimates are obtained by 
solving the following linear matrix equation for a, 
 
 ( )tEa y  (211) 
 
where matrix E and vector a have the following structures: 
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n is the number of modes, and N is the number of time points.  Then, the least-squares solution is 
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where a is a vector of complex numbers which, in polar notation, give the magnitude and initial 
angle of the signal. 
 
This method is particularly useful for this application because one may choose a priori that the 
modes include the SMIB eigenvalues of interest.   Then, the SMIB eigenvalues are forced to 
appear in the Prony analysis results, and only their amplitudes and initial phases need to be 
determined.  Once these are determined, one may examine the amplitudes of the modes to 
determine which generators are significant contributions to the event. 
 
The quality of the resulting approximation depends extensively on which modes are specified. If 
a careful choice of representative modes is made initially, then f(t) is approximately equal to the 
original signal.  Conversely, if the modes are poorly selected, a meaningful approximation may 
not be found.  We have experimented with several ways of choosing the initial modes for this 
algorithm.  Suggestions include the SMIB eigenvalues, possibly in conjunction with estimates 
obtained from other methods.  In conclusion, this method is not as robust as the SM algorithm, 
since if the modes chosen to match for this algorithm are not a good match to the true signal, the 
results of the estimation will not be valid. 
 
6.3.3. Results for 37-Bus Ringdowns 
This section presents experimental results of events at several locations and examines the 
identifying information that is present in the ringdowns from these events.  The example system 
is the GSO 37-bus case [173].  The one-line diagram for the system is shown in Figure 67.  The 
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same study system is used throughout the chapter.  Results of Prony, Mode-matching LS, and 
SM methods applied to the GSO case are presented in detail in [167], along with discussion of 
tradeoffs to be made in choosing the various methods.  In this section, some results are 
highlighted.   
 
 
Figure 67. GSO 37-bus system 
 
The bus angle measurement ―BUCKY138‖ in this system is used as the simulated PMU signal.  
The angle reference in the simulations is the average of all generator angles.   
 
In Figure 68a, several SMIB eigenvalues which have low damping are shown.  These correspond 
to generators BLT138, LAUF69, ROGER69, BLT69, and BOB69.  The Prony analysis results of 
ringdowns due to simulated three-phase-to-ground faults at the generators followed by the 
generator tripping are shown in Figure 68b.   
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By inspection of Figure 68, there is some similarity in structure between SMIB eigenvalues and 
Prony analysis modal estimates, but more analysis is needed.  Initially, we note that the SMIB 
eigenvalues do exhibit a similar pattern to the estimated Prony modes, but the scaling is 
substantially different. 
 
Below, we compare the ringdowns for events in the GSO case.  The event at BLT138 from 
Figure 68b is used to illustrate the application of the mode-matching LS method to the GSO 
case.  The SMIB eigenvalues are chosen as the specified modes, then the generators with 
electromechanical modes corresponding to the highest estimated amplitudes should be noted.  
The identified generator or generators may serve as an indication of the likely source of the 
event. Figure 69 shows the results from fitting 29 generator SMIB eigenvalues to the ringdown 
using mode-matching LS, and the original signal is also plotted.    
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Figure 68. (a) SMIB eigenvalues for generators, (b) Prony analysis of events at generators 
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Figure 69. Reconstruction of event ringdown with mode-matching LS 
 
For the ringdown in Figure 69, the SMIB modes with the highest amplitudes and their associated 
generators are identified.  The generators with the largest contributions are identified in Table 29. 
As indicated in the table, the SMIB modes of generator BLT 138, which is where the event 
occurred, have higher amplitudes than the other SMIB modes.  Thus, the precipitating generator 
is correctly identified as BLT138. 
 
Table 29. Mode-matching LS results for estimating SMIB amplitudes 
Generator Ai σi ωi 
BLT138 17525.0000 -2.8161 3.6975 
BLT138 17525.0000 -2.8161 -3.6975 
ROGER69 9.9970 -1.9498 -12.603 
ROGER69 9.9968 -1.9498 12.603 
LAUF69 8.0001 -1.6795 14.944 
LAUF69 7.9998 -1.6795 -14.944 
BLT138 122.1300 -2.661 -15.716 
BLT138 122.1300 -2.661 15.716 
 
It is important to note that identification of a single contributing generator will not always be this 
apparent.  Which modes are present in the ringdown depends on which modes are excited, and 
this is based on both the system input and system state. Further investigation on more general 
cases is warranted. 
 
A useful result regarding the SM method is apparent from this application, as discussed in [167].  
It is found that the SM approximation, when the initial transfer function poles are chosen, more 
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closely matches the true signal than the Prony approximation.  Thus, a key insight is to use the 
SM approach with specified initial parameters, since a noteworthy improvement in the results is 
observed.  When fewer modes are estimated, the discrepancy between the Prony and the SM 
methods is more obvious.  For a 0.1 second balanced three-phase to ground fault at BLT138 in 
the two-bus equivalent, the bus angle ringdowns with both methods approximating only four 
modes are shown in Figure 70.  The approximations for 30 modes are shown in Figure 71.   
 
 
Figure 70. Four-mode estimate for BLT138 fault in two-bus equivalent – Prony method 
(left), SM method (right) 
 
 
Figure 71. 30-mode estimate for BLT 138 fault in two-bus equivalent – Prony method (left), 
SM method (right) 
 
Interestingly, when no initial parameters for the SM method are specified, its results essentially 
match the Prony method.  Suggestions for choices of initial parameters include the largest-
amplitude eigenvalues from an initial Prony analysis and the SMIB eigenvalues.  This effect is 
observed generally, regardless of which ringdown signals are studied. 
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To conclude the section, a comparison is given for ringdowns at all generators in the 37-bus case 
due to the same type of event.  In particular, three-phase to ground faults lasting 0.1 seconds are 
applied at each of the eight generator buses.  Table 30 provides a summary of results from the 
three modal estimation algorithms for each event.  The goal is to be able to pick out 
characteristics that make each event appear distinct.  
 
Table 30. Modal estimate comparisons for events at each generator 
 (1) Gen 53 – “BLT138,” s = -2.66±j15.7162 
Prony SB LS 
s =-3.78±j10.92  
(d: 4.92, 4.80) 
s = -3.51±j16.63, 
(d:1.25, -0.91) 
s = -3.78±j10.92, 
(d:4.92, 4.80) 
s =-3.51±j17.13,  
(d:1.65, -1.41) 
s = -2.97±j10.82, 
(d: 4.91, 4.90) 
s = -3.51±j17.13, 
(d:1.65, -1.41) 
(2) Gen 44 – “LAUF69,” s = -1.68±j14.94 
Prony SB LS 
s =-6.02±j9.51 
(d:6.95, 5.44) 
s =-7.06±j14.97, 
(d:5.38, -0.03) 
s =-6.02±j9.51, 
(d:6.95, 5.44) 
s =-2.10±j16.15,  
(d:1.29, -1.21) 
s =-2.13±j16.70, 
(d:1.82, -1.76) 
s =-2.10±j16.15, 
(d:1.29, -1.21) 
(3) Gen 50 – “ROGER69,” s = -1.95±j12.60 
Prony SB LS 
s =-2.674±j12.221 
(d:0.82, 0.38) 
s =-2.862±j11.95 
(d:1.12, 0.65) 
s =-2.674±j12.221 
(d:0.82, 0.38) 
(4) Gen 54- “BLT69,” s = -1.90±j11.28 
Prony SB LS 
s =-2.09±j11.09 
(d:0.27, 0.19) 
s =-1.32±j11.20 
(d:0.59, 0.08) 
s =-2.09±j11.09 
(d:0.27, 0.19) 
  s =-1.90±j11.279 
(d:0.00, 0.00) 
(5) Gen 31- “SLACK345,” s = -3.68±j8.17 
Prony SB LS 
s =-2.86±j12.07 
(d:3.98, -3.90) 
s =-2.94±j10.79 
(d:2.72, -2.62) 
s =-3.683±j8.171 
(d:0.00, 0.00) 
s =-3.52±j14.45 
(d:6.28, -6.28) 
s =-1.91±j13.9 
(d:6.00, -5.73) 
 
(6) Gen 28 – “JO345,” s = -2.25±j14.69 
Prony SB LS 
s =-2.362±j12.74 
(d:1.95, 1.95) 
s =-2.872±j11.49 
(d:3.26, 3.2) 
s =-3.517±j14.46 
(d:1.29, 0.23) 
s =-6.224±j16.63 
(d:4.42, -1.94) 
s =-2.09±j14.40 
(d:0.33, 0.29) 
s =-2.86±j12.07 
(d:2.69, 2.62) 
(7) Gen 14- “WEBER69,” s = -3.75±j15.25 
Prony SB LS 
s = -2.22±j13.30 
(d:2.48, 1.95) 
s = -2.13±j13.32 
(d:2.52, 1.93) 
s = -3.75±j15.25 
(d:0.00, 0.00) 
(8) Gen 48 – “BOB69,” s = -3.37±j12.96 
Prony SB LS 
s = -3.08±j11.34 
(d:1.65, 1.62) 
s = -3.32±j11.33 
(d:1.63, 1.63) 
s = -3.37±j12.96 
(d:0.00, 0.00) 
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The results in Table 30 provide a comparison of estimated modal content of the measured signal 
with SMIB eigenvalues of known generators.  The first row in each portion of Table 30 denotes 
the generator and its electromechanical SMIB modes.  
 
An important challenge becomes apparent, which is how best to quantify similarity of modes.  In 
these results, we give both the Euclidean distance and the Manhattan distance in the jω direction.  
Beneath each estimated mode in Table 30 are two numbers, indicated in the (d:a,b) term, where 
a is the Euclidean distance and b is the Manhattan distance of each mode to the SMIB mode. 
Low distance values indicate an estimate which is well-matched to the SMIB electromechanical 
mode.  The Manhattan distance shown is the SMIB eigenvalue frequency minus the estimated 
frequency, in radians. The reason for providing this metric is that the value of the frequency term 
may be of greater significance than the value of the damping term.  Frequency is based on 
physical characteristics of the generator, whereas damping may more readily change based on 
controls in the system.  More research is needed to better quantify the ―closeness‖ of modes, or 
how best to compare similarity of modal content. 
 
6.4. Automated Event Recognition 
The OMS pattern recognition scheme is further developed in this section, and results of its 
application to a large system are provided.  An important aspect of the problem is addressed, 
namely, the automatic classification of the ringdowns.  The event recognition approach is 
formulated to facilitate its automatic implementation and the expansion of its functionality.  In 
Section 6.4.1, the construction of mode maps for automatic ringdown analysis is presented. The 
approach requires the ―similarity‖ of modes to be defined.  Specification of this distance function 
is discussed in Section 6.4.2. Then, Section 6.4.3 demonstrates the success of the approach for 
oscillations originating at generators in the western interconnect (WECC). 
 
It is important to point out that the approach is developed to work irrespective of having 
knowledge of the network or measurements.  Of course, having any of these obviously makes the 
job easier.  While in a substation or a control room, under normal circumstances, everything is 
mostly known about the system or can at least be queried, and it is understood that this 
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immediate application of identifying fault location is probably not necessary.  Generally, there 
are much simpler ways of detecting such an event; for example, a relay will simply report that a 
three-phase fault occurred.  If one has access to this status information, there is no need for 
complicated oscillation monitoring event detection.  Where this application may be particularly 
valuable are in situations where little or nothing is known about the underlying system.  This is 
similar to the model-free assumptions of the PMU-based equivalencing application Chapter 4.  
Model-free applications are designed to work when all that is available may be a spreadsheet of 
data.  This may happen, for example, if one is recording oscillations from a wall outlet.  These 
techniques may also be useful for post-event reconstruction; that is, after a significant 
disturbance.  Model-free tools are useful for determining what may have occurred, without 
needing to piece together information from many different devices and sources.  One may be 
able to discern significant identifying information of the event just from one device.      
 
6.4.1. Generator Mode Maps for Ringdown Comparison  
The goal of the decision-making process is to assign a given ringdown to one of m categories 
based on a vector d of features. Here, the m categories or classes are the generators, and the 
feature vector d is from the OMS data (frequency, damping, etc).  Results in [167], highlighted in 
the previous section, show the effectiveness of three methods at finding the dominant modes.  
However, in Section 6.3, the responsibility to make a final conclusion that the ringdown is at a 
particular generator is ultimately left to the discerning eye of a viewer examining the results.  
Automatic analysis is desired instead.  This motivates the need for an appropriate metric to 
quantify ―closeness‖ of ringdown results to SMIB eigenvalues.  Especially when considering 
large systems, a quantifiable way of interpreting the results is needed. An approach to 
interpreting the modal estimates is presented here which is designed to handle the fact that there 
is some uncertainty in the eigenvalues. In Section 6.4.3, this is demonstrated for events in the 
WECC.  
 
The ringdown comparison approach presented in this section involves constructing mode maps 
for each generator.  In general, this mode map should be representative of a particular generator 
or event.  In this case, the mode maps are obtained by considering generator SMIB eigenvalues.  
Each point in the space of an image can be considered to receive some contribution from each of 
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the eigenvalues.  That is, a set E of eigenvalues for a particular generator is positioned at fixed 
points in the complex plane.  Then, there is some uncertainty surrounding these eigenvalues.  As 
a point becomes farther away from the points in E, the probability that it corresponds to that 
generator decreases to zero.  A function may be used to describe this uncertainty, but finding the 
most appropriate function may be a challenge.  In summary, the purpose of a mode map is to 
define the expectation that any point in the complex plane belongs to a particular generator or 
event. 
 
Additionally, the SMIB eigenvalue mode maps provide a 2D field of scalar values which can be 
mapped to colors and visualized, thus taking advantage of the extraordinary capability of the 
human visual system for pattern recognition.  The value at each 2D coordinate is a weight 
reflecting the likelihood that a particular point belongs to that generator.  These mode maps or 
modal images form the knowledge base.  Once modal images are constructed, they are available 
for easy comparison with measured ringdowns. 
 
The mode maps described above are calculated offline.  Then, when a new ringdown is 
encountered, the likelihood of the instance belonging to each of the predefined classes needs to 
be evaluated.  Then, the instance may be assigned to the class, or generator, with the highest 
likelihood.  Consider events which occur at different generators, represented by the classes Gi. 
The Prony ringdown data R is the ―evidence.‖  The problem can be considered probabilistically 
[174], 
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where the intersection of R and Gi is the joint probability, and is determined from the modal 
image.  Rather than deal with probabilities, we deal with weights,  
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where s is a scale factor, and imageGi(σk,fk) denotes a point on the modal image Gi for each of the 
k modes.  If it is assumed that all generators are equally probable, the scale factor, s, can be 
neglected.   
 
As indicated in (216), the estimated modal components give coordinates in the generator modal 
image, and the corresponding retrieved values are then compared to classify the event.   The 
event is thus assigned some likelihood of belonging to each class. 
 
It is important to continue this work to develop classification methods for power system event 
data so we can better facilitate the automatic recognition of events. The ability of the analysis to 
occur automatically is emphasized.  In this work, the classifier is described by the mode maps.  
Then, similarity of modal characteristics is evaluated by comparing the mode measurements in a 
ringdown response to mode maps of possible contributing generators. 
 
6.4.2. Choice of Distance Function 
For the mode maps used in this chapter, the value at any point is based on the distance of that 
point to the SMIB eigenvalues.  However, there are potentially an infinite number of distance 
function choices that could be defined.  Comparing similarity of modal content requires 
specification of this distance function. 
 
In examining the choice of a distance function, we note that the problem of representing the 
extent to which the true modes are located near the SMIB eigenvalues lends itself naturally to 
graphics.  Thus, in this work, the weighting function used is one which is adapted from 
Shepherd’s method [175]. Sheppard’s method interpolates points on a grid and is also used in 
power system visualization to create color contours (e.g. voltage) on one-line diagrams [176].   
The value at any point on the 2D plane is a weighed combination of the values at points with 
specified values: 
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In this work, the points with specified values are the generator eigenvalues.  The modal images 
show the interpolation of the likelihood of these eigenvalues.  The weighting function used in 
(217) is the following inverse distance function: 
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where α and β reflect the fact that the damping and the frequency components may be assigned a 
different level of importance. 
 
This distance function choice is made to illustrate the feasibility of the approach, and it appears 
to represent the problem well.  Many other functions are possible, as discussed in [177], so this is 
not a unique choice.  This distance function does reflect the uncertainty of eigenvalues, which is 
an important feature.  A clear opportunity is present for further research to develop a more 
general or optimal way of constructing modal images.  The distance function can be considered 
as part of the knowledge base, and new information can be incorporated to enhance its accuracy. 
 
A difficulty in designing applications is that some assumptions must be made concerning what 
information or starting knowledge one may already have, and the available information will 
obviously influence the course of action one takes.  There is a wide spectrum of starting 
knowledge one might possess when performing this analysis.  Thus, it is worth emphasizing that 
one must be able to adapt this approach based on the amount and extent of available starting 
information.  The mode maps are one place where extra information can be incorporated, and the 
distance function choice is another. For example, it will be useful to collect and incorporate 
information about how modes move in the complex plane and show this in the modal images.  
Once modal images are constructed, the possible origin of a measured ringdown can then be 
estimated.   
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6.4.3. Results for WECC Ringdowns  
A system representing the WECC is now examined.  The WECC system has approximately 3300 
generators and 8200 loads.  There are numerous dynamic models, and each dynamic model 
potentially contains a large number of states and parameters.  In this section, we examine 
simulated events in the WECC system and demonstrate the use of our approach on the resulting 
ringdowns.  The angle reference in the simulation is the average of all generator angles.  Then, in 
the next sub-section, we discuss these results and propose useful extensions. 
 
Four WECC generators are studied for this example.  To construct the modal images, the SMIB 
eigenvalues of the generators are required. These are plotted in Figure 72.  The horizontal axis is 
damping and the vertical axis is frequency in Hz.  Each symbol denotes a different generator.  
From Figure 72, one can observe that certain eigenvalues are not distinguishable from those of 
other generators. Fortunately, however, the pattern of the eigenvalues for each generator is still 
distinct. The question is whether these distinct patterns can be captured and recognized in the 
ringdowns.   
 
 
Figure 72. West SMIB eigenvalues 
 
The model types of these four generators are given in Table 31.  The ringdowns for three-phase-
to-ground faults at generators G1, G2, G3, and G4 are shown in Figure 73, and they are labeled 
respectively R1, R2, R3, and R4.  The modal images constructed for each generator are shown in 
Figure 74. 
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Table 31. Machine model types 
 Machine Exciter Governor Stabilizer Other 
G1 GENROU TEXS GGOV1 PSS2A OEL1 
G2 GENTPF EXAC3A IEEEG1 WSCCST OEL1 
G3 GENROU EXAC3A - IEEEST OEL1 
G4 GENROU TEXS GGOV1 PSS2A OEL1 
 
 
Figure 73. (Top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right) Measured ringdowns R1, R2, R3, 
and R4, shown with corresponding SM approximations, respectively 
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Figure 74. (Top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right) Modal images for G1, G2, G3, and 
G4, respectively 
 
Results showing the estimated modes for each ringdown of Figure 73 are given in Table 32 
through Table 35, obtained by applying the SM method with initial parameters, as previously 
described. Results and experience indicate that the electromechanical modes of the generator 
with the fault tend to be prominent in the ringdown for this type of event. Electromechanical 
modes, typically in the 1-3 Hz range, are associated with machine rotor angle and speed. The 
electromechanical modes can be identified using participation factor analysis [160].  Let 
participation factors p∂,ω relate how rotor angle and speed impact the mode. Then, the 
electromechanical modes of the four generators and the corresponding participation factors are 
given by the following:  
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1 ,:       2.304 11.042        0.66,0.61EMG j p       (219) 
 
2 ,:       0.439 12.595        0.69,0.72EMG j p       (220) 
2 ,:       28.041 6.846        0.13EMG j p       (221) 
 
3 ,:       0.765 11.656        0.67,0.74EMG j p       (222) 
3 ,:       28.237 6.876        0.10EMG j p       (223) 
 
4 ,:       2.262 11.353        0.65,0.53EMG j p       (224) 
 
As (221) and (223) indicate, participation factors for generators 2 and 3 indicate the presence of 
a second mode which contributes to the speed state variable.  However, its participation factor is 
still significantly less than that of the other mode.    
 
Table 32. G1 ringdown, SM method results 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
59.538 0.009333 0 0 3.1416 
0.001071 -0.63631 38.171 6.0751 1.8971 
0.001071 -0.63631 -38.171 -6.0751 -1.8971 
0.36997 -1.3121 11.41 1.816 0.64625 
0.36997 -1.3121 -11.41 -1.816 -0.64625 
0.009564 -1.5249 28.16 4.4817 -0.07392 
0.009564 -1.5249 -28.16 -4.4817 0.073921 
1.967 -6.1478 9.3534 1.4886 -0.41702 
1.967 -6.1478 -9.3534 -1.4886 0.41702 
 
Table 33. G2 ringdown, SM method results 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
27.808 0.085692 0 0 3.1416 
3.6972 -0.90208 12.869 2.0481 -1.1021 
3.6972 -0.90208 -12.869 -2.0481 1.1021 
4.7489 -2.5911 6.4759 1.0307 0.04304 
4.7489 -2.5911 -6.4759 -1.0307 -0.04304 
0.19369 -2.6439 24.789 3.9453 2.9495 
0.19369 -2.6439 -24.789 -3.9453 -2.9495 
0.034903 -3.5326 36.608 5.8263 0.18261 
0.034903 -3.5326 -36.608 -5.8263 -0.18261 
 
 184 
Table 34. G3 ringdown, SM method results 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
30.207 0.022992 0 0 3.1416 
1.155 -0.40206 12.297 1.957 -1.258 
1.155 -0.40206 -12.297 -1.957 1.258 
0.037089 -1.2903 23.355 3.7171 2.3166 
0.037089 -1.2903 -23.355 -3.7171 -2.3166 
5.4866 -3.0222 9.1124 1.4503 -0.67972 
5.4866 -3.0222 -9.1124 -1.4503 0.67972 
0.099438 -7.4538 44.578 7.0949 -2.0917 
0.099438 -7.4538 -44.578 -7.0949 2.0917 
 
 
Table 35. G4 ringdown, SM method results 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
59.093 0.015505 0 0 3.1416 
0.153 -1.7292 13.083 2.0823 -1.0678 
0.153 -1.7292 -13.083 -2.0823 1.0678 
1.3745 -3.4335 5.4603 0.86903 0.30096 
1.3745 -3.4335 -5.4603 -0.86903 -0.30096 
0.045315 -4.1202 26.548 4.2252 1.702 
0.045315 -4.1202 -26.548 -4.2252 -1.702 
0.15645 -10.379 27.326 4.3491 -1.9781 
0.15645 -10.379 -27.326 -4.3491 1.9781 
 
 
When examining the above tables, the electromechanical modes are clearly present but are not an 
exact match.  Other modes are also present in the signals.  Already an exclusivity problem begins 
to emerge: the electromechanical modes may not be sufficiently distinct to allow one to 
confidently distinguish between the generators based on ringdown data. 
 
Using the proposed modal image comparison approach, it is possible to take advantage of 
constructed modal images to perform comparisons quickly and automatically. The modal image 
approach extends the manual electromechanical mode-matching concept to a more general 
procedure. Modal images may include eigenvalues, uncertainty, and expected eigenvalue 
movement. The automatic event recognition approach is applied with the modal images in Figure 
74.  In Table 36, each column represents one ringdown. For each ringdown, the value in (216) is 
computed from each of the modal images in Figure 74.  
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Table 36. WECC modal image matching results 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 
G1 1.2902 1.7164 1.9082 1.5172 
G2 0.81342 1.7525 1.2115 1.9025 
G3 1.2566 1.3864 1.9564 1.5296 
G4 1.1335 0.44082 1.8571 1.9862 
 
Each ringdown is correctly classified to its originating generator, as shown by the highlighted 
values in Table 36.  As Table 36 indicates, there is a distinction between the ringdowns in a way 
that is analyzed and related back to the key contributing generators.   
 
From analysis of this system, it is apparent that ringdowns can exhibit relatively small 
differences, and these need to be accentuated. Generators often have similar models and modes, 
so it becomes necessary to sharpen their distinguishing features.  Even small differences can 
provide important identifying information. 
 
6.5. Generator Exciter Event Classification  
In addition to considering events which are generator faults, other event types may also be 
studied based on the same approach previously described.  In particular, in this section we 
consider events caused by a change in exciter setpoint.  The reason for choosing this type of 
event to study is that while the fault event recognition approach is illustrative of the basic 
concepts of automatic pattern recognition encouraged in this thesis, there are a number of 
reasons why a fault might not be the most ―interesting‖ type of event to study using this method.  
As alluded to previously, determining the existence and location of faults is typically 
accomplished quite readily using existing methods and technology; hence, using the proposed 
methods specifically for event diagnostics consisting of identifying generator involvement in 
faults has limited applicability.  Additionally, faults are physically occurring phenomena, and 
their effects cannot (easily or directly) be caused by human actions.  Comparatively, there are a 
number of other event types in power systems which one can conceive of as being a result of 
something other than the normal operation of the power system.  For example, an exciter setpoint 
can be changed simply via communications.  Generally, when it is changed, there is a reason or a 
need for the change.  In fact, a change in exciter setpoint that is not intended would be cause for 
further investigation and possibly alarm.  In such a case, using the described methodology to 
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accomplish the identification of a signature indicative of an exciter setpoint change event would 
be advantageous.  The SMIB eigenvalues of the generator used in this section are given in Table 
37. 
 
Table 37. Exciter example, generator SMIB eigenvalues 
Ai σi ωi fi 
19.0621 -19.0621 0 0 
11.1046 -0.4889 11.0939 1.7656 
11.1046 -0.4889 -11.0939 -1.7656 
4.2084 -4.2084 0 0 
0.906 -0.6059 0.6736 0.1072 
0.906 -0.6059 -0.6736 -0.1072 
  
A few differences between the event types are noted.  The time constant involved for the exciter 
events is slower.  To view the entire ringdown, one must look at a window of approximately 50 
seconds, compared to a window of 10 seconds for the faults.   If too short of a time window is 
used, the information captured will be inadequate.  Based on the ringdowns over 10 seconds, 
high-frequency oscillations appear to be visible in the ringdown of the bus angle, as shown in 
Figure 75.  These plots show respectively the rotor angle, the voltage magnitude at the bus, and 
the voltage angle at the bus.   
 
 
Figure 75. Rotor angle, bus voltage, and bus angle, due to exciter event, 10-s time window 
 
Observing the same event over 50 seconds in Figure 76 reveals that indeed there is a high-
frequency component present in the bus angle signal. 
 
109876543210
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
109876543210
1.09
1.08
1.07
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.02
1.01
1
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
0.92
0.91
0.9
0.89
0.88
109876543210
14.8
14.6
14.4
14.2
14
13.8
13.6
13.4
13.2
13
12.8
12.6
12.4
12.2
12
11.8
11.6
11.4
11.2
Rotor Angle (degrees) Bus Voltage (pu) Bus Angle (degrees)
 187 
 
Figure 76. Rotor angle, bus voltage, and bus angle, due to exciter event, 50-s time window 
 
It is not known what is causing this oscillation. The high frequency oscillations can present a 
difficulty for the modal estimation algorithms to approximate the signal.  One possible solution 
is to apply a low-pass filter first, and experimentation shows that a low-pass filter does indeed 
help remedy this problem.  If we first apply a low-pass filter to the signal, it is now possible to 
approximate the bus angle ringdown using a lower order (six instead of 20 or more).  Figure 77 
shows the original and the filtered signal, estimated using the Steiglitz Mc-Bride algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 77. Bus angle ringdown with (left) and without (right) low-pass filtering   
 
Table 38 shows the estimation, with the low-pass filter applied to the original signal first. 
 
 
 
Rotor Angle (degrees)
50454035302520151050
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
50454035302520151050
1.09
1.08
1.07
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.02
1.01
1
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
0.92
0.91
0.9
0.89
0.88
50454035302520151050
14.8
14.6
14.4
14.2
14
13.8
13.6
13.4
13.2
13
12.8
12.6
12.4
12.2
12
11.8
11.6
11.4
11.2
Bus Voltage (pu) Bus Angle (degrees)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Time
S
ig
n
a
l
SM Results 
SB Approximate
Measured
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
Time
S
ig
n
a
l
SM Results 
SB Approximate
Measured
 188 
Table 38. Bus angle signal, modal estimation, after low-pass filter 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
16.208 -0.01885 0 0 0 
0.37154 -0.27821 6.0087 0.95631 0.91344 
0.37154 -0.27821 -6.0087 -0.95631 -0.91344 
4.7636 -0.49225 0 0 3.1416 
0.23662 -0.63961 8.9137 1.4187 1.8014 
0.23662 -0.63961 -8.9137 -1.4187 -1.8014 
 
Comparatively, with no low-pass filtering, the signals are estimated according to Table 39.  As 
evident in the table, the low-pass filtering leads to a better identification of the key modes: 
 
Table 39. Bus angle signal, modal estimation, without low-pass filter 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
15.863 -0.01642 0.000553 8.79E-05 -0.00582 
0.10367 -0.02581 8.34 1.3274 -2.2586 
0.10502 -0.02697 -8.3451 -1.3282 2.2787 
4.0909 -0.43738 -0.0124 -0.00197 3.12 
0.44023 -0.85646 -9.7346 -1.5493 -2.0023 
0.44481 -0.85948 9.7248 1.5477 2.0054 
 
The ringdown results for SM method for the voltage magnitude signal are given in Table 40. 
This oscillation is a much lower frequency than those from the three-phase faults looked at 
earlier.    
 
Table 40. Exciter example, voltage signal, modal estimates 
Ai σi ωi fi ϕi 
0.93779 -0.00104 -8.26E-07 -1.31E-07 8.60E-07 
0.076554 -0.33436 0.72877 0.11599 0.3879 
0.076554 -0.33436 -0.72877 -0.11599 -0.38791 
0.003219 -0.55351 -8.6731 -1.3804 0.50131 
0.003219 -0.55351 8.6731 1.3804 -0.50131 
0.001996 -3.3483 -10.63 -1.6918 -1.5171 
0.001996 -3.3483 10.63 1.6918 1.5171 
 
Comparing Table 40 with Table 37, the same dominant modes are present. These values are 
highlighted in the respective tables.  Interestingly, rather than the response containing one mode 
in the 1-2 Hz range, it contains two, one at 1.38 Hz and another at 1.69 Hz.  The dampings of 
these two modes do not match the damping of the 1.76 Hz SMIB eigenvalue. 
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Further investigation is made into cause of the high-frequency oscillations. The above examples 
correspond to a generator with an exciter of type SEXS_PTI illustrated in Figure 78: 
 
 
Figure 78. Original exciter model - SEXS_PTI 
 
Then, this exciter was changed to IEEET1, as shown in Figure 66.  The default parameters were 
used.  The change in exciter type impacted the ringdowns, as we can see.  This was done to try to 
see if the same high-frequency oscillation is observed with other exciters. With no other changes 
in the system except this exciter model, the ringdowns are given in Figure 79: 
 
 
Figure 79. Rotor angle, bus voltage, and bus angle, due to exciter event, 50-s time window, 
different exciter mdoel 
 
Interestingly, the high frequency oscillations observed in the bus angle signal earlier are not 
present when this exciter is used instead. 
 
As can be seen in the preceding examples, a distinct ringdown signature is present for exciter 
setpoint modifications, which is related to the exciter SMIB eigenvalues of the precipitating 
generator.  As described previously, once such signatures have been identified, the part of the 
work which is unique to each event type is essentially complete.  What remains once a 
characterization of the event is obtained is to develop the online tools needed to perform this 
analysis automatically and quickly on incoming ringdowns.  The previous section described how 
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this can be done using mode maps.  For this type of event, rather than mode maps containing a 
heavy weighting or representation of generator electromechanical modes, it should contain the 
modes associated with the exciter.  As we have seen, these tend to be lower in frequency and so 
require a larger time window to capture.   
 
We have also seen that the use of filters can be a beneficial step to ensuring we do not obtain 
―noise‖ in our results, where ―noise‖ here refers to signals outside of our range of interest.  In 
fact, the noise itself may be indicative of a problem or an event.  High frequency oscillations 
indicate that something may be switching quickly – so perhaps that exciter model was 
experiencing problems due to its output hitting a limit and then possibly reacting and hitting a 
different limit.  There is further evidence in this application of the value of data for diagnostics.  
In addition to looking for the presence of certain events (event signatures) there is also the 
possibility of inducing an event and not seeing the presence of the expected signature, as 
occurred in this scenario.  So, while this can be used to see if an exciter setpoint has changed 
without our knowledge or our authorization, it can also be used as a verification tool.  While 
verifying what we expect, we can simultaneously increase our knowledge base (and mode maps) 
and improve the accuracy (or at least the trustworthiness) of the tool. 
 
6.6. Conclusions  
In this chapter, estimated modal content from oscillations is used to identify event signatures.  
The ability to accurately estimate modes is a valuable starting point for the further study of 
oscillations based on data, as described in Section 6.1.  Section 6.2 examines the relationship 
between events in the system and the measured modal content of the oscillations.  The links 
between system identification and data mining become apparent when analyzing oscillations. 
 
Our results indicate that events impact modal estimates in distinct, predicable ways.  With 
knowledge of the nominal modes of certain generators, it is often possible to distinguish an event 
at one of these generators.  Regardless of which modal estimation algorithm is used, the 
feasibility of distinguishing different events from each other in the resulting ringdown data is 
clearly illustrated.  While we conclude that model types and parameters have a distinguishable 
effect on modes, it is not an easy concept to quantify.  Participation factors help by describing 
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how state variables relate to the eigenvalues, and we can quantify how certain modes may be 
expected in measurements.   
 
A useful result regarding the SM method is obtained from this chapter. It is found that with the 
SM approximation, when the initial transfer function poles are chosen, a noteworthy 
improvement in results is observed when compared to a Prony approximation of the same order.   
 
An important aspect of the problem is the automatic classification of the ringdowns, which is 
also addressed.  Automated processing of modal estimates from OMS results can facilitate online 
decision making. An approach is introduced in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 for the systematic and 
automatic classification of ringdowns to events based on modal content.  Modal images for each 
generator are constructed, where the values in a modal image reflect the likelihood associated 
with a mode belonging to a particular generator.  These modal images are useful for comparing 
event ringdowns and can be generalized to use any choice of distance function.  The method is 
demonstrated using examples from a WECC case, and results show that the ringdowns can be 
correctly classified.   The ringdown comparison approach involves constructing mode maps or 
modal images for each generator, representative of a particular generator or event.  Modal 
images are an attempt to deal with the problem of ringdown comparisons while accounting for 
the fact that modal estimates have some intrinsic uncertainty and error.   A potentially rich 
opportunity is present for further research on a more general and optimal way of constructing 
these modal images.    
 
By building up a knowledge base of these mode maps, a framework is in place to further 
discover and quantify associations between measured data and events.  There is a wide spectrum 
of starting knowledge one might possess when performing this analysis.  The framework is 
extensible to incorporate other events and various levels of known information.  The available 
information will obviously influence the course of action one takes.  In the event that no 
information is known, it can still be possible to build a knowledge base from actual measured 
ringdown data.   Extra information can be incorporated into the mode maps as well as into the 
distance function choice.  For example, it will be useful to collect and incorporate information 
about how modes move in the complex plane.  The framework can be extended to other events 
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such as exciter setpoint change, considered in Section 6.5, and is a forerunner to performing 
more in-depth analysis based on event patterns or signatures in estimated modal content.  This 
chapter highlights the fact that it is possible to build upon this work to ultimately be able to 
identify a wide variety of signatures for different types of events.   
 
In conclusion, measurement data can be used to characterize relationships and facilitate event 
detection and classification.   A relationship exists between the system eigenvalues, which may 
be associated with certain generators, and the modes in a ringdown.  Examining the contributions 
of generator electromechanical modes to ringdowns lays the foundation for continued work in 
detecting and distinguishing event characteristics.  Continuing work is needed to develop 
methods for signature recognition and classification in OMS data.  The applications in this 
chapter are supplemental to existing OMS analysis, leading towards an improved and automated 
root-cause analysis of oscillations.   
 
There is opportunity for further investigation into a number of questions, including the 
following: What circumstances are necessary to assure that certain events will present distinct 
signatures? How can we obtain more information by simultaneously considering the steady-state 
changes that occur?   
 
A key challenge which is fundamental for this work is to develop metrics for comparing 
similarity of signals based on their modal content.  A more basic question is how best to quantify 
similarity of modes.  For example, the value of the frequency term may be of greater significance 
than the value of the damping term since frequency is based on physical characteristics of the 
generator whereas damping may more readily change based on controls in the system. 
 
The work in this chapter may be additionally useful for aiding in transient stability response 
comparison, such as to validate dynamic characteristics of equivalents in Chapter 4. The 
applications in this chapter also provide further evidence of the value of data for diagnostics, 
examined in Chapter 5. 
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Another challenge is dealing with cases where the strong modes excited by an event are not 
easily identifiable as belonging to a particular generator’s local modes.  Rather than attempting 
to associate an event with one particular generator, it may be useful to determine sets of coherent 
generators, as in Chapter 4, and find the coherent group to which an event is likely to belong.  
Finding these groups or clusters can help make pattern-matching more tractable since rather than 
searching the large set of all generators, it is only necessary to search a small set of groups.     
 
These results in this chapter are promising, especially considering the fact that the SMIB 
eigenvalues are essentially two orders of approximations; firstly from the non-linear system 
dynamics to a linearized representation of the system, and secondly from a linearized 
representation of the system to generator models which are decoupled from the dynamics of 
other generators.  The connection between SMIB models and the full system is further examined 
in [161]. 
 
Difficulty arises from the fact that the concept of eigenvalues does not truly extend to nonlinear 
systems. The only exception is linearization around an equilibrium point.  Thus, measured modes 
in power systems are not truly defined by the eigenvalues of linear system theory.  Measured 
modes of the system are changing, especially during an event. It would be better to have an 
algorithm designed to account for the expected changes over time.  Studying the trajectory of 
eigenvalues over a window of time may provide more information about the events.  Modal 
sensitivities calculated from data [178], as part of the Modal Analysis for Grid Operation 
(MANGO) framework [179], provide insight into the relationships between measured modes and 
events or control actions in the system.  Model types and parameters have a distinguishable 
effect on modes, but this is not an easy concept to quantify.  Participation factors help by 
describing how state variables relate to the eigenvalues. Work remains to better represent the 
information contained in measured modes.   
 
As a suggested extension, one may consider doing the reverse of the MANGO framework.  That 
is, if modal sensitivities are known, perhaps from MANGO, and then one observes a mode 
changing in a certain way, the question is whether it is possible to go the other direction and map 
that mode change to possible injection changes.  That is, it may be possible to determine what 
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generator output changes (or at least what space of generator changes) may have occurred to 
cause the change.   In the MANGO framework, this amounts to needing the inverse of the modal 
sensitivity matrix and multiplying that matrix by the observed mode changes.  Such an event 
detection application would be different from the current work since it is also makes use of 
steady state information. 
 
There are other aspects and ongoing advancements in OMS technology which are beyond the 
scope of this work.  Some issues include signal selection, filtering, model order, and linearity 
assessment [155], [156].  The number of modes, n, which should be estimated is often unknown.  
A primary limitation to obtaining accurate modal estimates is noise.  Measurement location can 
also impact the estimates.  It may be beneficial to consider the impact of location using relevant 
concepts in electromagnetic wave propagation theory [180], [181]. Signals at different locations 
can be correlated to reflect how events move through the system. Also, utilizing a multi-signal 
approach in [155] provides more accurate modal estimates in the presence of noise and system 
nonlinearities. Another useful area for further investigation is system identification.  The ideal 
method would allow certain modes to be specified as algorithm parameters while allowing the 
remaining modes to be selected such that a best-fit of the signal is obtained by the algorithm.  
More research is needed to seek direct ways to accomplish this.  Including such ongoing 
advances will further enhance this work.   
 
 
 
 
  
 195 
7.  Protecting Data and Applications   
The focus in this chapter is on protecting the data itself as well as the applications which use the 
data.  From this viewpoint, the goal is to make the system secure so that it will behave in the 
ways that are intended and not in the ways that are not intended.  To leverage power system 
protection terminology, ―dependability‖ and ―security‖ must be balanced; this analogy is equally 
valid from an overall system perspective.  There is a balance between acting every time that an 
action is required (dependable) and refraining from taking any actions that are unnecessary 
(secure).  The protections of data and applications must also strive to reach this balance. 
 
Accounting for the impact of false or ―bad‖ data is crucial to defining the relationship between 
data and power systems.  The goal of bad data protection is to improve the robustness or 
resilience of algorithms in the presence of wrong, malicious, or missing data.  Data availability 
and integrity are critical for operational data.  Sensors need to be protected from inappropriate 
access, both physical and remote.  As new applications are created, they must be designed to 
operate safely and correctly, as much as possible, in the presence of any conceivable received 
data.   
 
Given the criticality of the power grid, it can be an attractive attack target. Adversaries may 
attempt to manipulate sensor measurements, insert fake control commands, introduce delays into 
measurements and commands, and take other malicious actions. It is crucial to protect these 
systems against such malicious activity to ensure safe and reliable operation of the power grid. 
 
Another component of protecting data and applications is the ability to detect and respond to 
problems caused by false data.  This chapter also focuses on how to detect false or ―bad‖ data in 
power system applications, while alerting operators to its presence and recommending actions, 
without disrupting the normal operation of the power grid.  Regardless of how good the 
protections of a system are designed to be, they cannot be perfect; that is the emphasis of the 
second half of this chapter.  As an engineer, one must walk the line between the role of designing 
applications which are maximally robust against false data and the role of identifying and 
handling false data in a system which necessarily has an imperfect defense.   
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The emphasis in the next two sections is on designing secure applications with respect to data 
quality.  Some key considerations relating data to all the applications in this thesis are presented.  
Then, solutions along two different avenues of bad data detection and response are presented in 
the third and fourth sections.  In Section 7.1, the framework detailed in [42] for intelligently 
coordinating and controlling devices is outlined.  This framework was developed in parallel with 
the voltage control application in Chapter 3, in particular.  In Section 7.2, the problem of 
protecting DC state estimation from false data injection attacks is solved by measurement 
selection.  Then, the CPIDS framework we proposed in [182] is described in Section 7.3, which 
combines cyber and physical state information to provide a better awareness of the overall 
combined state of the system.  Then, the last application, described in Section 7.4 and presented 
in [187], is a perturbation-based bad data detection system.   
 
7.1. Intelligent Control and Communications Framework   
An intelligent, secure communications and control framework is absolutely essential for the 
voltage control application in Chapter 3. Thus, it is imperative to mention some of its 
requirements here, as one cannot omit this discussion when describing control applications.  
With powerful wide-area control schemes comes the responsibility to understand and describe 
the requirements for a secure communications infrastructure to control these resources.  Only 
then can a solution be carried out to satisfy these requirements, and only then can such controls, 
made available via smart-grid technologies, be actuated in the system. 
 
In order to coordinate the control of the possibly vast amounts of distributed resources via the 
voltage control method, a communication structure which recognizes the authority and 
responsibility of the participating entities is required. An intelligent control framework is 
proposed in [41], [42] to coordinate many resources in order to achieve a common goal during an 
event.  An intelligent control framework allows the control of end-user reactive-power-capable 
devices for mitigation of low voltage problems at a system-wide level.   The framework involves 
requirements to control these resources over a secure communications infrastructure, outlined 
below. Such controls can be actuated in the system to maintain a desired voltage profile.    
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In [42], a communications and control hierarchy is proposed to address some of these concerns. 
This scheme is a part of the voltage control framework introduced in Chapter 3. The framework 
mimics a chain of command structure such as the Incident Command System (ICS), where 
members follow a line of authority and responsibility.  Such an authority structure is the key idea 
of the proposed framework. The ICS is a ―systematic tool used for the command, control, and 
coordination of an emergency response‖ [183].  This system is in widespread use by firefighters 
and other emergency personnel for efficiently handling the emergency scenarios they face daily.  
In particular, the ICS has proven that it is successful for dealing with emergencies and for 
coordinating large numbers of responders.  Responders under its command may not all work 
together normally but have the same goals for the incident.   
 
There are notable parallels between the ICS and the requirements of a framework needed for the 
intelligent control of power system devices.  In particular, the reactive power control devices in 
Chapter 3 can be controlled to respond efficiently when the power system is in crisis.  In the ICS, 
each individual reports to only one supervisor. The individuals work in groups, and the members 
report to a particular supervisor or officer who in turn reports to another designated officer.  The 
functional unit with the highest authority is called command.  Beneath command, there may exist 
different sections, branches, functional groups, and geographical divisions [183]. The resources 
which perform the task and have no responsibility to command other resources are at the lowest 
level in this structure. 
 
The individual end-user reactive-power-capable devices in Chapter 3 are the resources, which 
are then aggregated. Similarly to the personnel resources in the ICS, while these end-user devices 
do not normally work together, they have the same goal in a crisis.  For devices which are a part 
of the framework, by following a chain of command during an event, they are able to provide the 
help that is needed.  As described in Chapter 3, reactive support groups [41] are a key enabler of 
the voltage control application.  Since reactive power support is local in nature and must be 
generated close to its point of consumption, such reactive power support must come from within 
the region with the voltage problems.  Each reactive support group would include an officer, who 
is responsible for that group.  This officer may be a particular device within the group.  Likewise, 
that officer reports to a supervisor who may be the central Energy Management System (EMS).  
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Following the same structure, the individual members of reactive support groups (devices at the 
transmission system buses) are lower-level officers responsible for assigning and coordinating 
the responses of those under their command. Ultimately the distribution system buses and end-
user devices fall under the command of a transmission system level reactive support group 
member.  Figure 80 illustrates this hierarchy in terms of power system components, where C0-
C9 represent controllers which regulate the loads L0-L9.  Such controllable loads may be able to 
provide services back to the grid during an event.  The relays A-D control the delivery of power 
to the loads.   
 
 
Figure 80. Transmission-distribution block diagram 
 
Figure 80 shows officer-member groupings called realms which consist of a top layer and a 
bottom layer. Each device in the top layer of a realm can supervise and control the activity of a 
set of devices in its bottom layer. The top-level devices in each realm do not communicate 
directly with any devices lower in the hierarchy than the bottom-level devices in their realm. 
Instead, if control actions need to be taken further down the hierarchy, the bottom-level devices 
of the realm, which are also the top-level devices of the next lower realm, will send the 
appropriate control signals downstream. This pattern of delegation is at the heart of the ICS 
model, and it provides a convenient way to segregate and secure communications on the smart 
grid.  Support regions can be used to establish webs of trust ahead of time, which will greatly 
simplify the task of distributing the keys to perform authentication.   
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To understand this idea of realms and layers, consider how a top-down detection-and-response 
pattern would work for the voltage control application of Chapter 3. 
 
(1) The Central EMS detects a voltage problem somewhere on the system. It computes a 
response that would mitigate the problem, using the approach described in Chapter 3. It 
formulates action requests and sends them through the hierarchy where they are received 
by the feeder relays. 
(2) Each feeder relay receives a reactive support request which originated from the EMS. 
The feeder relay agent computes a set of response actions that would allow it to fulfill the 
request, formulates the corresponding action requests, and sends them to the relays to 
which they are connected. 
(3) Each relay receives the reactive support request from its feeder, computes a response 
action, formulates the corresponding action requests, and sends them to the load 
controllers it servers. 
(4) Each controller then controls the loads under its supervision to meet the requests. 
 
These communications each occur within a distinct realm. A device’s realm and layer determine 
the actions and communications it is allowed to perform.  Consider a simple example with only 
two realms, R1 and R2.  The devices in these realms can be subdivided into three sets: A, B, and 
C (Figure 81).  
 
 
Figure 81. Example grouping of devices to help segregate and secure communications 
 
A
B
C
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In Figure 81, set A devices can communicate directly with set B devices. Likewise, set B devices 
can communicate directly with set C devices. However, set A devices cannot communicate 
directly with set C devices. Each realm is intended to have its own security parameters which it 
uses for communication exchanges. An exchange within this proposed secure communications 
infrastructure is detailed in an example in [41].    
 
The number of devices involved in formulating and implementing a response action may be quite 
large.  Their communications must also be immune to a variety of attacks.  In considering the 
security of such communications, particularly important are authentication and the integrity of 
messages.  These requirements are briefly described below; more detail is found in [41] and [42].  
Specifically, an unauthorized device must not be able to send a control message to another 
device, and it must not be possible for a message to be replayed inappropriately.  Any 
communication between devices must traverse unmodified from sender to receiver. If devices are 
not who they claim to be, or if devices receive messages that are not what the sending device 
intended, then the resulting action may actually worsen system conditions rather than improve 
them. Strategies for ensuring the authentication and integrity of the communications framework 
are critical to the overall success of such a wide-area measurement and control framework.   
 
A description of the security requirements are found in [41] and [42].  While of critical 
importance for supporting the applications described, it is not part of the main focus of the thesis, 
so only a sketch is provided.  Some of the key requirements are timeliness, authentication, 
integrity, and availability.  Authentication mechanisms are used to ―corroborate that an entity is 
the one that is claimed‖ according to the international standard ISO/IEC 9798-1 [184].  
Confidentiality is less of a concern, at least for the basic functionality of this application.  It is 
most important to ensure that only authenticated messages are delivered, and that their delivery 
is not disrupted.  Authentication is critically important since incorrect responses of the 
controllers can have disastrous consequences for the system.  If distributed reactive power 
resources can restore an unsolvable system to solvability, they can also do the opposite.   End-to-
end authentication is needed since intermediate routing nodes may not always be trustworthy.  
Design principles for authentication developed specifically for power grid cyber protocols are 
identified in [185].  Myriad tools exist for providing authentication and integrity.  Availability is 
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also crucial because otherwise the controllers may not be able to reach devices to provide 
control, or worse, they may think that their messages are being delivered when they are not.  To 
ensure availability, the system must be efficient in its use of computation and communication 
resources and must have sufficient error management built in to ensure proper handling of 
failures.  Furthermore, the error management functions must not lead to resource exhaustion 
even in the face of adversarial action.  Redundancy is also an important factor in maintaining 
availability.  These issues, and several ideas to address them in the context of the voltage control 
framework, are explored in more detail in [41] and [42].     
 
7.2. Measurement Protection for Application Security 
The focus of this section is the protection of measurements to ensure application security.  First, 
the subject of bad data detection is briefly reviewed.  Then, an application is presented for 
protecting DC state estimation from false data injection.  The motivation for this work is largely 
a response to an application proposing such attacks, explained below.  A fundamental purpose of 
power system state estimation, as outlined in Chapter 2, is essentially to process raw data and 
turn it into meaningful information in the form of state variables.  State estimation is a way to 
filter data into something humans and other applications can utilize.  Due to this role of state 
estimation, much attention has been paid to the impact of bad data on its results.    
 
7.2.1. Bad Data Detection 
Bad data detection often accompanies power system state estimation.  The purpose of bad data 
detection is to detect, identify, and correct measurement data which is inconsistent with the rest 
of the information about the system.  Conventional bad data detection schemes are described in 
more detail as background for applications presented in [186], [182], and [187].   Measurement 
errors are a common source of bad data, also discussed in Chapter 5.  Typical encountered errors 
include device misconfiguration and device failures, in addition to measurement inaccuracy. The 
estimation of state variables can be adversely affected by these errors.  In fact, all data which is 
used to compute the estimate has at least some impact on its result, so it is important to find and 
eliminate bad data sources.  Many proposed schemes exist for the purpose of detecting, 
identifying, and correcting bad measurements [28, 32]. 
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Most bad data detection approaches are based on residuals.  If the state estimate is denoted  , 
then the measurement residual z−H   is the difference between the true measurements z and 
estimated values of the measurements. A common approach [28, 32] for detecting the presence 
of bad data is by examining the L2 −norm of measurement residual:  
 
 ˆz Hx  (225) 
 
Then, if the L2 −norm of the measurement residual in (225) is greater than a certain threshold η, 
it is assumed that bad data is present in the observed measurements.  
 
Until recently, it was generally assumed the bad data detection systems accompanying state 
estimators are sufficient to detect and recover from sensor measurement manipulation. The 
failure of typical bad data detection methods for malicious attacks can be suspected from the 
analysis in [188], but the issue has been largely brought to the attention of the power system 
cyber security community more recently by [32]. 
 
False data injection attacks on DC state estimation against this criterion, demonstrated in [32], 
illustrate the focus of existing bad data detection techniques on dealing with errors rather than 
interacting or malicious bad data. Bad data detection approaches which are based on the residual 
inherently require an initial estimate to be computed which may be affected by the bad data. That 
is, it is only after the estimate is first computed that the residual can be evaluated.  
 
The work for this particular application, protecting DC state estimation, is inspired by our 
interest in defending against the proposed attacks in [32].  In summary, Liu et al. [32, 189] 
demonstrates that an adversary, armed with the knowledge of system topology, can inject false 
data into DC state estimators without being detected by current bad data detection techniques. 
The core of the problem is that most bad data detection techniques are designed to deal with 
certain types of errors, but not coordinated malicious changes.  Under such circumstances, an 
adversary can fool the bad data detection scheme and cause various manipulations to state 
variables.   
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A large part of the problem is the detection of bad data, especially when produced by a 
coordinated, malicious attack.  Recent work has proposed solutions to address detection 
problems [186, 190, 191, 192]. Cyber-based approaches typically involve deploying 
cryptographic mechanisms on the communications between the sensors in the field and the 
control center or deploying tamper resistant or tamper evident sensor hardware. Other 
approaches involve revisiting bad data detection schemes with the adversary in mind.    Bad data 
detection for power systems, particularly with respect to state estimation, is a common topic in 
the literature [193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205].  More 
background on the approaches described in the literature are provided in [187]. 
 
7.2.2. Protection Strategy  
We propose a protection strategy in [186] which addresses the underlying question of whether 
some measurements are better to protect than others.  This examination is made primarily as a 
response to [32], where if an adversary is able to alter measurements, the adversary may be able 
to affect state estimation results without being detected.  Conceivably, errors may be injected to 
manipulate the state variables to achieve specific conditions; details are omitted here. 
 
The conclusion of this work is that we can identify a set of sensors such that if those sensors’ 
measurements are protected, false data injection attacks on DC state estimation would be 
detected. Network observability plays a crucial role in this application.  In state estimation, basic 
measurements are a minimum set of measurements sufficient to ensure system observability.  A 
network is observable if the measurement matrix H is full rank.  In [186], it is proven that 
protecting a set of basic measurements is a necessary and sufficient condition for detecting the 
false data injection attacks of [32] on DC state estimation. Multiple sets of basic measurements 
are straightforward to compute.  We also show that a basic measurement is exchangeable for a 
verifiable state variable, such as a PMU angle.   Thus, PMUs provide redundancy to critical 
measurements for further protection against such attacks.  For details concerning the analysis, 
results, and other directions in this area, refer to [186]. 
 
A set of measurements that causes a loss of observability is called a critical set. In [206], a 
method to compute the LU factorization is described which is applied in [207] to the topology 
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matrix H.  This LU factorization provides the necessary information to identify critical 
measurements [207], [208]. The basic idea is to do a change of basis on the matrix H to obtain a 
mapping from measurements to equivalent states.  The following decomposition of H is then 
obtained as 
 
  -1 bH P LU  (226) 
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where the new basis has the following structure: 
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where n is the number of states.  Then, the rows of In correspond to the essential measurements 
or basic measurements we seek. Rows of R correspond to redundant measurements.  Columns 
correspond to the equivalent states which can easily be mapped back to the original states using 
the permutation matrix P obtained from the LU decomposition.  If a column in R has no non-
zero entry, then there is only one entry for that state variable and it is in In. Thus, the 
measurement corresponding to that row in In is critical, since no information about that state 
variable can be obtained from any of the other measurements. Removing that measurement 
would cause a loss of observability.  Thus, this factorization can be used to examine issues of 
observability relating to measurement redundancy.  
 
As proven in [186], there is a clear relationship between identifying good meters to protect 
against false data injection attacks and ensuring network observability.  Thus, existing techniques 
in power system observability analysis, such as the above matrix decomposition, provide insight 
into the nature of how applications which rely on measurement data can be made robust.  There 
are a number of factors related to observability which can now be optimized over when 
determining which measurements to protect.  Since sets of essential measurements are non-
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unique, greater choices in measurement sets provide flexibility when designing a protection 
scheme. 
 
7.3. Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection Systems (CPIDS) 
In this application, key aspects of the cyber-physical intrusion detection system (CPIDS) 
introduced in [182] are presented.  Detection is an important part of protecting the power grid, 
and specifically designed intrusion detection techniques for large-scale cyber-physical systems 
are needed.  While cyber-event detection is not the focus of this thesis, the cyber aspects of the 
problem are very much interwoven with the power aspects.  A sketch of the cyber-security 
contributions of this work is necessarily included to convey the benefit of CPIDS to both 
domains.  By taking advantage of network structures and data, both on the communications 
(cyber) side and the power side, the CPIDS is able to utilize cyber security information to make 
the power system applications such as state estimation more robust, an insight that no existing 
techniques seem to offer.  A particular application of the CPIDS has been implemented for use 
with power system AC state estimation, and is described in this chapter.  It is important to point 
out that although state estimation is the focus of this application, the concepts presented are not 
limited to state estimation. Valuable information is made available about potentially 
compromised hosts, which is translated into information about suspicious measurements. 
 
At each time instant, the CPIDS identifies the compromised set of computers in the cyber 
network and their corresponding sets of measurements (power system sensors) which may have 
been maliciously modified. The main contribution is to combine information from distributed 
sensors of different types to detect the malicious activities within the cyber-physical system. A 
working prototype of the CPIDS has been implemented and evaluated.  In [182], experimental 
results are presented for the IEEE 24-bus RTS (Figure 3), showing that the CPIDS significantly 
improves scalability of the tradition intrusion detection techniques by using information from 
both cyber and power sensors.  
 
A key characteristic of the power grid, which is exploited by this application, is the 
interdependency between the cyber and physical systems.  The power grid is a cyber-physical 
system whose electrical infrastructure’s reliable operation depends largely on its cyber 
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infrastructure. In such an interdependent system, the requirements of both components should be 
considered simultaneously.  Data is a common point of interdependence. Data acquisition occurs 
at the measurement devices. Then, data is transmitted through a communication system to a 
control center.  In traversing the information path from the field to end-point applications for the 
electric power grid, it is clear that these communications and data handling alone form a complex 
infrastructure. The measurement devices and the communication system possess properties, 
cyber and physical, which may affect the electrical state of the power system though accidental 
and/or malicious impact on the data.  This data is a fundamental requirement for power system 
applications. Therefore, the identification of potentially compromised measurements is valuable 
to any data-dependent power system applications such as cyber-physical state estimation.  
 
While measurements of the power system are useful to verify what occurred, the conclusions are 
only as valid as the data is trustworthy. If one allows for the possibility that the data may be 
corrupted or maliciously altered, then it is no longer obvious whether the data alone can provide 
a clear indication of whether a perceived incident in the power grid was the appropriate response 
of the physical system.  A concerning problem, which we aim to help address, is that power 
system applications which rely upon this data are usually considered in isolation from the 
computer and communications systems which provide the data. 
 
Numerous examples exist of proposed detection mechanisms, specific either to the cyber domain 
or to the physical domain, but not both.  Examples of work specific to the cyber side are listed in 
[182].  On the power system side, typical bad data detection has some major limitations, as 
described in Section 7.2.1. In particular, most initially consider all the measurements good, such 
as in least-square error based algorithms [209], and most ignore information from cyber sensors.     
 
The CPIDS makes use of sensory information from both power-side measurement data and 
cyber-side intrusion detectors to identify cyber attacks and potential compromises of power 
system measurement data.  It is hoped that this work will incentivize further development of 
cyber-physical detection systems as well as motivate real-world implementation, specifically 
including the technology transfer of the solution presented here.      
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The steps taken in the CPIDS application are summarized as follows.  First in an offline 
preprocess phase, the CPIDS automatically generates the attack graph of the network based on 
the enforced access control policies. During the operational mode, the CPIDS monitors the 
power and the communication networks, detects and analyzes attacks based on the attack graph, 
and then probabilistically determines the set of computer systems and power system 
measurements which are likely to have maliciously been compromised. The CPIDS then uses 
this probabilistic information to make decisions regarding the suspicious measurements in order 
to protect the power system state estimator (or other applications) from the potentially malicious 
data. At each time instant, the CPIDS is able to provide situational awareness to the system 
operators by presenting them with a clear and complete cyber-physical state of the power grid. 
 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, an overview is presented of the cyber-
physical state notion used for the CPIDS. A short background on the cyber detection aspects, 
needed to fully understand this system, is included for completeness.  Then, we discuss how 
suspicious activities are identified using a joint cyber and power state estimation algorithm. The 
experimental setup and evaluation are also presented.  
 
7.3.1. Cyber-Physical System State  
The purpose of the CPIDS is to link together information from the cyber network with 
information from the power network to better reconstruct the system state.  Figure 82 [210] 
shows the combined cyber-physical state, which consists of compromised hosts (top) and power 
system consequences (bottom), determined from cyber IDS alerts and power system 
measurements.  
 
 
Figure 82. Cyber-physical state [210] 
 
Attacker’s
Privilege(s)
Past 
Consequences
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The compromised hosts, consequences, and associated set of probabilities are collectively called 
the ―information state.‖ The system information state is based on measured power system and 
cyber system data. The cyber data is used to determine the likely compromised hosts. Then, a 
mapping of the hosts to power system measurement devices is used to consolidate information 
about the network, both cyber and power.   
 
Estimating the cyber-physical state involves the reconstruction of the path the attacker took to 
cause the event. This path is represented by an attack graph. Given the firewall rules and the 
communication network topology, a pessimistic attack graph is automatically generated using the 
proposed approach. The purpose of the firewall rules is to construct a network accessibility 
matrix which defines which devices can communicate. Figure 83 illustrates this concept for two 
hosts (A and B) and one protective relay (R1). The associated network connectivity map is shown 
in Figure 84. 
 
 
Figure 83. Privilege escalation (left) and attack graph (right) [210] 
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Figure 84. Network connectivity map for Figure 83 example [210]  
 
The attack graph is pessimistic since it assumes that every host has a vulnerability. The firewall 
rules give a mapping of paths that can be used to penetrate the system. A privilege escalation 
graph gives the state space in which an attacker can move by exploiting vulnerabilities in the 
system. 
 
7.3.2. IDSs and Attack Graphs as Hidden Markov Models 
The cyber state estimation aspect of the solution is described in [182]. It is not a focus of this 
thesis. Only its key points are highlighted here to provide necessary background.  The main 
inputs are the communication network topology and the security policy (e.g., firewall rulesets). 
This information defines the global access policy of the network.  The CPIDS analyzes this input 
and automatically creates a network connectivity matrix as in Figure 84. The [i, j] entry of the 
matrix is true if the traffic from host hi to host hj is allowed, and false otherwise. The 
connectivity matrix always includes an internet node representing groups of hosts outside of the 
network. Attackers are assumed to initially reside in the internet node before launching the 
attacks.  Based on the state-space notion introduced above, the approach and experimental results 
are outlined in the next sections. 
 
The first step of the approach is attack graph generation for the cyber network.  The starting state 
of the attack graph is the empty state, where the attacker has no privilege over the network (no 
hosts have been compromised). Starting with the attack graph’s initial state and the network 
connectivity map, the set of next states is automatically deduced. State transitions represent 
vulnerability exploitations to escalate attacker’s privileges. Applying this reasoning in a 
recursive manner, the entire attack graph is automatically generated. The generated attack graph 
is then available to use while the system is operating. To improve scalability and deployment 
ease, CPIDS generates attack graphs at the network level. Details are provided in [182] regarding 
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how to generate these attack graphs for real systems.  By design, the completed AGT includes all 
possible attack paths from a remote (internet) host against the network.   
 
In the next step of the approach, the CPIDS uses the generated AGT and online alerts from the 
distributed IDSs to do forensics analysis.  This is done by modeling the AGT as a hidden Markov 
model (HMM).  An HMM [211] assumes the system to be a Markov process with unobserved 
(hidden) states. However, the output which is dependent on the state is visible. Each state has a 
probability distribution over the possible outputs, so observing the output sequence gives some 
information about the sequence of states. Note that ―hidden‖ refers to the state sequence through 
which the model passes, not to the parameters of the model; even if the model parameters are 
known exactly, the model is still hidden.  
 
All state transitions of the HMM (network links of the AGT) are monitored by IDSs. A list of 
IDSs and corresponding links can be defined within the network topology file. The IDSs provide 
probabilistic locations of intrusion in the system. The observation probabilities of the HMM are 
IDS false negative and false positive rates. While the system is operating, at each time instant, 
the engine receives a set of IDS alerts and uses the generated attack graph to find the most likely 
attack path traversed by the attacker. The HMM allows for the fact that we have incomplete 
information and that the observed state might not be the true state. The result is probabilistic 
information of the attacker’s privileges.  To obtain this information, it is necessary to predict the 
most likely sequence of states in the HMM from a given observation sequence.  To find the most 
likely hidden sequence of states, a dynamic programming algorithm, called Iturbi [212], is 
applied to the above problem.  The solution gives the most likely path of the attacker. 
 
7.3.3. Malicious Data Detection and Handling  
Ultimately, the results reveal which measurements are potentially compromised and with what 
probabilities.  Information about the attacker’s current privileges can then be used by power 
system applications to make decisions about the data. Given the attacker’s privileges, the CPIDS 
automatically determines a set of power measurements which may be compromised. These 
measurements may have been modified in a malicious way. Power system applications are then 
able to account for this before the measurements corrupt applications.  
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Bad data detection for power system state estimation, using the non-linear AC model described 
in Chapter 2, is implemented and evaluated with the CPIDS for this work.   A description of this 
evaluation is given in [182].  Comparatively, a simplified DC model (23) is often used in papers 
addressing false data injection attacks on state estimation [32].  To prudently account for 
maliciously altered data, the proposed approach circumvents the need to compute the first 
estimate from the full data set.   
 
Consider that if there are M sensors in the power network, any combination of the sensors may 
produce corrupted, altered, or ―bad‖ data. This yields 2M possible combinations of sensors which 
may be simultaneously compromised. The possibilities range from m = (0,0, . . . ,0)
T
 if all 
measurements are good to m= (1,1, . . . ,1)
T
 if all measurements are bad. The approach proceeds 
as follows. Assume each one of the 2
M
 possibilities, and omit the measurements at the indices 
which correspond to a value of  ―1.‖ Using the remaining measurements, proceed with the 
normal state estimation routine. As long as there are enough good measurements which are 
available in order to ensure observability (basic measurements), the other measurements can 
theoretically be omitted from the analysis.  From the state estimation routine, obtain (1) the state 
estimate and (2) the estimates of the measurements calculated from the state estimate. Using (2), 
determine if the estimate of the measurements which were assumed to be bad are significantly 
different from the true measured value. If so, then conclude that a particular set of measurements 
is bad.  
 
Without information from cyber sensors, the method above is combinatorial [213] and should not 
be used, since the search space to detect bad measurements grows exponentially in the number of 
measurements. We take advantage of the IDS alerts and HMM results to refine the above method 
and address the scalability issue. The hosts and corresponding measurements which pose a 
potential threat may be segregated into networks or control areas (consisting of a group of 
measurement devices).  When particular measurements are identified as suspicious, those sensors 
should be evaluated to confirm whether they are in fact producing malicious data.  The set of 
flagged sensors will (typically) be much smaller than the total number of sensors in the network, 
so their subsequent evaluation is scalable.    
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7.3.4. CPIDS Implementation and Evaluation 
The simulated power system used in this work is the IEEE 24-bus RTS, shown in Figure 3.  The 
system is divided into two control networks. The first control network consists of buses 1-12 and 
the second control consists of buses 13-24. For each control network, there is one host 
corresponding to each bus. In general, each system will have different numbers and 
configurations of control networks and hosts.  The Network Access Policy Tool (NetAPT) is 
used to obtain a network connectivity map listing all the host pairs and ports between which 
traffic is allowed given a topology and firewall rules.  
 
PowerWorld Simulator is used via SimAuto in MATLAB to simulate the power system. The 
MATLAB program acts as an interpreter, taking the simulated SCADA measurements of the 
system as well as inputs from the IDSs in the cyber network and interfacing with the state 
estimator. The MATLAB toolbox MATPOWER [214] is used as the state estimator. The 
implementation occurs as follows: 
 
(1) The program first reads in the HMM result file. This file contains the information state, 
which reveals the host or hosts that are likely to be compromised. 
(2) The program internally maintains a Host Measurement Map, which keeps track of which 
hosts have control over which power system measurements. Based on which hosts are 
determined to be compromised from step (1), the Host Measurement Map is used to 
determine which corresponding measurements are likely to be compromised by an 
attacker. 
(3) The program removes the potentially malicious measurements and does an observability 
check. 
(4) If the system is still observable, the potentially malicious measurements are ignored.  
Then, the state estimation procedure proceeds with the remaining measurements. 
(5) Based on the computed state estimate, the system real and reactive power flows are 
computed. 
(6) The values of the ignored potentially malicious measurements from step (5) are compared 
with the computed measurements in step (6) to determine which measurements in (5) are 
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significantly different. This provides identification of whether a measurement has 
actually been modified.  
 
The implementation of the CPIDS and results are described in [182]. An overview of the 
combined framework is shown in Figure 85. 
 
 
Figure 85. System implementation overview 
 
Based on the AGT for the sample network, the CPIDS reveals the compromised hosts and 
associated probabilities.  From the results of the HMM file, highlighted in Figure 86, the hosts at 
buses 1 and 2 are determined to be compromised with probability 0.953. This information is 
obtained during step (1) of the above procedure. 
 
 
Figure 86. HMM result file 
 
The structure of the host measurement map for the system is illustrated in Figure 87. The host 
measurement map is compared with the file in Figure 86 during steps (2) and (3). As revealed in 
NetAPT
HMM Toolkit
Firewall rules Network topology
State estimation 
results
Interface State estimation 
(MATPOWER)
IEEE 24-bus RTS
(PowerWorld)
Simulated 
SCADA data
0.032141 28.1.1.1
0.953099 28.1.1.1      101.10.0.3
0.001001 28.1.1.1      101.10.0.3     101.11.0.3 
0.016759 28.1.1.1      101.11.0.3
Prob. Compromised hosts
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Figure 87, the hosts at buses 1 and 2 correspond to the hosts identified in Figure 86, 28.1.1. and 
101.10.0.3.  In this example, each bus controls measurement data for its adjacent lines. The 
mapping is shown only for the suspected compromised hosts, although the entire system 
mapping is maintained. 
 
 
Figure 87. Measurement map for potentially compromised hosts 
 
In Figure 87, labels PF, PT, QF, and QT correspond to measurement types. Real power flows are 
denoted PF and PT, measured respectively at the from and to buses of the lines. Similarly, Q 
denotes reactive power flow measurements.  As an example interpretation of one of these labels, 
Bus 1 monitors the real and reactive power flow on line (1,2) at the line’s designated from bus.  
The format of the data identifiers in Figure 87 can be modified as necessary to match the 
convention used by the utility.   
 
Once the measurements corresponding to bus 1 and bus 2 are flagged, they are removed 
according to step (4), and state estimation then proceeds successfully. Note that choices exist for 
how to handle flagged measurements. In addition to removing some or all of the flagged 
measurements, one may simply reduce the weightings of the suspicious measurements.  
Removing the flagged measurements is the simplest but not necessarily the optimal action. If the 
observability check in step (5) fails, removing all measurements is not an option.  One may take 
the reduced set of selected sensors and perform the refined bad data verification and removal 
process.  The subset may be expanded to include sensors which share a network or control area 
with the suspicious sensors. Analysis can determine specifically which measurements are 
producing results inconsistent with the other data.  In summary, appropriate post-processing 
schemes should be developed to deal with the flagged measurements.  
Host: Bus1: 28.1.1.1
1 2;1 3;1 5; 
; 
1 2; 1 3; 1 5; 
; 
Host: Bus2: 101.10.0.3
2 4; 2 6; 
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1 2;
PF
PT
QF
QT
PF
PT
QF
QT
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7.3.5. Data Rejection vs. Observability 
The ability to estimate the system state from the given measurements (observability) is an 
important property which must be preserved, and the CPIDS solution should be applied with this 
consideration in mind. In this work, observability is important because compromised 
measurements may only be discarded if those compromised measurements are all redundant. If 
too many measurements are compromised, they cannot be removed, or the system will no longer 
be observable. Section 7.2 provides further analysis of the relationship between measurement 
protection and observability.  
 
When selecting measurements to remove, we must avoid the removal of critical sets.  If the set of 
suspicious measurements includes a critical set, the system will lose observability if those 
measurements are removed. Hence, observability analysis must be performed before an attempt 
is made to compute the state estimate with a reduced measurement set.  
 
There exists a tradeoff, which may be encountered in practice, regarding whether it is more 
important to discard a potentially malicious measurement, and lose observability, or to keep the 
potentially malicious measurement and know that the resulting state estimate may be incorrect.  
Fortunately, those are not the only two possibilities.  If one knows that a critical measurement 
may be malicious, one can take action to remedy the situation.  This may be as simple as 
inserting a pseudomeasurement.  It is important to point out the existence and possible 
occurrence of this situation.  However, recommendations on how to handle a critical malicious 
measurement set are beyond the scope of this work.  The key point is that the situation should be 
monitored and may require a decision concerning what tradeoffs to make.     
 
7.4. Perturbation-Based Data Quality Assessment  
As the previous sections and chapters have indicated, data quality is a serious practical problem 
which in many ways presents a barrier which must be overcome before applying more advanced 
techniques to the refined data.  Measurement data in power systems may be ―bad‖ for any 
number of reasons.  Malicious data injection attacks, which alter the values of measurements 
without being detected, are one potential cause of bad data and may have serious consequences. 
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The idea in this application is to use a probing technique as a way to detect bad data.  In 
principle, the idea is simple. We apply some known controlled input to the system, and we 
measure the response.  The basis of the approach is that we (the defenders of the grid) perform 
the probing, so we also know the injected probing signal.  If the response does not match what 
we expect, then we should be suspicious that something is wrong.  More specifically, the 
solution is proposed in [187] for bad data detection in power systems, and it is particularly 
designed to detect malicious data attacks. 
 
By applying particular perturbations to the system and measuring the changes elsewhere, we 
probe the system for unexpected responses of measurement values. Evaluating measurement 
changes due to the probes provides an indication of both bad and malicious data.  Using the 
―keyspace approach,‖ developed in this work, the probes are intended to be unknown and 
unpredictable to the attacker.  
 
Conceptually, the approach is closely related to other applications of perturbations in power 
systems.  Here, the perturbations are used for a specific purpose, which is to gauge the response 
of data.  The perturbation approach detects data which does not respond appropriately.  
Regardless of whether the data is incorrect because it has been altered maliciously or because a 
measurement device is simply misconfigured or malfunctioning, the system recognizes the 
discrepancy and indicates that further investigation is warranted.   
 
In this section, we describe an example of using our probing approach for detecting false data 
injection attacks. Specifically, we hypothetically leverage D-FACTS devices, introduced in 
[215], to perturb the system by changing the effective impedance on a set of lines.  The 
perturbations should be large enough to cause an observable change in the measurement values 
of interest, but at the same time the perturbation should be small enough not to move the system 
away from optimal operation.  These limits are investigated in [187].  It is important to highlight 
that our approach is in no way limited to D-FACTS devices.  Any controllable components may 
be used.  For example, an analogous approach may be developed for reactive power injection or 
other input perturbation schemes. In fact, it may be the case that other means of perturbation are 
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simpler, less costly, or more effective to implement. Such a comparison is beyond the scope of 
the current work. 
 
The motivation for this work comes from a desire to design a bad data detector that is general 
enough to work reliably whenever it is needed and is robust against attacks. Rather than design a 
bad data detector for specific applications, we purposefully develop an approach which is 
application-independent. A great advantage of this approach is that it is completely independent 
of end-point applications which ultimately use the data.  The reason is simple: bad data is a 
problem for everyone, yet proposed solutions are often overly specific to a particular application. 
While most bad data detection methods are closely interwoven with state estimation and possibly 
other applications, this solution avoids that limitation, and can therefore help protect the entire 
range of applications.  
 
Using probing for the cyber security for control systems is investigated by [216]. In particular, 
[216] perturbs the system to detect replay attacks on a control system. In power systems, probing 
to study oscillatory modes is common in the western interconnect of the US (WECC) [217, 218]. 
The probing tests in WECC and their results are reported in several NASPI documents [219, 
220]. A study of probing signal design for power systems is found in [221]. The most common 
probing signals for power systems, from [222], are rectangular pulses, brief periodic waveforms, 
sustained sinusoid signals, and sustained noise signals. In [222], square waves are used to probe 
specific oscillatory modes. 
 
Specific devices where the probe is to be injected must chosen.  The devices used to perform the 
probing could be of any type, or any combination of types.  Sensitivities are again useful for 
providing the ability to characterize the effect of a small change.  The probing approach can 
utilize any pair of variables where it is possible to perturb the input and observe the output. The 
generality of the solution approach is a key point to highlight.  
 
In [187], the system is probed by changing D-FACTS settings to pre-determined values in the 
neighborhood around the optimal point.  The vector of new settings is termed a key.  If the 
measurements do not change in the way we expect, there may be cause for alarm, and further 
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investigation is warranted.  It is assumed that the attacker can compromise values received from 
the measuring devices in the field.  Random selection of the key from a pool of acceptable keys 
provides security by preventing the attacker from simply spoofing his measurements to match 
the values we expect from our probe. Keys, keyspaces and key choice are explored further in 
[187].  Each key ki is a vector of impedance settings for controlled lines, where k0 denotes 
optimal operating point. The sensitivities, the key, and the current set of D-FACTS settings allow 
us to determine the predicted set of values. The perturbation applied to the system is denoted by 
Δx: 
 
  iΔx k x  (229) 
 
The sensitivity matrix A describes how measurement variables such as voltages or line flows 
(depending on choice) are expected to change in relation to a change in impedance.  Denote the 
initial measurements m0 and the measurements at the next observed time mobs. For voltage 
magnitude measurements, the expected changes are Δm= mobs - m0 in (230), and the predicted 
perturbed voltages are mpred in (231).  
 
 Δm AΔx  (230) 
  pred tm AΔx m  (231) 
 
Bad data is detected by subtracting mpred from mobs, discarding values within the acceptable 
error range, and noting any values remaining. These flagged values are indicative of bad data, 
and provide a starting point for further investigation of compromise or other measurement 
problems. Further validation of the model can be provided by comparing the observed difference 
in measured voltages be Δmmeas = mobs-m0 times the inverse of A (assuming A is invertible) with 
the known probe.  That is, we compute an estimate of our probe from the actual data, denoted by 
Δxpred in (232).   
 
  -1pred measΔx A Δm  (232) 
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An important attribute of our approach is that detection is done by comparing the expected 
changes due to our probe with the actual changes, and the approach is enhanced by the secret, 
private key, which conceals the nature of the chosen perturbation.  The approach does not require 
inherent trustworthiness of the observations. Effectively, the approach separates detection from 
trust determination, which can begin after an observation has been deemed suspect. This process 
of trust determination remains to be fully described, but it begins with finding ―anchor points‖ 
for which the data can be validated as accurate. Once the set of trustworthy anchors is 
established, it is possible to continue to build trust levels for the remaining sensors.   
 
7.5. Conclusions  
The focus in this chapter is on protecting data itself as well as any applications which use the 
data.  Through this work we have determined that the protection of power system data and 
applications is a broad subject.  The applications in this chapter provide some key steps towards 
solving these problems. A key conclusion drawn from this work is that, moving forward, there 
needs to be an increase in studies and applications which focus on how to consider these 
seemingly different systems (cyber and physical) simultaneously. 
 
The first application in the chapter describes a hierarchical framework to facilitate distributed 
control such as for voltage support, as in Chapter 3.  In general, such a scheme can be used to 
enact any corrective and preventative controls, and the potential applications of the framework 
extend beyond voltage control. The framework is designed to segment and secure 
communications and to be able to easily assign and manage duties, which is especially important 
as the number of devices involved in a response action may be quite large.  The ICS structure is 
flexible enough to support the handling of problems in a decentralized way.  Rather than involve 
the Central EMS, an event may potentially be handled within the individual regions where it 
occurs.  In that case, a device at a lower layer in the hierarchy may assume the highest command 
position for that incident.  If a top-level device on any of the realms detects a local problem, it 
can initiate correction of the problem by coordinating the devices beneath it. The approach has 
since been studied in the context of an agent-based framework [223] and decentralized control 
[224].  The incentive to pursue these alternative approaches is driven by the impact of such 
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control on the rest of the system and whether there is a perceived benefit over centralized 
control. 
  
In the second application, presented in [186], the key result is to analytically relate power system 
observability to protection with respect to cyber attackers, and we prove that protecting a set of 
basic measurements is a necessary and sufficient condition for detecting the false data injection 
attacks on DC state estimation.  It is recognized that techniques in power system observability 
analysis can provide insight into how applications which rely on measurement data can be made 
robust.  
 
A discrepancy may exist between the precipitating event that the power system data indicates 
and that which the cyber information indicates.  Such discrepancies need to be reconciled.  The 
third application is the design and implementation of a cyber-physical intrusion detection system 
(CPIDS), presented in [182].  While the cyber-event detection aspects of this application are not 
the focus of this thesis, the cyber and power (physical) aspects of the problem highly 
interdependent.   By taking advantage of both the communications and power network as well as 
their data, the CPIDS provides a solution to make power system applications more robust, an 
insight that no existing techniques seem to offer.  The approach circumvents the need to compute 
the first estimate from the full data set.  The approach is resistant to noise and does not depend 
on the existence of a linear power-system model.  A key benefit is the ability provide feedback to 
operators for identifying data sources which are potentially compromised.  The CPIDS can help 
operators evaluate the extent to which a perceived problem is caused by data which is wrong due 
to a cyber problem or due to a physical power system problem. A working prototype has been 
implemented and evaluated, and the results reported in [182].  The usefulness of this application 
is more general than bad data detection for state estimation; there are many ways information 
about potentially compromised hosts and measurements can be utilized on the power side.   
   
Interesting applications lie ahead for implementations of the CPIDS on real systems, since real 
systems have real communications network with real IDSs which can be utilized.  Future plans 
for this application include the TCIPG test bed and real utilities.  Other directions for future 
enhancements include asking utilities about IDS domains and real compromises to give us 
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insight so we can better validate our framework with what is done in real life.  Additionally, 
utilities may be able to provide information about the frequency of such events in their system.  
It is also possible to provide this as a tool to utilities to obtain the host measurement maps for 
their real systems.  The host measurement maps are helpful in determining what to protect.  For 
example, certain PMUs are recording more measurements, so those may be more critical. That is, 
we may need to think in terms of entire RTUs or even entire substations going down.  The cost is 
essentially the same to compromise or protect measurements which all belong to one device 
(host, RTU, PMU).  Thus, grouping measurements that belong to the same RTU, or sets of RTUs 
that do not cost extra to protect, may be a sensible defense strategy.  Such groupings are enabled 
by the work in this thesis. Finally, it would be useful for the industry to develop a set of cyber-
physical models for experimental and study purposes based on a tool like this, in particular for 
benchmark systems such as the IEEE 24-bus used in this work.   
 
The final application considered in this thesis involves using measurement probing as a 
technique to detect bad data.  This approach is purposefully designed to be an application-
independent solution for detecting data which is in error.  Malicious activity is considered as a 
special case of other data-source problems which could be detected using this technique.  
Analysis and results are presented in [187].  For bad data detection, one can also use data 
trending methods to characterize when measurements are behaving/changing in an inconsistent 
way. 
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8. Conclusion  
There exist a wide variety of techniques which facilitate the enhancement of knowledge based on 
data.  The commonality among such techniques, which are often referred to under the very broad 
category of data mining, is that they provide a way to discover and recognize patterns and 
relationships in the data in order that one may learn about the system and utilize the knowledge 
for improved power systems analysis, operations, and control.  Thus, in this thesis, it is shown 
that several seemingly different aspects of power systems analysis are related through their 
ability to be enhanced by finding and utilizing patterns that exist in data.  
 
The stated purpose of this work was to adopt an application-centric viewpoint, and study the use 
of data mining and data mining concepts in the context of certain important areas and 
applications of power systems analysis where data mining insight is deemed to be useful.  This 
has been accomplished.  Several areas with specific applications for which the benefits of these 
techniques are immediately apparent are described in this thesis.   
 
In the power systems field, the types of data which need to be handled include varying 
granularities of models of the system, models of the generators, models of the loads, simulation 
results, and actual measurements.  The existing data that is already being collected is 
underutilized, and its full value is still being understood.  Even when considering data mining 
specifically for power systems, as in this work, a cross-disciplinary approach is required to 
leverage expertise from several complementary areas.  The major conclusions from the 
applications in these areas are summarized below. 
 
To summarize, several key areas have been identified and addressed in this work.  These are the 
following: sensitivity-based pattern recognition, model estimation and enhancement based on 
data (focus was on network models, but applicable to other models as well), statistical analysis of 
time series data, event signature recognition (oscillation monitoring), and identifying data 
problems and building applications which are robust to those data problems.   
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There is considerable insight to be gained from sensitivities, which is valuable throughout this 
thesis.  Sensitivities are a repository of expected patterns revealing how variables are coupled to 
each other and may be exploited by myriad machine learning, data mining, and pattern 
recognition tools.  In Chapter 3, sensitivities are used for the selective grouping of reactive 
support devices for providing wide-area voltage support as well as for identifying generators 
with market power potential.  Thus, Chapter 3 reveals that clustering sensitivities allows for the 
selection and aggregation of buses with the ability to ―help each other.‖  Offering a variety of 
algorithmic tools as choices to the user is important. The concepts developed in Chapter 3 are 
general and applicable to a wide range of applications.   
 
The validity of power network models is important; the model needs to be consistent with the 
data which is obtained.  Chapter 4 illustrates the benefit of data-over-time for obtaining 
information about the system, facilitating improved network modeling. From this chapter, it is 
apparent that data and data mining insight can be utilized to develop models, an important focus 
since such models underlie most power systems analysis.  In Chapter 4, the need for well-defined 
metrics for acceptable network reductions is also made apparent.    
 
When underlying models of the system are unavailable or incomplete, there is still a need to 
know what events are occurring.  Section 4.2 explores the extent to which it is possible to 
develop such models from the data itself.  In summary, although this estimation is possible, its 
accuracy depends on factors over which we have no control.  Obtaining and analyzing real data 
in the context of this application will provide a better understanding of how severe the ―external 
factors‖ are and how much they will truly affect the estimation. Then, Section 4.3 builds upon 
the clustering and data mining insight from Chapter 3 to group network elements and obtain 
reduced system models which preserve important structural features, where the important 
features may vary depending on the application.  The tools created for this application provide a 
framework for evaluating any equivalent or model for which transient stability properties are of 
interest.  The application in Section 4.4 is analogous to the first application except that rather 
than estimating an equivalent model, it estimates the parameters on specific lines.  There is great 
potential to further develop and apply these methods, as discussed in Section 4.5.   
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The introduction of real data and error for this application is considered in Chapter 5.  Real data 
provided by a North American utility is studied.  Visualization is an important aspect of data 
analysis and pattern recognition.  Tools such as correlation analysis and visualization are used to 
identify relationships in the measurement data at a basic level. These empirical relationships can 
be compared to what is expected and supported by the model, as in Chapter 4.  From Chapter 5, 
we conclude real data is important for developing data mining applications.  Especially for the 
type of analysis presented here, it is important to obtain data corresponding to known events for 
learning and verification purposes. It is difficult to represent real data distributions in simulation, 
and there is no substitute for validating applications with real data. Results with real data also 
indicate its usefulness for identifying sources of problems, which may be due to model problems, 
data problems, or both.   
 
Chapter 6 examines the associations between measured modal content and events in the system.  
The question is whether this type of information is enough to distinguish between events.   We 
find that certain changes impact modal estimates in distinct, predicable ways.  Ringdowns differ 
from each other to an extent related to how different the events are from which they originate. 
The applications in Chapter 6 develop a methodology for using OMS data to classify ringdown 
events resulting from generator faults.  Our results show that with knowledge of the nominal 
modes of certain generators, it is often possible to distinguish an event at one of these generators.  
Regardless of which modal estimation algorithm is used, the feasibility of distinguishing 
different events from each other in the resulting ringdown data is clearly illustrated. Thus, a 
relationship exists between the system eigenvalues, which may be associated with certain 
generators, and the modes in a ringdown. Measurement data can be used to characterize these 
relationships to facilitate event detection and classification.  The framework can be extended to 
other events, and is a forerunner to performing more in-depth event analysis based on patterns or 
signatures in estimated modal content.  An extension to exciter setpoint changes is considered in 
Section 6.5.  
   
The modal estimates obtained from OMS results can be processed in an automated way which 
facilitates decision making.  In Chapter 6, an approach is presented to automatically classify 
ringdowns to events based on modal content. Results in Section 6.4.3 show that the ringdowns in 
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the WECC case can be correctly classified with this approach.  More detailed conclusions and 
results from the OMS applications are presented in Section 6.6. Examining the contributions of 
generator electromechanical modes to ringdowns lays the foundation for continued work in 
detecting and distinguishing event characteristics.  Continuing work is needed to develop 
methods for signature recognition and classification in OMS data.   It is possible to build upon 
the work presented here to ultimately be able to identify a wide variety of signatures for different 
types of events.  A main contribution of Chapter 6 is essentially to highlight this fact. 
 
The focus of Chapter 7 is on protecting data as well as applications which use the data.  The 
cyber and power (physical) aspects of protecting data and applications are highly interdependent.     
Two general conclusions are drawn from the work in this chapter.  First, we conclude that 
moving forward, there needs to be an increase in studies and applications which focus on how to 
consider these seemingly different systems (cyber and physical) simultaneously.  Secondly, 
through this work, we have determined that the protection of power system data and applications 
is a broad subject, and the applications in this chapter provide key steps towards solving these 
problems.  By no means are these solutions expected to provide full coverage. 
 
There are numerous existing software tools and documented methods to perform well-known 
data mining tasks such as classification, so those have not been the focus of this work.  What is 
the most pertinent for the power systems field right now is to analyze how power system 
problems can utilize data to solve problems and how data mining tools may be able to help 
automate the decision making process.   
 
While there are benefits of using data, there are also barriers which have prevented us from 
utilizing data to its full potential.  There is no reason to believe that these barriers will disappear 
or become less of a problem on their own.  The barriers must be directly addressed and adequate 
solutions must be found.  In summary, several of the major barriers fall under the category of 
data quality problems.  The problem is data availability as well as integrity.  Availability issues 
at the low level are related to storing, handling, and passing the raw data.  First, making data 
available requires a communication network with specific characteristics, and there are technical 
 226 
challenges associated with making the correct data available to the correct people at the correct 
times.     
 
However, even if deployable technical solutions are developed so that the appropriate 
applications may obtain and share data as required, there still remain significant barriers for data 
dissemination, largely due to the proprietary nature of the data.  A lot of the data resides in 
industry.  Entities which own the data are often (but not always) reluctant to share it with others, 
even for research purposes. It is difficult to do advanced data analysis research without ready 
access to data.  One needs data to do the research about what is useful within the data.  These 
concerns are understandable from their perspective, especially when the goal is, in fact, to extract 
information about the system from the data.  There is the potential concern that the relationships 
extracted from the data may reveal information that the owners do not wish for us to know 
(proprietary information).  Thus, it may be said that their desire for confidentiality of their data 
actually causes a lack of availability and integrity.  This problem is beginning to be more widely 
recognized, and there are a number of possible proposed solutions and work-arounds.  The 
current approach is to sign legal agreements between entities who wish to share and use the data.  
These are bureaucratic challenges.  A long-term solution to this problem is needed, and finding 
and implementing such a solution presents a challenge since the entities and organizations 
involved in the data-flow may have different or even contradictory goals.  The policy and 
bureaucracy obstacles to data availability are not a conventional engineering problem, but they 
certainly present a barrier to solving engineering problems.  Thus, it may be that a solution can 
be orchestrated just as well by engineers as by anyone else.   
 
Assume the above problem is solved and data is made available.  Then, the data one obtains 
often has errors of indeterminate types.  These are integrity issues.  The contents of each data 
point are intended to reflect physically based quantities, represented by specific identifiers.  A 
data integrity failure is when an actual data value fails to represent the identifier with which it is 
associated.  The identifiers reflect what the data is supposed to represent; typically these are 
based on physical measurements but may also involve constants or components of a model.  If 
the data does not reflect the true value of the identifier, this is an integrity problem.  In the course 
of doing this work, it was discovered that bad data exists in reality and truly is a source of a lot of 
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problems.  Thus, finding effective ways to find, handle, and remove bad data and to build 
applications which are robust with respect to bad data has immeasurable value for future work.  
Bad data is seen as a serious impediment to rolling out large-scale data mining solutions, and 
applying algorithms blindly without solving the data quality problems first may be a foolish or at 
least an unfruitful pursuit.  In summary, data quality is a practical problem that in many ways 
presents a barrier which must be overcome before applying more advanced techniques to the 
refined data.  Strategies for detecting and dealing with data problems are presented in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 7. The work on bad data in this thesis is motivated by the desire for future efforts to 
more easily proceed in this area, unhindered by the problems associated with data quality. 
 
In summary, the challenges associated with the data may act either as a barrier or as an enabler to 
the smart grid.  Data mining is a broad, large area, full of useful concepts and techniques, and 
attempting to apply all of it to power systems at once is not feasible.  An analogy can be drawn 
between ―data mining‖ and ―smart grid‖; both are terms which seem to encompass everything.  It 
is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to address the entire problem.  The work in 
this thesis has required a broad background both on different areas and techniques related to data 
mining and advanced data processing as well as power systems areas.  The recommendation 
from this work is to focus on particular aspects of the whole problem. The work in this thesis 
provides a coverage of data analysis and categories of its potential uses and application areas in 
power systems.    
 
This thesis motivates further extensions in several seemingly different but related areas, where 
the central connection between these areas is their potential to be enhanced by data and data 
mining.    It is hoped that this thesis will provide the foundation for more of such explorations.  
In fact, the work of this thesis is already accomplishing such a purpose. Most of the explored 
applications in this thesis have already found a following, armed with this knowledge, to 
continue work along related directions.  It is hoped that subsequent researchers can take the data 
analysis principles and power system insights in this thesis and develop applications which have 
not yet been fathomed. 
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